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minix/kernel/system/do_copy.c

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Al's system call -> kernel call renaming
2005-10-14 10:58:59 +02:00
/* The kernel call implemented in this file:
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
* m_type: SYS_VIRCOPY, SYS_PHYSCOPY
*
Al's system call -> kernel call renaming
2005-10-14 10:58:59 +02:00
* The parameters for this kernel call are:
rename message.m5_c[12] to m5_s[12]
2010-01-19 22:19:59 +01:00
* m5_s1: CP_SRC_SPACE source virtual segment
Moved "Changes" comments from system/do_....c to system.h. All changes are now in a single header file.
2005-08-10 12:23:55 +02:00
* m5_l1: CP_SRC_ADDR source offset within segment
more kernel header typos
2010-01-01 21:18:05 +01:00
* m5_i1: CP_SRC_ENDPT source process number
rename message.m5_c[12] to m5_s[12]
2010-01-19 22:19:59 +01:00
* m5_s2: CP_DST_SPACE destination virtual segment
Moved "Changes" comments from system/do_....c to system.h. All changes are now in a single header file.
2005-08-10 12:23:55 +02:00
* m5_l2: CP_DST_ADDR destination offset within segment
more kernel header typos
2010-01-01 21:18:05 +01:00
* m5_i2: CP_DST_ENDPT destination process number
Moved "Changes" comments from system/do_....c to system.h. All changes are now in a single header file.
2005-08-10 12:23:55 +02:00
* m5_l3: CP_NR_BYTES number of bytes to copy
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
*/
Convert kernel over to bsdmake
2010-04-02 00:22:33 +02:00
#include "kernel/system.h"
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
#include <minix/type.h>
#if (USE_VIRCOPY || USE_PHYSCOPY)
/*===========================================================================*
* do_copy *
*===========================================================================*/
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
PUBLIC int do_copy(struct proc * caller, message * m_ptr)
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
{
/* Handle sys_vircopy() and sys_physcopy(). Copy data using virtual or
- Fixed comments in various system call handlers. Work in progress on new sys_privctl() call to dynamically start servers and drivers. - Shutdown sequence slightly adjusted: called as watchdog timer to let the busy sys_abort() call from the PM return first. - Changed umap_bios() to have more restrictive check: BIOS memory is now allowed in BIOS_MEM_BEGIN to END (interrupt vectors) and BASE_MEM_TOP to UPPER_MEM_END. Hopefully this keeps QEMU and Bochs happy.
2005-07-21 20:36:40 +02:00
* physical addressing. Although a single handler function is used, there
Al's system call -> kernel call renaming
2005-10-14 10:58:59 +02:00
* are two different kernel calls so that permissions can be checked.
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
*/
struct vir_addr vir_addr[2]; /* virtual source and destination address */
Cleaned up table. Moved policies to table. Small fixes to do_copy, do_privctl and do_fork.
2005-08-02 17:28:09 +02:00
phys_bytes bytes; /* number of bytes to copy */
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
int i;
- enable remembering of device memory ranges set by PCI and told to kernel - makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory) - VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left by GQ - remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
2009-11-03 12:12:23 +01:00
#if 0
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
if (m_ptr->m_source != PM_PROC_NR && m_ptr->m_source != VFS_PROC_NR &&
m_ptr->m_source != RS_PROC_NR && m_ptr->m_source != MEM_PROC_NR &&
m_ptr->m_source != VM_PROC_NR)
Added do_readbios. Added debugging output for unexpected use of unsafe copy functions.
2006-07-10 14:27:26 +02:00
{
static int first=1;
if (first)
{
first= 0;
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf(
Added do_readbios. Added debugging output for unexpected use of unsafe copy functions.
2006-07-10 14:27:26 +02:00
"do_copy: got request from %d (source %d, seg %d, destination %d, seg %d)\n",
m_ptr->m_source,
m_ptr->CP_SRC_ENDPT,
m_ptr->CP_SRC_SPACE,
m_ptr->CP_DST_ENDPT,
m_ptr->CP_DST_SPACE);
}
}
- enable remembering of device memory ranges set by PCI and told to kernel - makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory) - VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left by GQ - remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
2009-11-03 12:12:23 +01:00
#endif
Added do_readbios. Added debugging output for unexpected use of unsafe copy functions.
2006-07-10 14:27:26 +02:00
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
/* Dismember the command message. */
'proc number' is process slot, 'endpoint' are generation-aware process instance numbers, encoded and decoded using macros in <minix/endpoint.h>. proc number -> endpoint migration . proc_nr in the interrupt hook is now an endpoint, proc_nr_e. . m_source for messages and notifies is now an endpoint, instead of proc number. . isokendpt() converts an endpoint to a process number, returns success (but fails if the process number is out of range, the process slot is not a living process, or the given endpoint number does not match the endpoint number in the process slot, indicating an old process). . okendpt() is the same as isokendpt(), but panic()s if the conversion fails. This is mainly used for decoding message.m_source endpoints, and other endpoint numbers in kernel data structures, which should always be correct. . if DEBUG_ENABLE_IPC_WARNINGS is enabled, isokendpt() and okendpt() get passed the __FILE__ and __LINE__ of the calling lines, and print messages about what is wrong with the endpoint number (out of range proc, empty proc, or inconsistent endpoint number), with the caller, making finding where the conversion failed easy without having to include code for every call to print where things went wrong. Sometimes this is harmless (wrong arg to a kernel call), sometimes it's a fatal internal inconsistency (bogus m_source). . some process table fields have been appended an _e to indicate it's become and endpoint. . process endpoint is stored in p_endpoint, without generation number. it turns out the kernel never needs the generation number, except when fork()ing, so it's decoded then. . kernel calls all take endpoints as arguments, not proc numbers. the one exception is sys_fork(), which needs to know in which slot to put the child.
2006-03-03 11:00:02 +01:00
vir_addr[_SRC_].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->CP_SRC_ENDPT;
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
vir_addr[_SRC_].segment = m_ptr->CP_SRC_SPACE;
vir_addr[_SRC_].offset = (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CP_SRC_ADDR;
'proc number' is process slot, 'endpoint' are generation-aware process instance numbers, encoded and decoded using macros in <minix/endpoint.h>. proc number -> endpoint migration . proc_nr in the interrupt hook is now an endpoint, proc_nr_e. . m_source for messages and notifies is now an endpoint, instead of proc number. . isokendpt() converts an endpoint to a process number, returns success (but fails if the process number is out of range, the process slot is not a living process, or the given endpoint number does not match the endpoint number in the process slot, indicating an old process). . okendpt() is the same as isokendpt(), but panic()s if the conversion fails. This is mainly used for decoding message.m_source endpoints, and other endpoint numbers in kernel data structures, which should always be correct. . if DEBUG_ENABLE_IPC_WARNINGS is enabled, isokendpt() and okendpt() get passed the __FILE__ and __LINE__ of the calling lines, and print messages about what is wrong with the endpoint number (out of range proc, empty proc, or inconsistent endpoint number), with the caller, making finding where the conversion failed easy without having to include code for every call to print where things went wrong. Sometimes this is harmless (wrong arg to a kernel call), sometimes it's a fatal internal inconsistency (bogus m_source). . some process table fields have been appended an _e to indicate it's become and endpoint. . process endpoint is stored in p_endpoint, without generation number. it turns out the kernel never needs the generation number, except when fork()ing, so it's decoded then. . kernel calls all take endpoints as arguments, not proc numbers. the one exception is sys_fork(), which needs to know in which slot to put the child.
2006-03-03 11:00:02 +01:00
vir_addr[_DST_].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->CP_DST_ENDPT;
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
vir_addr[_DST_].segment = m_ptr->CP_DST_SPACE;
vir_addr[_DST_].offset = (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CP_DST_ADDR;
bytes = (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CP_NR_BYTES;
/* Now do some checks for both the source and destination virtual address.
* This is done once for _SRC_, then once for _DST_.
*/
for (i=_SRC_; i<=_DST_; i++) {
'proc number' is process slot, 'endpoint' are generation-aware process instance numbers, encoded and decoded using macros in <minix/endpoint.h>. proc number -> endpoint migration . proc_nr in the interrupt hook is now an endpoint, proc_nr_e. . m_source for messages and notifies is now an endpoint, instead of proc number. . isokendpt() converts an endpoint to a process number, returns success (but fails if the process number is out of range, the process slot is not a living process, or the given endpoint number does not match the endpoint number in the process slot, indicating an old process). . okendpt() is the same as isokendpt(), but panic()s if the conversion fails. This is mainly used for decoding message.m_source endpoints, and other endpoint numbers in kernel data structures, which should always be correct. . if DEBUG_ENABLE_IPC_WARNINGS is enabled, isokendpt() and okendpt() get passed the __FILE__ and __LINE__ of the calling lines, and print messages about what is wrong with the endpoint number (out of range proc, empty proc, or inconsistent endpoint number), with the caller, making finding where the conversion failed easy without having to include code for every call to print where things went wrong. Sometimes this is harmless (wrong arg to a kernel call), sometimes it's a fatal internal inconsistency (bogus m_source). . some process table fields have been appended an _e to indicate it's become and endpoint. . process endpoint is stored in p_endpoint, without generation number. it turns out the kernel never needs the generation number, except when fork()ing, so it's decoded then. . kernel calls all take endpoints as arguments, not proc numbers. the one exception is sys_fork(), which needs to know in which slot to put the child.
2006-03-03 11:00:02 +01:00
int p;
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
/* Check if process number was given implictly with SELF and is valid. */
'proc number' is process slot, 'endpoint' are generation-aware process instance numbers, encoded and decoded using macros in <minix/endpoint.h>. proc number -> endpoint migration . proc_nr in the interrupt hook is now an endpoint, proc_nr_e. . m_source for messages and notifies is now an endpoint, instead of proc number. . isokendpt() converts an endpoint to a process number, returns success (but fails if the process number is out of range, the process slot is not a living process, or the given endpoint number does not match the endpoint number in the process slot, indicating an old process). . okendpt() is the same as isokendpt(), but panic()s if the conversion fails. This is mainly used for decoding message.m_source endpoints, and other endpoint numbers in kernel data structures, which should always be correct. . if DEBUG_ENABLE_IPC_WARNINGS is enabled, isokendpt() and okendpt() get passed the __FILE__ and __LINE__ of the calling lines, and print messages about what is wrong with the endpoint number (out of range proc, empty proc, or inconsistent endpoint number), with the caller, making finding where the conversion failed easy without having to include code for every call to print where things went wrong. Sometimes this is harmless (wrong arg to a kernel call), sometimes it's a fatal internal inconsistency (bogus m_source). . some process table fields have been appended an _e to indicate it's become and endpoint. . process endpoint is stored in p_endpoint, without generation number. it turns out the kernel never needs the generation number, except when fork()ing, so it's decoded then. . kernel calls all take endpoints as arguments, not proc numbers. the one exception is sys_fork(), which needs to know in which slot to put the child.
2006-03-03 11:00:02 +01:00
if (vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e == SELF)
vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->m_source;
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
if (vir_addr[i].segment != PHYS_SEG) {
if(! isokendpt(vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e, &p)) {
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("do_copy: %d: seg 0x%x, %d not ok endpoint\n",
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
i, vir_addr[i].segment, vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e);
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
return(EINVAL);
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
}
}
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
/* Check if physical addressing is used without SYS_PHYSCOPY. */
if ((vir_addr[i].segment & PHYS_SEG) &&
m_ptr->m_type != SYS_PHYSCOPY) return(EPERM);
}
/* Check for overflow. This would happen for 64K segments and 16-bit
* vir_bytes. Especially copying by the PM on do_fork() is affected.
*/
Fixed some type inconsistencies in the kernel.
2010-01-26 13:26:06 +01:00
if (bytes != (phys_bytes) (vir_bytes) bytes) return(E2BIG);
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
/* Now try to make the actual virtual copy. */
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
return( virtual_copy_vmcheck(caller, &vir_addr[_SRC_],
&vir_addr[_DST_], bytes) );
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
}
#endif /* (USE_VIRCOPY || USE_PHYSCOPY) */
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