Importing usr.bin/bdes
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Cort
Lionel Sambuc
parent
c50a22578e
commit
92f7a4ab20
6 changed files with 1456 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -219,6 +219,7 @@
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./usr/bin/badblocks minix-sys obsolete
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./usr/bin/banner minix-sys
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./usr/bin/basename minix-sys
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./usr/bin/bdes minix-sys
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./usr/bin/bsdtar minix-sys
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./usr/bin/bsfilt minix-sys
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./usr/bin/btrace minix-sys
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@ -1207,6 +1208,7 @@
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./usr/man/man1/awk.1 minix-sys
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./usr/man/man1/banner.1 minix-sys
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./usr/man/man1/basename.1 minix-sys
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./usr/man/man1/bdes.1 minix-sys
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./usr/man/man1/break.1 minix-sys
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./usr/man/man1/bsdtar.1 minix-sys
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./usr/man/man1/bsfilt.1 minix-sys
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@ -124,6 +124,7 @@
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2012/10/17 12:00:00,tools/tsort
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2009/05/08 12:48:43,usr.bin/apropos
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2012/10/17 12:00:00,usr.bin/banner
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2013/05/31 12:00:00,usr.bin/bdes
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2012/10/17 12:00:00,usr.bin/bzip2
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2012/10/17 12:00:00,usr.bin/bzip2recover
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2013/03/15 12:00:00,usr.bin/cal
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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.include <bsd.own.mk>
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SUBDIR= \
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banner \
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banner bdes \
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bzip2 bzip2recover \
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cal chpass cksum \
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col ctags \
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12
usr.bin/bdes/Makefile
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12
usr.bin/bdes/Makefile
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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# $NetBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2007/05/28 12:06:24 tls Exp $
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# @(#)Makefile 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93
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USE_FORT?= yes # cryptographic software
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WARNS= 3
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PROG= bdes
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LDADD+= -lcrypt
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DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPT}
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.include <bsd.prog.mk>
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366
usr.bin/bdes/bdes.1
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366
usr.bin/bdes/bdes.1
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@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
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.\" $NetBSD: bdes.1,v 1.14 2010/01/15 19:40:17 joerg Exp $
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.\"
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.\" Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
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.\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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.\"
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.\" This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
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.\" Matt Bishop of Dartmouth College.
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.\"
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.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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.\" are met:
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.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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.\" 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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.\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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.\" without specific prior written permission.
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.\"
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.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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.\" @(#)bdes.1 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/29/93
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.\"
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.Dd December 1, 2001
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.Dt BDES 1
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.Os
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.Sh NAME
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.Nm bdes
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.Nd encrypt/decrypt using the Data Encryption Standard
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.Sh SYNOPSIS
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.Nm
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.Op Fl abdp
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.Op Fl F Ar N
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.Op Fl f Ar N
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.Op Fl k Ar key
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.Op Fl m Ar N
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.Op Fl o Ar N
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.Op Fl v Ar vector
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.Sh DESCRIPTION
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.Nm
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implements all DES modes of operation described in FIPS PUB 81,
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including alternative cipher feedback mode and both authentication
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modes.
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.Nm
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reads from the standard input and writes to the standard output.
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By default, the input is encrypted using cipher block chaining mode.
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Using the same key for encryption and decryption preserves plain text.
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.Pp
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All modes but the electronic code book mode require an initialization
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vector; if none is supplied, the zero vector is used.
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If no
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.Ar key
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is specified on the command line, the user is prompted for one (see
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.Xr getpass 3
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for more details).
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.Pp
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The options are as follows:
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.Bl -tag -width "-v vector" -compact
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.It Fl a
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The key and initialization vector strings are to be taken as ASCII,
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suppressing the special interpretation given to leading
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.Dq 0X ,
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.Dq 0x ,
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.Dq 0B ,
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and
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.Dq 0b
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characters.
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This flag applies to
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.Em both
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the key and initialization vector.
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.It Fl b
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Use electronic code book mode.
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This is not recommended for messages
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longer than 8 bytes, as patterns in the input will show through to the
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output.
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.It Fl d
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Decrypt the input.
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.It Fl F Ar N
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Use
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.Ar N Ns -bit
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alternative cipher feedback mode.
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Currently
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.Ar N
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must be a multiple of 7 between 7 and 56 inclusive (this does not conform
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to the alternative CFB mode specification).
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.It Fl f Ar N
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Use
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.Ar N Ns -bit
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cipher feedback mode.
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Currently
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.Ar N
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must be a multiple of 8 between 8 and 64 inclusive (this does not conform
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to the standard CFB mode specification).
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.It Fl k Ar key
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Use
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.Ar key
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as the cryptographic key.
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.It Fl m Ar N
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Compute a message authentication code (MAC) of
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.Ar N
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bits on the input.
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The value of
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.Ar N
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must be between 1 and 64 inclusive; if
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.Ar N
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is not a multiple of 8, enough 0 bits will be added to pad the MAC length
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to the nearest multiple of 8.
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Only the MAC is output.
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MACs are only available in cipher block chaining mode or in cipher feedback
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mode.
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.It Fl o Ar N
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Use
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.Ar N Ns -bit
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output feedback mode.
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Currently
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.Ar N
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must be a multiple of 8 between 8 and 64 inclusive (this does not conform
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to the OFB mode specification).
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.It Fl p
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Disable the resetting of the parity bit.
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This flag forces the parity bit of the key to be used as typed, rather than
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making each character be of odd parity.
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It is used only if the key is given in ASCII.
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.It Fl v Ar vector
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Set the initialization vector to
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.Ar vector ;
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the vector is interpreted in the same way as the key.
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The vector is ignored in electronic codebook mode.
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For best security, a different
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initialization vector should be used for each file.
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.El
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.Pp
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The key and initialization vector are taken as sequences of ASCII
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characters which are then mapped into their bit representations.
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If either begins with
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.Dq 0X
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or
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.Dq 0x ,
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that one is taken as a sequence of hexadecimal digits indicating the
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bit pattern;
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if either begins with
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.Dq 0B
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or
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.Dq 0b ,
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that one is taken as a sequence of binary digits indicating the bit pattern.
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In either case,
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only the leading 64 bits of the key or initialization vector
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are used,
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and if fewer than 64 bits are provided, enough 0 bits are appended
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to pad the key to 64 bits.
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.Pp
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According to the DES standard, the low-order bit of each character in the
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key string is deleted.
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Since most ASCII representations set the high-order bit to 0, simply
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deleting the low-order bit effectively reduces the size of the key space
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from
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.if t 2\u\s-356\s0\d
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.if n 2**56
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to
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.if t 2\u\s-348\s0\d
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.if n 2**48
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keys.
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To prevent this, the high-order bit must be a function depending in part
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upon the low-order bit; so, the high-order bit is set to whatever value
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gives odd parity.
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This preserves the key space size.
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Note this resetting of the parity bit is
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.Em not
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done if the key is given in binary or hex, and can be disabled for ASCII
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keys as well.
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.Pp
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The DES is considered a very strong cryptosystem hobbled by a short
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key, and other than table lookup attacks, key search attacks, and
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Hellman's time-memory tradeoff (all of which are very expensive and
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time-consuming), no practical cryptanalytic methods for breaking the
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DES are known in the open literature.
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As of this writing, the best
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known cryptanalytic method is linear cryptanalysis, which requires an
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average of
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.if t 2\u\s-343\s0\d
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.if n 2**43
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known plaintext-ciphertext pairs to succeed.
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Unfortunately for the DES, key search attacks (requiring only
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a single known plaintext-ciphertext pair and trying
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.if t 2\u\s-355\s0\d
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.if n 2**55
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keys on average) are becoming practical.
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.Pp
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As with all cryptosystems, the choice of keys and
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key security remain the most vulnerable aspect of
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.Nm .
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.Sh IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
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For implementors wishing to write software compatible with this program,
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the following notes are provided.
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This software is believed to be compatible with the implementation of the
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data encryption standard distributed by Sun Microsystems, Inc.
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.Pp
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In the ECB and CBC modes, plaintext is encrypted in units of 64 bits (8 bytes,
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also called a block).
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To ensure that the plaintext file is encrypted correctly,
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.Nm
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will (internally) append from 1 to 8 bytes, the last byte containing an
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integer stating how many bytes of that final block are from the plaintext
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file, and encrypt the resulting block.
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Hence, when decrypting, the last block may contain from 0 to 7 characters
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present in the plaintext file, and the last byte tells how many.
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Note that if during decryption the last byte of the file does not contain an
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integer between 0 and 7, either the file has been corrupted or an incorrect
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key has been given.
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A similar mechanism is used for the OFB and CFB modes, except that those
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simply require the length of the input to be a multiple of the mode size,
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and the final byte contains an integer between 0 and one less than the number
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of bytes being used as the mode.
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(This was another reason that the mode size must be a multiple of 8 for those
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modes.)
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.Pp
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Unlike Sun's implementation, unused bytes of that last block are not filled
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with random data, but instead contain what was in those byte positions in
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the preceding block.
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This is quicker and more portable, and does not weaken the encryption
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significantly.
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.Pp
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If the key is entered in ASCII, the parity bits of the key characters are set
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so that each key character is of odd parity.
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Unlike Sun's implementation, it is possible to enter binary or hexadecimal
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keys on the command line, and if this is done, the parity bits are
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.Em not
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reset.
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This allows testing using arbitrary bit patterns as keys.
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.Pp
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The Sun implementation always uses an initialization vector of 0
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(that is, all zeroes).
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By default,
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.Nm
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does too, but this may be changed from the command line.
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.Sh SEE ALSO
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.Xr crypt 3 ,
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.Xr getpass 3
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.Rs
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.%T Data Encryption Standard
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.%R Federal Information Processing Standard #46
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.%Q National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce
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.\" should be .%C as soon as it's supported.
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.%O Washington DC
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.%D January 1977
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%T DES Modes of Operation
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.%R Federal Information Processing Standard #81
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.%Q National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce
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.\" should be .%C as soon as it's supported.
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.%O Washington DC
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.%D December 1980
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%A Dorothy Denning
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.%T Cryptography and Data Security
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.%I Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
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.\" should be .%C as soon as it's supported.
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.%O Reading, MA
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.%D 1982
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%A Matt Bishop
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.%T Implementation Notes on bdes(1)
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.%R Technical Report PCS-TR-91-158
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.%Q Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Dartmouth College
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.\" should be .%C as soon as it's supported.
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.%O Hanover, NH 03755
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.%D April 1991
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%A M.J. Wiener
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.%T Efficient DES Key Search
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.%R Technical Report 244
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.%Q School of Computer Science, Carleton University
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.%D May 1994
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%A Bruce Schneier
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.%T Applied Cryptography (2nd edition)
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.%I John Wiley \*[Am] Sons, Inc.
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.%O New York, NY
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.\" should be .%C as soon as it's supported.
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.%D 1996
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%A M. Matsui
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.%T Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher
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.%R Advances in Cryptology -- Eurocrypt '93 Proceedings
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.%I Springer-Verlag
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.%D 1994
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.Re
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.Rs
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.%A Blaze
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.%A Diffie
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.%A Rivest
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.%A Schneier
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.%A Shimomura
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.%A Thompson
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.%A Wiener
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.%T Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers To Provide Adequate Commercial Security
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.%I Business Software Alliance
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.%U http://www.bsa.org/policy/encryption/cryptographers.html
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.%D January 1996
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.Re
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.Sh BUGS
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When this document was originally written, there was a controversy
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raging over whether the DES would still be secure in a few years.
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There is now near-universal consensus in the cryptographic community
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that the key length of the DES is far too short.
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The advent of
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special-purpose hardware could reduce the cost of any of the methods
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of attack named above so that they are no longer computationally
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infeasible; in addition, the explosive growth in the number and speed
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of modern microprocessors as well as advances in programmable logic
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devices has brought an attack using only commodity hardware into the
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realm of possibility.
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Schneier and others currently recommend using
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cryptosystems with keys of at least 90 bits when long-term security is
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needed.
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.Pp
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As the key or key schedule is stored in memory, the encryption can be
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compromised if memory is readable.
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Additionally, programs which display programs' arguments may compromise the
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key and initialization vector, if they are specified on the command line.
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To avoid this
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.Nm
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overwrites its arguments, however, the obvious race cannot currently be
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avoided.
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.Pp
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Certain specific keys should be avoided because they introduce potential
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weaknesses; these keys, called the
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.Em weak
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and
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.Em semiweak
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keys, are (in hex notation, where p is either 0 or 1, and P is either
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e or f):
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.Bd -literal -offset indent
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0x0p0p0p0p0p0p0p0p 0x0p1P0p1P0p0P0p0P
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0x0pep0pep0pfp0pfp 0x0pfP0pfP0pfP0pfP
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0x1P0p1P0p0P0p0P0p 0x1P1P1P1P0P0P0P0P
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0x1Pep1Pep0Pfp0Pfp 0x1PfP1PfP0PfP0PfP
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0xep0pep0pfp0pfp0p 0xep1Pep1pfp0Pfp0P
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0xepepepepepepepep 0xepfPepfPfpfPfpfP
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0xfP0pfP0pfP0pfP0p 0xfP1PfP1PfP0PfP0P
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0xfPepfPepfPepfPep 0xfPfPfPfPfPfPfPfP
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.Ed
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.Pp
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This is inherent in the DES algorithm (see Moore and Simmons,
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.Do
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Cycle structure of the DES with weak and semi-weak keys
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.Dc ,
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.Em "Advances in Cryptology \- Crypto '86 Proceedings" ,
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Springer-Verlag New York, \(co1987, pp. 9-32.)
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1074
usr.bin/bdes/bdes.c
Normal file
1074
usr.bin/bdes/bdes.c
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
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