7e73260cf5
told to kernel
- makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed
to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page
boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything
smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't
be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory)
- VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less
hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left
by GQ
- remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but
it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded
explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
93 lines
3.2 KiB
C
93 lines
3.2 KiB
C
/* The kernel call implemented in this file:
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* m_type: SYS_VIRCOPY, SYS_PHYSCOPY
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*
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* The parameters for this kernel call are:
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* m5_c1: CP_SRC_SPACE source virtual segment
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* m5_l1: CP_SRC_ADDR source offset within segment
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* m5_i1: CP_SRC_PROC_NR source process number
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* m5_c2: CP_DST_SPACE destination virtual segment
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* m5_l2: CP_DST_ADDR destination offset within segment
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* m5_i2: CP_DST_PROC_NR destination process number
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* m5_l3: CP_NR_BYTES number of bytes to copy
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*/
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#include "../system.h"
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#include "../vm.h"
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#include <minix/type.h>
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#if (USE_VIRCOPY || USE_PHYSCOPY)
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/*===========================================================================*
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* do_copy *
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*===========================================================================*/
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PUBLIC int do_copy(m_ptr)
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register message *m_ptr; /* pointer to request message */
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{
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/* Handle sys_vircopy() and sys_physcopy(). Copy data using virtual or
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* physical addressing. Although a single handler function is used, there
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* are two different kernel calls so that permissions can be checked.
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*/
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struct vir_addr vir_addr[2]; /* virtual source and destination address */
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phys_bytes bytes; /* number of bytes to copy */
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int i;
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#if 0
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if (m_ptr->m_source != PM_PROC_NR && m_ptr->m_source != VFS_PROC_NR &&
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m_ptr->m_source != RS_PROC_NR && m_ptr->m_source != MEM_PROC_NR &&
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m_ptr->m_source != VM_PROC_NR)
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{
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static int first=1;
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if (first)
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{
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first= 0;
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kprintf(
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"do_copy: got request from %d (source %d, seg %d, destination %d, seg %d)\n",
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m_ptr->m_source,
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m_ptr->CP_SRC_ENDPT,
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m_ptr->CP_SRC_SPACE,
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m_ptr->CP_DST_ENDPT,
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m_ptr->CP_DST_SPACE);
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}
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}
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#endif
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/* Dismember the command message. */
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vir_addr[_SRC_].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->CP_SRC_ENDPT;
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vir_addr[_SRC_].segment = m_ptr->CP_SRC_SPACE;
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vir_addr[_SRC_].offset = (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CP_SRC_ADDR;
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vir_addr[_DST_].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->CP_DST_ENDPT;
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vir_addr[_DST_].segment = m_ptr->CP_DST_SPACE;
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vir_addr[_DST_].offset = (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CP_DST_ADDR;
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bytes = (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CP_NR_BYTES;
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/* Now do some checks for both the source and destination virtual address.
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* This is done once for _SRC_, then once for _DST_.
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*/
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for (i=_SRC_; i<=_DST_; i++) {
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int p;
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/* Check if process number was given implictly with SELF and is valid. */
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if (vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e == SELF)
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vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e = m_ptr->m_source;
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if (vir_addr[i].segment != PHYS_SEG) {
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if(! isokendpt(vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e, &p)) {
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kprintf("do_copy: %d: seg 0x%x, %d not ok endpoint\n",
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i, vir_addr[i].segment, vir_addr[i].proc_nr_e);
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return(EINVAL);
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}
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}
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/* Check if physical addressing is used without SYS_PHYSCOPY. */
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if ((vir_addr[i].segment & PHYS_SEG) &&
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m_ptr->m_type != SYS_PHYSCOPY) return(EPERM);
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}
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/* Check for overflow. This would happen for 64K segments and 16-bit
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* vir_bytes. Especially copying by the PM on do_fork() is affected.
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*/
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if (bytes != (vir_bytes) bytes) return(E2BIG);
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/* Now try to make the actual virtual copy. */
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return( virtual_copy_vmcheck(&vir_addr[_SRC_], &vir_addr[_DST_], bytes) );
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}
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#endif /* (USE_VIRCOPY || USE_PHYSCOPY) */
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