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- enable remembering of device memory ranges set by PCI and

Browse source 
told to kernel
  - makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed
    to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page
    boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything
    smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't
    be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory)
  - VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less
    hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left
    by GQ
  - remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but
    it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded
    explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
This commit is contained in:
Ben Gras 2009-11-03 11:12:23 +00:00
parent 56d485c1d6
commit 7e73260cf5
10 changed files with 138 additions and 67 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

5
drivers/pci/pci.c
View file

@ -358,11 +358,6 @@ endpoint_t proc;
mr.mr_limit= mr.mr_base +
pcidev[devind].pd_bar[i].pb_size-1;
if(debug) {
printf(
"pci_reserve3: for proc %d, should add memory range [0x%x..0x%x]\n",
proc, mr.mr_base, mr.mr_limit);
}
r= sys_privctl(proc, SYS_PRIV_ADD_MEM, &mr);
if (r != OK)
{

5
include/minix/com.h
View file

@ -362,6 +362,7 @@
#define SYS_PRIV_USER 5 /* Make a process an oridinary user
* process.
*/
#define SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM 6 /* Verify memory privilege. */
/* Subfunctions for SYS_SETGRANT */
#define SYS_PARAM_SET_GRANT 1 /* Set address and size of grant table */
@ -512,6 +513,10 @@
#define CTL_ADDRESS m2_l1 /* address at traced process' space */
#define CTL_DATA m2_l2 /* data field for tracing */
/* SYS_PRIVCTL with CTL_REQUEST == SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM */
#define CTL_PHYSSTART m2_l1 /* physical memory start in bytes*/
#define CTL_PHYSLEN m2_l2 /* length in bytes */
/* Field names for SYS_SETGRANT */
#define SG_ADDR m2_p1 /* address */
#define SG_SIZE m2_i2 /* no. of entries */

2
include/minix/syslib.h
View file

@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ _PROTOTYPE( int sys_trace, (int req, endpoint_t proc_ep, long addr, long *data_p
_PROTOTYPE( int sys_runctl, (endpoint_t proc_ep, int action, int flags));
_PROTOTYPE( int sys_privctl, (endpoint_t proc_ep, int req, void *p));
_PROTOTYPE( int sys_privquery_mem, (endpoint_t proc_ep,
phys_bytes physstart, phys_bytes physlen));
_PROTOTYPE( int sys_setgrant, (cp_grant_t *grants, int ngrants));
_PROTOTYPE( int sys_nice, (endpoint_t proc_ep, int priority));

2
kernel/system/do_copy.c
View file

@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ register message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
phys_bytes bytes; /* number of bytes to copy */
int i;
#if 0
if (m_ptr->m_source != PM_PROC_NR && m_ptr->m_source != VFS_PROC_NR &&
m_ptr->m_source != RS_PROC_NR && m_ptr->m_source != MEM_PROC_NR &&
m_ptr->m_source != VM_PROC_NR)
@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ register message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
m_ptr->CP_DST_SPACE);
}
}
#endif
/* Dismember the command message. */
vir_addr[_SRC_].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->CP_SRC_ENDPT;

27
kernel/system/do_privctl.c
View file

@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
*/
register struct proc *caller_ptr;
register struct proc *rp;
register struct priv *sp;
int proc_nr;
int priv_id;
int i, r;
@ -198,16 +197,14 @@ message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
if((r=data_copy(who_e, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
SYSTEM, (vir_bytes) &mem_range, sizeof(mem_range))) != OK)
return r;
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_MEM; /* Check I/O accesses */
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_MEM; /* Check memory mappings */
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range;
if (i >= NR_MEM_RANGE)
return ENOMEM;
#if 0
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base= mem_range.mr_base;
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit= mem_range.mr_limit;
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range++;
#endif
return OK;
@ -230,6 +227,28 @@ message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq++;
return OK;
case SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM:
{
phys_bytes addr, limit;
struct priv *sp;
/* See if a certain process is allowed to map in certain physical
* memory.
*/
addr = (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_PHYSSTART;
limit = addr + (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_PHYSLEN - 1;
if(limit < addr)
return EPERM;
if(!(sp = priv(rp)))
return EPERM;
if (!(sp->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
return EPERM;
for(i = 0; i < sp->s_nr_mem_range; i++) {
if(addr >= sp->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base &&
limit <= sp->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit)
return OK;
}
return EPERM;
}
default:
kprintf("do_privctl: bad request %d\n", m_ptr->CTL_REQUEST);
return EINVAL;

1
lib/other/_vm_set_priv.c
View file

@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ PUBLIC int vm_set_priv(int nr, void *buf)
m.VM_RS_BUF = (long) buf;
return _syscall(VM_PROC_NR, VM_RS_SET_PRIV, &m);
}

12
lib/syslib/sys_privctl.c
View file

@ -10,3 +10,15 @@ int sys_privctl(endpoint_t proc_ep, int request, void *p)
return _taskcall(SYSTASK, SYS_PRIVCTL, &m);
}
int sys_privquery_mem(endpoint_t proc_ep, phys_bytes start, phys_bytes len)
{
message m;
m.CTL_ENDPT = proc_ep;
m.CTL_REQUEST = SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM;
m.CTL_PHYSSTART = start;
m.CTL_PHYSLEN = len;
return _taskcall(SYSTASK, SYS_PRIVCTL, &m);
}

105
servers/vm/main.c
View file

@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ typedef u32_t mask_t;
#define MINEPM 0
#define MAXMASK (sizeof(mask_t)*8)
#define ANYEPM (MINEPM+MAXMASK-1)
#define MAXEPM (ANYEPM-1)
#define NEEDACL (MINEPM+MAXMASK-2)
#define MAXEPM (NEEDACL-1)
#define EPM(e) ((1L) << ((e)-MINEPM))
#define EPMOK(mask, ep) (((mask) & EPM(ANYEPM)) || ((ep) >= MINEPM && (ep) <= MAXEPM && (EPM(ep) & (mask))))
#define EPMANYOK(mask, ep) ((mask) & EPM(ANYEPM))
/* Table of calls and a macro to test for being in range. */
struct {
@ -65,10 +65,8 @@ struct {
((c) - VM_RQ_BASE) : -1)
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE(void vm_init, (void));
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE(int vm_acl_ok, (endpoint_t caller, int call));
#if SANITYCHECKS
extern int kputc_use_private_grants;
#endif
/*===========================================================================*
* main *
@ -131,35 +129,14 @@ PUBLIC int main(void)
continue;
}
who_e = msg.m_source;
c = msg.m_type - VM_RQ_BASE;
c = CALLNUMBER(msg.m_type);
result = ENOSYS; /* Out of range or restricted calls return this. */
if((c=CALLNUMBER(msg.m_type)) < 0 || !vm_calls[c].vmc_func) {
if(c < 0 || !vm_calls[c].vmc_func) {
printf("VM: out of range or missing callnr %d from %d\n",
msg.m_type, msg.m_source);
} else if(!EPMOK(vm_calls[c].vmc_callers, msg.m_source)) {
printf("VM: restricted call %s from %d instead of 0x%lx\n",
vm_calls[c].vmc_name, msg.m_source,
vm_calls[c].vmc_callers);
} else if (EPMANYOK(vm_calls[c].vmc_callers, who_e) &&
c != VM_MMAP-VM_RQ_BASE &&
c != VM_MUNMAP_TEXT-VM_RQ_BASE &&
c != VM_MUNMAP-VM_RQ_BASE) {
/* check VM acl, we care ANYEPM only,
* and omit other hard-coded permission checks.
*/
int n;
if ((r = vm_isokendpt(who_e, &n)) != OK)
vm_panic("VM: from strange source.", who_e);
if (!GET_BIT(vmproc[n].vm_call_priv_mask, c))
printf("VM: restricted call %s from %d\n",
vm_calls[c].vmc_name, who_e);
else {
SANITYCHECK(SCL_FUNCTIONS);
result = vm_calls[c].vmc_func(&msg);
SANITYCHECK(SCL_FUNCTIONS);
}
msg.m_type, who_e);
} else if (vm_acl_ok(who_e, c) != OK) {
printf("VM: unauthorized %s by %d\n",
vm_calls[c].vmc_name, who_e);
} else {
SANITYCHECK(SCL_FUNCTIONS);
result = vm_calls[c].vmc_func(&msg);
@ -326,7 +303,8 @@ PRIVATE void vm_init(void)
vm_calls[i].vmc_func = (func); \
vm_calls[i].vmc_name = #code; \
if(((thecaller) < MINEPM || (thecaller) > MAXEPM) \
&& (thecaller) != ANYEPM) { \
&& (thecaller) != ANYEPM \
&& (thecaller) != NEEDACL ) { \
vm_panic(#thecaller " invalid", (code)); \
} \
vm_calls[i].vmc_callers |= EPM(thecaller); \
@ -350,35 +328,23 @@ PRIVATE void vm_init(void)
CALLMAP(VM_ALLOCMEM, do_allocmem, PM_PROC_NR);
CALLMAP(VM_NOTIFY_SIG, do_notify_sig, PM_PROC_NR);
/* Physical mapping requests.
* tty (for /dev/video) does this.
* memory (for /dev/mem) does this.
*/
CALLMAP(VM_MAP_PHYS, do_map_phys, TTY_PROC_NR);
CALLMAP(VM_UNMAP_PHYS, do_unmap_phys, TTY_PROC_NR);
CALLMAP(VM_MAP_PHYS, do_map_phys, MEM_PROC_NR);
CALLMAP(VM_UNMAP_PHYS, do_unmap_phys, MEM_PROC_NR);
/* Requests from RS */
CALLMAP(VM_RS_SET_PRIV, do_rs_set_priv, RS_PROC_NR);
/* Requests from userland (source unrestricted). */
CALLMAP(VM_MMAP, do_mmap, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_MUNMAP, do_munmap, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_MUNMAP_TEXT, do_munmap, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_REMAP, do_remap, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_GETPHYS, do_get_phys, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_SHM_UNMAP, do_shared_unmap, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_GETREF, do_get_refcount, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_CTL, do_ctl, ANYEPM);
CALLMAP(VM_MAP_PHYS, do_map_phys, ANYEPM); /* Does its own checking. */
CALLMAP(VM_UNMAP_PHYS, do_unmap_phys, ANYEPM);
/* Request only from IPC server */
CALLMAP(VM_QUERY_EXIT, do_query_exit, ANYEPM);
/* Requests (actually replies) from VFS (restricted to VFS only). */
CALLMAP(VM_VFS_REPLY_OPEN, do_vfs_reply, VFS_PROC_NR);
CALLMAP(VM_VFS_REPLY_MMAP, do_vfs_reply, VFS_PROC_NR);
CALLMAP(VM_VFS_REPLY_CLOSE, do_vfs_reply, VFS_PROC_NR);
/* Requests from RS */
CALLMAP(VM_RS_SET_PRIV, do_rs_set_priv, RS_PROC_NR);
/* Requests from userland (anyone can call but need an ACL bit). */
CALLMAP(VM_REMAP, do_remap, NEEDACL);
CALLMAP(VM_GETPHYS, do_get_phys, NEEDACL);
CALLMAP(VM_SHM_UNMAP, do_shared_unmap, NEEDACL);
CALLMAP(VM_GETREF, do_get_refcount, NEEDACL);
CALLMAP(VM_CTL, do_ctl, NEEDACL);
CALLMAP(VM_QUERY_EXIT, do_query_exit, NEEDACL);
/* Sanity checks */
if(find_kernel_top() >= VM_PROCSTART)
@ -392,3 +358,30 @@ PRIVATE void vm_init(void)
_minix_unmapzero();
}
/*===========================================================================*
* vm_acl_ok *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int vm_acl_ok(endpoint_t caller, int call)
{
int n, r;
/* Some calls are always allowed by some, or all, processes. */
if(EPMOK(vm_calls[call].vmc_callers, caller)) {
return OK;
}
if ((r = vm_isokendpt(caller, &n)) != OK)
vm_panic("VM: from strange source.", caller);
/* Other calls need an ACL bit. */
if (!(vm_calls[call].vmc_callers & EPM(NEEDACL))) {
return EPERM;
}
if (!GET_BIT(vmproc[n].vm_call_priv_mask, call)) {
printf("VM: no ACL for %s for %d\n",
vm_calls[call].vmc_name, caller);
return EPERM;
}
return OK;
}

45
servers/vm/mmap.c
View file

@ -88,6 +88,34 @@ PUBLIC int do_mmap(message *m)
return OK;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* map_perm_check *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int map_perm_check(endpoint_t caller, endpoint_t target,
phys_bytes physaddr, phys_bytes len)
{
int r;
/* TTY and memory are allowed to do anything.
* They have to be special cases as they have to be able to do
* anything; TTY even on behalf of anyone for the TIOCMAPMEM
* ioctl. MEM just for itself.
*/
if(caller == TTY_PROC_NR)
return OK;
if(caller != target)
return EPERM;
if(caller == MEM_PROC_NR)
return OK;
/* Anyone else needs explicit permission from the kernel (ultimately
* set by PCI).
*/
r = sys_privquery_mem(caller, physaddr, len);
return r;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_map_phys *
*===========================================================================*/
@ -98,25 +126,38 @@ PUBLIC int do_map_phys(message *m)
endpoint_t target;
struct vir_region *vr;
vir_bytes len;
phys_bytes startaddr;
target = m->VMMP_EP;
len = m->VMMP_LEN;
if(target == SELF)
target = m->m_source;
if((r=vm_isokendpt(target, &n)) != OK)
return EINVAL;
startaddr = (vir_bytes)m->VMMP_PHADDR;
/* First check permission, then round range down/up. Caller can't
* help it if we can't map in lower than page granularity.
*/
if(map_perm_check(m->m_source, target, startaddr, len) != OK) {
printf("VM: unauthorized mapping of 0x%lx by %d\n",
startaddr, m->m_source);
return EPERM;
}
vmp = &vmproc[n];
if(!(vmp->vm_flags & VMF_HASPT))
return ENXIO;
len = m->VMMP_LEN;
if(len % VM_PAGE_SIZE)
len += VM_PAGE_SIZE - (len % VM_PAGE_SIZE);
if(!(vr = map_page_region(vmp, arch_vir2map(vmp, vmp->vm_stacktop),
VM_DATATOP, len, (vir_bytes)m->VMMP_PHADDR,
VM_DATATOP, len, startaddr,
VR_DIRECT | VR_NOPF | VR_WRITABLE, 0))) {
return ENOMEM;
}

1
servers/vm/rs.c
View file

@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ PUBLIC int do_rs_set_priv(message *m)
if (r != OK)
return r;
}
return OK;
}