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minix/kernel/main.c

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Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
/* This file contains the main program of MINIX as well as its shutdown code.
* The routine main() initializes the system and starts the ball rolling by
* setting up the process table, interrupt vectors, and scheduling each task
* to run to initialize itself.
Cleaned up process table structure: removed p_type, p_pendcount. Removed stop sequence when MINIX is shut down. Disabled send mask checks --- to be replaced by proper mechanism. Fixed bug relating to 'shutdown -x'. Simplified clock accounting of realtime. Updated Makefiles for mkdept script.
2005-06-24 18:24:40 +02:00
* The routine shutdown() does the opposite and brings down MINIX.
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
*
* The entries into this file are:
* main: MINIX main program
* prepare_shutdown: prepare to take MINIX down
*/
#include "kernel.h"
Various fixes and improvements. - fixed bug that caused IDLE to panic (irq hook inconsistency); - kprintf() now accepts multiple arguments; moved to utility.c; - prepare_shutdown() signals system processes with SIGKSTOP; - phys_fill() renamed to phys_memset(), argument order changed; - kmemset() removed in favor of phys_kmemset(); - kstrncpy() removed in favor of phys_copy(); - katoi, kstrncmp replaced by normal library procedure again; - rm_irq_handler() interface changed (simply pass hook pointer);
2005-07-20 17:25:38 +02:00
#include <string.h>
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
#include <unistd.h>
re-establish kernel assert()s. use the regular <assert.h> assert() instead of vmassert() in kernel. throw out some #if 0 code. fix a few assert() conditions. enable by default.
2010-03-10 14:00:05 +01:00
#include <assert.h>
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
#include <a.out.h>
#include <minix/com.h>
'proc number' is process slot, 'endpoint' are generation-aware process instance numbers, encoded and decoded using macros in <minix/endpoint.h>. proc number -> endpoint migration . proc_nr in the interrupt hook is now an endpoint, proc_nr_e. . m_source for messages and notifies is now an endpoint, instead of proc number. . isokendpt() converts an endpoint to a process number, returns success (but fails if the process number is out of range, the process slot is not a living process, or the given endpoint number does not match the endpoint number in the process slot, indicating an old process). . okendpt() is the same as isokendpt(), but panic()s if the conversion fails. This is mainly used for decoding message.m_source endpoints, and other endpoint numbers in kernel data structures, which should always be correct. . if DEBUG_ENABLE_IPC_WARNINGS is enabled, isokendpt() and okendpt() get passed the __FILE__ and __LINE__ of the calling lines, and print messages about what is wrong with the endpoint number (out of range proc, empty proc, or inconsistent endpoint number), with the caller, making finding where the conversion failed easy without having to include code for every call to print where things went wrong. Sometimes this is harmless (wrong arg to a kernel call), sometimes it's a fatal internal inconsistency (bogus m_source). . some process table fields have been appended an _e to indicate it's become and endpoint. . process endpoint is stored in p_endpoint, without generation number. it turns out the kernel never needs the generation number, except when fork()ing, so it's decoded then. . kernel calls all take endpoints as arguments, not proc numbers. the one exception is sys_fork(), which needs to know in which slot to put the child.
2006-03-03 11:00:02 +01:00
#include <minix/endpoint.h>
scheduling - time quantum in miliseconds - Currently the cpu time quantum is timer-ticks based. Thus the remaining quantum is decreased only if the processes is interrupted by a timer tick. As processes block a lot this typically does not happen for normal user processes. Also the quantum depends on the frequency of the timer. - This change makes the quantum miliseconds based. Internally the miliseconds are translated into cpu cycles. Everytime userspace execution is interrupted by kernel the cycles just consumed by the current process are deducted from the remaining quantum. - It makes the quantum system timer frequency independent. - The boot processes quantum is loosely derived from the tick-based quantas and 60Hz timer and subject to future change - the 64bit arithmetics is a little ugly, will be changes once we have compiler support for 64bit integers (soon)
2010-05-25 10:06:14 +02:00
#include <minix/u64.h>
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
#include "proc.h"
Primary goal for these changes is: - no longer have kernel have its own page table that is loaded on every kernel entry (trap, interrupt, exception). the primary purpose is to reduce the number of required reloads. Result: - kernel can only access memory of process that was running when kernel was entered - kernel must be mapped into every process page table, so traps to kernel keep working Problem: - kernel must often access memory of arbitrary processes (e.g. send arbitrary processes messages); this can't happen directly any more; usually because that process' page table isn't loaded at all, sometimes because that memory isn't mapped in at all, sometimes because it isn't mapped in read-write. So: - kernel must be able to map in memory of any process, in its own address space. Implementation: - VM and kernel share a range of memory in which addresses of all page tables of all processes are available. This has two purposes: . Kernel has to know what data to copy in order to map in a range . Kernel has to know where to write the data in order to map it in That last point is because kernel has to write in the currently loaded page table. - Processes and kernel are separated through segments; kernel segments haven't changed. - The kernel keeps the process whose page table is currently loaded in 'ptproc.' - If it wants to map in a range of memory, it writes the value of the page directory entry for that range into the page directory entry in the currently loaded map. There is a slot reserved for such purposes. The kernel can then access this memory directly. - In order to do this, its segment has been increased (and the segments of processes start where it ends). - In the pagefault handler, detect if the kernel is doing 'trappable' memory access (i.e. a pagefault isn't a fatal error) and if so, - set the saved instruction pointer to phys_copy_fault, breaking out of phys_copy - set the saved eax register to the address of the page fault, both for sanity checking and for checking in which of the two ranges that phys_copy was called with the fault occured - Some boot-time processes do not have their own page table, and are mapped in with the kernel, and separated with segments. The kernel detects this using HASPT. If such a process has to be scheduled, any page table will work and no page table switch is done. Major changes in kernel are - When accessing user processes memory, kernel no longer explicitly checks before it does so if that memory is OK. It simply makes the mapping (if necessary), tries to do the operation, and traps the pagefault if that memory isn't present; if that happens, the copy function returns EFAULT. So all of the CHECKRANGE_OR_SUSPEND macros are gone. - Kernel no longer has to copy/read and parse page tables. - A message copying optimisation: when messages are copied, and the recipient isn't mapped in, they are copied into a buffer in the kernel. This is done in QueueMess. The next time the recipient is scheduled, this message is copied into its memory. This happens in schedcheck(). This eliminates the mapping/copying step for messages, and makes it easier to deliver messages. This eliminates soft_notify. - Kernel no longer creates a page table at all, so the vm_setbuf and pagetable writing in memory.c is gone. Minor changes in kernel are - ipc_stats thrown out, wasn't used - misc flags all renamed to MF_* - NOREC_* macros to enter and leave functions that should not be called recursively; just sanity checks really - code to fully decode segment selectors and descriptors to print on exceptions - lots of vmassert()s added, only executed if DEBUG_VMASSERT is 1
2009-09-21 16:31:52 +02:00
#include "debug.h"
Clock task split - preemption handled in the clock timer interrupt handler, not in the clock task - more achitecture independent clock timer handling code - smp ready as each CPU can have its own timer
2009-11-06 10:04:15 +01:00
#include "clock.h"
APIC mode uses IO APICs - kernel turns on IO APICs if no_apic is _not_ set or is equal 0 - pci driver must use the acpi driver to setup IRQ routing otherwise the system cannot work correctly except systems like KVM that use only legacy (E)ISA IRQs 0-15
2010-09-07 09:18:11 +02:00
#include "hw_intr.h"
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
#include "smp.h"
#endif
SMP - Big kernel lock (BKL) - to isolate execution inside kernel we use a big kernel lock implemented as a spinlock - the lock is acquired asap after entering kernel mode and released as late as possible. Only one CPU as a time can execute the core kernel code - measurement son real hw show that the overhead of this lock is close to 0% of kernel time for the currnet system - the overhead of this lock may be as high as 45% of kernel time in virtual machines depending on the ratio between physical CPUs available and emulated CPUs. The performance degradation is significant
2010-09-15 16:10:03 +02:00
#ifdef CONFIG_WATCHDOG
#include "watchdog.h"
#endif
#include "spinlock.h"
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
*** empty log message ***
2005-05-02 16:30:04 +02:00
/* Prototype declarations for PRIVATE functions. */
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void announce, (void));
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
PUBLIC void bsp_finish_booting(void)
{
SMP - CPU local run queues - each CPU has its own runqueues - processes on BSP are put on the runqueues later after a switch to the final stack when cpuid works to avoid special cases - enqueue() and dequeue() use the run queues of the cpu the process is assigned to - pick_proc() uses the local run queues - printing of per-CPU run queues ('2') on serial console
2010-09-15 16:10:18 +02:00
int i;
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
#if SPROFILE
sprofiling = 0; /* we're not profiling until instructed to */
#endif /* SPROFILE */
cprof_procs_no = 0; /* init nr of hash table slots used */
Kernel keeps information about each cpu - kernel maintains a cpu_info array which contains various information about each cpu as filled when each cpu boots - the information contains idetification, features etc.
2010-10-26 23:07:27 +02:00
cpu_identify();
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
vm_running = 0;
krandom.random_sources = RANDOM_SOURCES;
krandom.random_elements = RANDOM_ELEMENTS;
/* MINIX is now ready. All boot image processes are on the ready queue.
* Return to the assembly code to start running the current process.
*/
SMP - proc_ptr and bill_ptr initialization - they should point somewhere
2010-09-15 16:10:24 +02:00
/* it should point somewhere */
get_cpulocal_var(bill_ptr) = get_cpulocal_var_ptr(idle_proc);
get_cpulocal_var(proc_ptr) = get_cpulocal_var_ptr(idle_proc);
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
announce(); /* print MINIX startup banner */
SMP - CPU local run queues - each CPU has its own runqueues - processes on BSP are put on the runqueues later after a switch to the final stack when cpuid works to avoid special cases - enqueue() and dequeue() use the run queues of the cpu the process is assigned to - pick_proc() uses the local run queues - printing of per-CPU run queues ('2') on serial console
2010-09-15 16:10:18 +02:00
/*
* we have access to the cpu local run queue, only now schedule the processes.
* We ignore the slots for the former kernel tasks
*/
for (i=0; i < NR_BOOT_PROCS - NR_TASKS; i++) {
RTS_UNSET(proc_addr(i), RTS_PROC_STOP);
}
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
/*
* enable timer interrupts and clock task on the boot CPU
*/
if (boot_cpu_init_timer(system_hz)) {
panic("FATAL : failed to initialize timer interrupts, "
"cannot continue without any clock source!");
}
SMP - lazy FPU - when a process is migrated to a different CPU it may have an active FPU context in the processor registers. We must save it and migrate it together with the process.
2010-09-15 16:11:25 +02:00
fpu_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_WATCHDOG
if (watchdog_enabled) {
if (arch_watchdog_init()) {
printf("WARNING watchdog initialization failed! Disabled\n");
watchdog_enabled = 0;
}
else
BOOT_VERBOSE(printf("Watchdog enabled\n"););
}
#endif
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
/* Warnings for sanity checks that take time. These warnings are printed
* so it's a clear warning no full release should be done with them
* enabled.
*/
#if DEBUG_SCHED_CHECK
FIXME("DEBUG_SCHED_CHECK enabled");
#endif
#if DEBUG_VMASSERT
FIXME("DEBUG_VMASSERT enabled");
#endif
#if DEBUG_PROC_CHECK
FIXME("PROC check enabled");
#endif
DEBUGEXTRA(("cycles_accounting_init()... "));
cycles_accounting_init();
DEBUGEXTRA(("done\n"));
SMP - CPU local run queues - each CPU has its own runqueues - processes on BSP are put on the runqueues later after a switch to the final stack when cpuid works to avoid special cases - enqueue() and dequeue() use the run queues of the cpu the process is assigned to - pick_proc() uses the local run queues - printing of per-CPU run queues ('2') on serial console
2010-09-15 16:10:18 +02:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
cpu_set_flag(bsp_cpu_id, CPU_IS_READY);
SMP - Scheduler can assign process to a cpu - machine information contains the number of cpus and the bsp id - a dummy SMP scheduler which keeps all system processes on BSP and all other process on APs. The scheduler remembers how many processes are assigned to each CPU and always picks the one with the least processes for a new process.
2010-09-15 16:10:33 +02:00
machine.processors_count = ncpus;
machine.bsp_id = bsp_cpu_id;
#else
machine.processors_count = 1;
machine.bsp_id = 0;
SMP - CPU local run queues - each CPU has its own runqueues - processes on BSP are put on the runqueues later after a switch to the final stack when cpuid works to avoid special cases - enqueue() and dequeue() use the run queues of the cpu the process is assigned to - pick_proc() uses the local run queues - printing of per-CPU run queues ('2') on serial console
2010-09-15 16:10:18 +02:00
#endif
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
switch_to_user();
NOT_REACHABLE;
}
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
Andy's formatting fixes.
2005-09-11 18:44:06 +02:00
* main *
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
*===========================================================================*/
kernel: fix main prototype
2010-07-06 14:14:59 +02:00
PUBLIC int main(void)
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
{
/* Start the ball rolling. */
- Kernel call handlers cleaned up. More strict checking of input parameters. - Moved generic_handler() from system.c to system/do_irqctl.c. - Set privileges of system processes somewhat stricter.
2005-07-29 17:26:23 +02:00
struct boot_image *ip; /* boot image pointer */
Various fixes and improvements. - fixed bug that caused IDLE to panic (irq hook inconsistency); - kprintf() now accepts multiple arguments; moved to utility.c; - prepare_shutdown() signals system processes with SIGKSTOP; - phys_fill() renamed to phys_memset(), argument order changed; - kmemset() removed in favor of phys_kmemset(); - kstrncpy() removed in favor of phys_copy(); - katoi, kstrncmp replaced by normal library procedure again; - rm_irq_handler() interface changed (simply pass hook pointer);
2005-07-20 17:25:38 +02:00
register struct proc *rp; /* process pointer */
Removed unused symbols. Minor cleanups.
2010-01-22 23:01:08 +01:00
register int i, j;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
int hdrindex; /* index to array of a.out headers */
Removed unused code in proc.c. New message passing code with pointer pointers is now in use. Rewrote ready() and unready() fuctions.
2005-06-20 13:26:48 +02:00
phys_clicks text_base;
Better initialization of the memory map of processes that are part of the image. Removed NO_MAP flag.
2006-05-11 16:49:46 +02:00
vir_clicks text_clicks, data_clicks, st_clicks;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
reg_t ktsb; /* kernel task stack base */
struct exec e_hdr; /* for a copy of an a.out header */
Zero out to three stack dwords to fix boot errors
2010-08-24 14:51:11 +02:00
size_t argsz; /* size of arguments passed to crtso on stack */
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
SMP - Big kernel lock (BKL) - to isolate execution inside kernel we use a big kernel lock implemented as a spinlock - the lock is acquired asap after entering kernel mode and released as late as possible. Only one CPU as a time can execute the core kernel code - measurement son real hw show that the overhead of this lock is close to 0% of kernel time for the currnet system - the overhead of this lock may be as high as 45% of kernel time in virtual machines depending on the ratio between physical CPUs available and emulated CPUs. The performance degradation is significant
2010-09-15 16:10:03 +02:00
BKL_LOCK();
- panic if there's no runnable process - more basic sanity check before recursive enter check (data segment) - try to jump to boot monitor instantly on recursive panic
2009-10-03 13:30:35 +02:00
/* Global value to test segment sanity. */
magictest = MAGICTEST;
system_init() renamed to arch_init() - a better name for architecture specific init function - some of x86 init code must execute in protected mode - prot_init() removed from this function and still called in cstart() Imho this should be called from the architecture specific assembly not cstart. cstart perform Minix monitor specific tasks and will be touched once another bootloader is in use, e.g. booting via tftp, therefore we keep it as is for now. - this is a backport from the SMP code which requires this. Merging will be simpler
2009-08-30 16:55:30 +02:00
Intermediate boot verbosity level EXTRA (2), MAX moved to 3
2010-05-10 20:07:59 +02:00
DEBUGEXTRA(("main()\n"));
use the verbose=2 boot monitor setting to get extensive output for debugging
2010-02-13 23:11:16 +01:00
proc_init() - code that initializes proc.c structures removed from main() and placed in proc_init() function
2010-09-15 16:09:43 +02:00
proc_init();
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
Al's comment fixes
2005-10-02 21:02:05 +02:00
/* Set up proc table entries for processes in boot image. The stacks of the
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
* kernel tasks are initialized to an array in data space. The stacks
* of the servers have been added to the data segment by the monitor, so
* the stack pointer is set to the end of the data segment. All the
* processes are in low memory on the 8086. On the 386 only the kernel
* is in low memory, the rest is loaded in extended memory.
*/
/* Task stacks. */
ktsb = (reg_t) t_stack;
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
for (i=0; i < NR_BOOT_PROCS; ++i) {
Fixed some type inconsistencies in the kernel.
2010-01-26 13:26:06 +01:00
int schedulable_proc;
proc_nr_t proc_nr;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
int ipc_to_m, kcalls;
more sanity checking. sanity checking disabled by default. give every process a full pagetable by default now. first step to disabling kernel page table code (processes might not have page tables -> no address translation).
2009-05-12 13:35:01 +02:00
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
ip = &image[i]; /* process' attributes */
Intermediate boot verbosity level EXTRA (2), MAX moved to 3
2010-05-10 20:07:59 +02:00
DEBUGEXTRA(("initializing %s... ", ip->proc_name));
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
rp = proc_addr(ip->proc_nr); /* get process pointer */
'proc number' is process slot, 'endpoint' are generation-aware process instance numbers, encoded and decoded using macros in <minix/endpoint.h>. proc number -> endpoint migration . proc_nr in the interrupt hook is now an endpoint, proc_nr_e. . m_source for messages and notifies is now an endpoint, instead of proc number. . isokendpt() converts an endpoint to a process number, returns success (but fails if the process number is out of range, the process slot is not a living process, or the given endpoint number does not match the endpoint number in the process slot, indicating an old process). . okendpt() is the same as isokendpt(), but panic()s if the conversion fails. This is mainly used for decoding message.m_source endpoints, and other endpoint numbers in kernel data structures, which should always be correct. . if DEBUG_ENABLE_IPC_WARNINGS is enabled, isokendpt() and okendpt() get passed the __FILE__ and __LINE__ of the calling lines, and print messages about what is wrong with the endpoint number (out of range proc, empty proc, or inconsistent endpoint number), with the caller, making finding where the conversion failed easy without having to include code for every call to print where things went wrong. Sometimes this is harmless (wrong arg to a kernel call), sometimes it's a fatal internal inconsistency (bogus m_source). . some process table fields have been appended an _e to indicate it's become and endpoint. . process endpoint is stored in p_endpoint, without generation number. it turns out the kernel never needs the generation number, except when fork()ing, so it's decoded then. . kernel calls all take endpoints as arguments, not proc numbers. the one exception is sys_fork(), which needs to know in which slot to put the child.
2006-03-03 11:00:02 +01:00
ip->endpoint = rp->p_endpoint; /* ipc endpoint */
scheduling - time quantum in miliseconds - Currently the cpu time quantum is timer-ticks based. Thus the remaining quantum is decreased only if the processes is interrupted by a timer tick. As processes block a lot this typically does not happen for normal user processes. Also the quantum depends on the frequency of the timer. - This change makes the quantum miliseconds based. Internally the miliseconds are translated into cpu cycles. Everytime userspace execution is interrupted by kernel the cycles just consumed by the current process are deducted from the remaining quantum. - It makes the quantum system timer frequency independent. - The boot processes quantum is loosely derived from the tick-based quantas and 60Hz timer and subject to future change - the 64bit arithmetics is a little ugly, will be changes once we have compiler support for 64bit integers (soon)
2010-05-25 10:06:14 +02:00
make_zero64(rp->p_cpu_time_left);
- Fixed comments in various system call handlers. Work in progress on new sys_privctl() call to dynamically start servers and drivers. - Shutdown sequence slightly adjusted: called as watchdog timer to let the busy sys_abort() call from the PM return first. - Changed umap_bios() to have more restrictive check: BIOS memory is now allowed in BIOS_MEM_BEGIN to END (interrupt vectors) and BASE_MEM_TOP to UPPER_MEM_END. Hopefully this keeps QEMU and Bochs happy.
2005-07-21 20:36:40 +02:00
strncpy(rp->p_name, ip->proc_name, P_NAME_LEN); /* set process name */
Userspace scheduling - exporting stats - contributed by Bjorn Swift - adds process accounting, for example counting the number of messages sent, how often the process was preemted and how much time it spent in the run queue. These statistics, along with the current cpu load, are sent back to the user-space scheduler in the Out Of Quantum message. - the user-space scheduler may choose to make use of these statistics when making scheduling decisions. For isntance the cpu load becomes especially useful when scheduling on multiple cores.
2010-09-19 17:52:12 +02:00
reset_proc_accounting(rp);
Change allowed kernel call bitmap to an array of bitmaps to allow any number of kernel calls. Allowed kernel calls are stored in table.c for every image process as a variably-sized array of allowed calls. This is used to fill the bitmap of size determined at compile time by the number of kernel calls. This filling is done by main.c. There is a special call called SYS_ALL_CALLS which fills the bitmap of allowed calls completely, if that is the only entry in the array.
2006-06-20 11:56:06 +02:00
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* See if this process is immediately schedulable.
* In that case, set its privileges now and allow it to run.
* Only kernel tasks and the root system process get to run immediately.
* All the other system processes are inhibited from running by the
* RTS_NO_PRIV flag. They can only be scheduled once the root system
* process has set their privileges.
Change allowed kernel call bitmap to an array of bitmaps to allow any number of kernel calls. Allowed kernel calls are stored in table.c for every image process as a variably-sized array of allowed calls. This is used to fill the bitmap of size determined at compile time by the number of kernel calls. This filling is done by main.c. There is a special call called SYS_ALL_CALLS which fills the bitmap of allowed calls completely, if that is the only entry in the array.
2006-06-20 11:56:06 +02:00
*/
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
proc_nr = proc_nr(rp);
schedulable_proc = (iskerneln(proc_nr) || isrootsysn(proc_nr));
if(schedulable_proc) {
/* Assign privilege structure. Force a static privilege id. */
(void) get_priv(rp, static_priv_id(proc_nr));
/* Priviliges for kernel tasks. */
if(iskerneln(proc_nr)) {
/* Privilege flags. */
priv(rp)->s_flags = (proc_nr == IDLE ? IDL_F : TSK_F);
/* Allowed traps. */
priv(rp)->s_trap_mask = (proc_nr == CLOCK
|| proc_nr == SYSTEM ? CSK_T : TSK_T);
ipc_to_m = TSK_M; /* allowed targets */
kcalls = TSK_KC; /* allowed kernel calls */
}
/* Priviliges for the root system process. */
else if(isrootsysn(proc_nr)) {
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_flags= RSYS_F; /* privilege flags */
priv(rp)->s_trap_mask= SRV_T; /* allowed traps */
ipc_to_m = SRV_M; /* allowed targets */
kcalls = SRV_KC; /* allowed kernel calls */
priv(rp)->s_sig_mgr = SRV_SM; /* signal manager */
rp->p_priority = SRV_Q; /* priority queue */
rp->p_quantum_size_ms = SRV_QT; /* quantum size */
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
}
Fixed some type inconsistencies in the kernel.
2010-01-26 13:26:06 +01:00
/* Priviliges for ordinary process. */
else {
NOT_REACHABLE;
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Fill in target mask. */
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
fill_sendto_mask(rp, ipc_to_m);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Fill in kernel call mask. */
Initialization protocol for system services. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF framework now supports a new SEF Init request type from RS. 3 different callbacks are available (init_fresh, init_lu, init_restart) to specify initialization code when a service starts fresh, starts after a live update, or restarts. SYSTEM SERVICE CHANGES: - Initialization code for system services is now enclosed in a callback SEF will automatically call at init time. The return code of the callback will tell RS whether the initialization completed successfully. - Each init callback can access information passed by RS to initialize. As of now, each system service has access to the public entries of RS's system process table to gather all the information required to initialize. This design eliminates many existing or potential races at boot time and provides a uniform initialization interface to system services. The same interface will be reused for the upcoming publish/subscribe model to handle dynamic registration / deregistration of system services. VM CHANGES: - Uniform privilege management for all system services. Every service uses the same call mask format. For boot services, VM copies the call mask from init data. For dynamic services, VM still receives the call mask via rs_set_priv call that will be soon replaced by the upcoming publish/subscribe model. RS CHANGES: - The system process table has been reorganized and split into private entries and public entries. Only the latter ones are exposed to system services. - VM call masks are now entirely configured in rs/table.c - RS has now its own slot in the system process table. Only kernel tasks and user processes not included in the boot image are now left out from the system process table. - RS implements the initialization protocol for system services. - For services in the boot image, RS blocks till initialization is complete and panics when failure is reported back. Services are initialized in their order of appearance in the boot image priv table and RS blocks to implements synchronous initialization for every system service having the flag SF_SYNCH_BOOT set. - For services started dynamically, the initialization protocol is implemented as though it were the first ping for the service. In this case, if the system service fails to report back (or reports failure), RS brings the service down rather than trying to restart it.
2010-01-08 02:20:42 +01:00
for(j = 0; j < SYS_CALL_MASK_SIZE; j++) {
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask[j] = (kcalls == NO_C ? 0 : (~0));
}
}
else {
/* Don't let the process run for now. */
User-space scheduling for system processes
2010-07-01 10:32:33 +02:00
RTS_SET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV | RTS_NO_QUANTUM);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
}
if (iskerneln(proc_nr)) { /* part of the kernel? */
Rewrite of process scheduling: - current and maximum priority per process; - quantum size and current ticks left per process; - max number of full quantums in a row allow (otherwise current priority is decremented)
2005-06-30 17:55:19 +02:00
if (ip->stksize > 0) { /* HARDWARE stack size is 0 */
Reorganized system call library; uses separate file per call now. New configuration header file to include/ exclude functionality. Extracted privileged features from struct proc and create new struct priv. Renamed various system calls for readability.
2005-07-14 17:12:12 +02:00
rp->p_priv->s_stack_guard = (reg_t *) ktsb;
*rp->p_priv->s_stack_guard = STACK_GUARD;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
Rewrite of process scheduling: - current and maximum priority per process; - quantum size and current ticks left per process; - max number of full quantums in a row allow (otherwise current priority is decremented)
2005-06-30 17:55:19 +02:00
ktsb += ip->stksize; /* point to high end of stack */
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
rp->p_reg.sp = ktsb; /* this task's initial stack ptr */
hdrindex = 0; /* all use the first a.out header */
} else {
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
hdrindex = 1 + i-NR_TASKS; /* system/user processes */
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
/* Architecture-specific way to find out aout header of this
* boot process.
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
*/
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
arch_get_aout_headers(hdrindex, &e_hdr);
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
/* Convert addresses to clicks and build process memory map */
text_base = e_hdr.a_syms >> CLICK_SHIFT;
Merge of Wu's GSOC 09 branch (src.20090525.r4372.wu) Main changes: - COW optimization for safecopy. - safemap, a grant-based interface for sharing memory regions between processes. - Integration with safemap and complete rework of DS, supporting new data types natively (labels, memory ranges, memory mapped ranges). - For further information: http://wiki.minix3.org/en/SummerOfCode2009/MemoryGrants Additional changes not included in the original Wu's branch: - Fixed unhandled case in VM when using COW optimization for safecopy in case of a block that has already been shared as SMAP. - Better interface and naming scheme for sys_saferevmap and ds_retrieve_map calls. - Better input checking in syslib: check for page alignment when creating memory mapping grants. - DS notifies subscribers when an entry is deleted. - Documented the behavior of indirect grants in case of memory mapping. - Test suite in /usr/src/test/safeperf|safecopy|safemap|ds/* reworked and extended. - Minor fixes and general cleanup. - TO-DO: Grant ids should be generated and managed the way endpoints are to make sure grant slots are never misreused.
2010-01-14 16:24:16 +01:00
text_clicks = (vir_clicks) (CLICK_CEIL(e_hdr.a_text) >> CLICK_SHIFT);
data_clicks = (vir_clicks) (CLICK_CEIL(e_hdr.a_data
+ e_hdr.a_bss) >> CLICK_SHIFT);
st_clicks = (vir_clicks) (CLICK_CEIL(e_hdr.a_total) >> CLICK_SHIFT);
Better initialization of the memory map of processes that are part of the image. Removed NO_MAP flag.
2006-05-11 16:49:46 +02:00
if (!(e_hdr.a_flags & A_SEP))
{
Merge of Wu's GSOC 09 branch (src.20090525.r4372.wu) Main changes: - COW optimization for safecopy. - safemap, a grant-based interface for sharing memory regions between processes. - Integration with safemap and complete rework of DS, supporting new data types natively (labels, memory ranges, memory mapped ranges). - For further information: http://wiki.minix3.org/en/SummerOfCode2009/MemoryGrants Additional changes not included in the original Wu's branch: - Fixed unhandled case in VM when using COW optimization for safecopy in case of a block that has already been shared as SMAP. - Better interface and naming scheme for sys_saferevmap and ds_retrieve_map calls. - Better input checking in syslib: check for page alignment when creating memory mapping grants. - DS notifies subscribers when an entry is deleted. - Documented the behavior of indirect grants in case of memory mapping. - Test suite in /usr/src/test/safeperf|safecopy|safemap|ds/* reworked and extended. - Minor fixes and general cleanup. - TO-DO: Grant ids should be generated and managed the way endpoints are to make sure grant slots are never misreused.
2010-01-14 16:24:16 +01:00
data_clicks = (vir_clicks) (CLICK_CEIL(e_hdr.a_text +
e_hdr.a_data + e_hdr.a_bss) >> CLICK_SHIFT);
Better initialization of the memory map of processes that are part of the image. Removed NO_MAP flag.
2006-05-11 16:49:46 +02:00
text_clicks = 0; /* common I&D */
}
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
rp->p_memmap[T].mem_phys = text_base;
rp->p_memmap[T].mem_len = text_clicks;
rp->p_memmap[D].mem_phys = text_base + text_clicks;
rp->p_memmap[D].mem_len = data_clicks;
Better initialization of the memory map of processes that are part of the image. Removed NO_MAP flag.
2006-05-11 16:49:46 +02:00
rp->p_memmap[S].mem_phys = text_base + text_clicks + st_clicks;
rp->p_memmap[S].mem_vir = st_clicks;
rp->p_memmap[S].mem_len = 0;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
/* Set initial register values. The processor status word for tasks
* is different from that of other processes because tasks can
* access I/O; this is not allowed to less-privileged processes
*/
boot image - no need for entry point - removes the initial_pc from struct boot_image. It is always set to 0 and RS uses a.out headers.
2010-05-18 15:51:46 +02:00
rp->p_reg.pc = 0; /* we cannot start anything else */
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
rp->p_reg.psw = (iskerneln(proc_nr)) ? INIT_TASK_PSW : INIT_PSW;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
Provide boot image process main functions with a full parameter list, so that bad things don't heppen when using getenv
2010-08-20 13:07:16 +02:00
/* Initialize the server stack pointer. Take it down three words
* to give crtso.s something to use as "argc", "argv" and "envp".
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
*/
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if (isusern(proc_nr)) { /* user-space process? */
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
rp->p_reg.sp = (rp->p_memmap[S].mem_vir +
rp->p_memmap[S].mem_len) << CLICK_SHIFT;
Zero out to three stack dwords to fix boot errors
2010-08-24 14:51:11 +02:00
argsz = 3 * sizeof(reg_t);
rp->p_reg.sp -= argsz;
phys_memset(rp->p_reg.sp -
(rp->p_memmap[S].mem_vir << CLICK_SHIFT) +
(rp->p_memmap[S].mem_phys << CLICK_SHIFT),
0, argsz);
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
. replace HZ by runtime system_hz (sysenv variable 'hz') . new flag PROC_FULLVM in table indicating process wants full address space (this is then created and managed by VM)
2008-12-11 15:15:23 +01:00
Primary goal for these changes is: - no longer have kernel have its own page table that is loaded on every kernel entry (trap, interrupt, exception). the primary purpose is to reduce the number of required reloads. Result: - kernel can only access memory of process that was running when kernel was entered - kernel must be mapped into every process page table, so traps to kernel keep working Problem: - kernel must often access memory of arbitrary processes (e.g. send arbitrary processes messages); this can't happen directly any more; usually because that process' page table isn't loaded at all, sometimes because that memory isn't mapped in at all, sometimes because it isn't mapped in read-write. So: - kernel must be able to map in memory of any process, in its own address space. Implementation: - VM and kernel share a range of memory in which addresses of all page tables of all processes are available. This has two purposes: . Kernel has to know what data to copy in order to map in a range . Kernel has to know where to write the data in order to map it in That last point is because kernel has to write in the currently loaded page table. - Processes and kernel are separated through segments; kernel segments haven't changed. - The kernel keeps the process whose page table is currently loaded in 'ptproc.' - If it wants to map in a range of memory, it writes the value of the page directory entry for that range into the page directory entry in the currently loaded map. There is a slot reserved for such purposes. The kernel can then access this memory directly. - In order to do this, its segment has been increased (and the segments of processes start where it ends). - In the pagefault handler, detect if the kernel is doing 'trappable' memory access (i.e. a pagefault isn't a fatal error) and if so, - set the saved instruction pointer to phys_copy_fault, breaking out of phys_copy - set the saved eax register to the address of the page fault, both for sanity checking and for checking in which of the two ranges that phys_copy was called with the fault occured - Some boot-time processes do not have their own page table, and are mapped in with the kernel, and separated with segments. The kernel detects this using HASPT. If such a process has to be scheduled, any page table will work and no page table switch is done. Major changes in kernel are - When accessing user processes memory, kernel no longer explicitly checks before it does so if that memory is OK. It simply makes the mapping (if necessary), tries to do the operation, and traps the pagefault if that memory isn't present; if that happens, the copy function returns EFAULT. So all of the CHECKRANGE_OR_SUSPEND macros are gone. - Kernel no longer has to copy/read and parse page tables. - A message copying optimisation: when messages are copied, and the recipient isn't mapped in, they are copied into a buffer in the kernel. This is done in QueueMess. The next time the recipient is scheduled, this message is copied into its memory. This happens in schedcheck(). This eliminates the mapping/copying step for messages, and makes it easier to deliver messages. This eliminates soft_notify. - Kernel no longer creates a page table at all, so the vm_setbuf and pagetable writing in memory.c is gone. Minor changes in kernel are - ipc_stats thrown out, wasn't used - misc flags all renamed to MF_* - NOREC_* macros to enter and leave functions that should not be called recursively; just sanity checks really - code to fully decode segment selectors and descriptors to print on exceptions - lots of vmassert()s added, only executed if DEBUG_VMASSERT is 1
2009-09-21 16:31:52 +02:00
/* scheduling functions depend on proc_ptr pointing somewhere. */
SMP - Cpu local variables - most global variables carry information which is specific to the local CPU and each CPU must have its own copy - cpu local variable must be declared in cpulocal.h between DECLARE_CPULOCAL_START and DECLARE_CPULOCAL_END markers using DECLARE_CPULOCAL macro - to access the cpu local data the provided macros must be used get_cpu_var(cpu, name) get_cpu_var_ptr(cpu, name) get_cpulocal_var(name) get_cpulocal_var_ptr(name) - using this macros makes future changes in the implementation possible - switching to ELF will make the declaration of cpu local data much simpler, e.g. CPULOCAL int blah; anywhere in the kernel source code
2010-09-15 16:09:46 +02:00
if(!get_cpulocal_var(proc_ptr))
get_cpulocal_var(proc_ptr) = rp;
Primary goal for these changes is: - no longer have kernel have its own page table that is loaded on every kernel entry (trap, interrupt, exception). the primary purpose is to reduce the number of required reloads. Result: - kernel can only access memory of process that was running when kernel was entered - kernel must be mapped into every process page table, so traps to kernel keep working Problem: - kernel must often access memory of arbitrary processes (e.g. send arbitrary processes messages); this can't happen directly any more; usually because that process' page table isn't loaded at all, sometimes because that memory isn't mapped in at all, sometimes because it isn't mapped in read-write. So: - kernel must be able to map in memory of any process, in its own address space. Implementation: - VM and kernel share a range of memory in which addresses of all page tables of all processes are available. This has two purposes: . Kernel has to know what data to copy in order to map in a range . Kernel has to know where to write the data in order to map it in That last point is because kernel has to write in the currently loaded page table. - Processes and kernel are separated through segments; kernel segments haven't changed. - The kernel keeps the process whose page table is currently loaded in 'ptproc.' - If it wants to map in a range of memory, it writes the value of the page directory entry for that range into the page directory entry in the currently loaded map. There is a slot reserved for such purposes. The kernel can then access this memory directly. - In order to do this, its segment has been increased (and the segments of processes start where it ends). - In the pagefault handler, detect if the kernel is doing 'trappable' memory access (i.e. a pagefault isn't a fatal error) and if so, - set the saved instruction pointer to phys_copy_fault, breaking out of phys_copy - set the saved eax register to the address of the page fault, both for sanity checking and for checking in which of the two ranges that phys_copy was called with the fault occured - Some boot-time processes do not have their own page table, and are mapped in with the kernel, and separated with segments. The kernel detects this using HASPT. If such a process has to be scheduled, any page table will work and no page table switch is done. Major changes in kernel are - When accessing user processes memory, kernel no longer explicitly checks before it does so if that memory is OK. It simply makes the mapping (if necessary), tries to do the operation, and traps the pagefault if that memory isn't present; if that happens, the copy function returns EFAULT. So all of the CHECKRANGE_OR_SUSPEND macros are gone. - Kernel no longer has to copy/read and parse page tables. - A message copying optimisation: when messages are copied, and the recipient isn't mapped in, they are copied into a buffer in the kernel. This is done in QueueMess. The next time the recipient is scheduled, this message is copied into its memory. This happens in schedcheck(). This eliminates the mapping/copying step for messages, and makes it easier to deliver messages. This eliminates soft_notify. - Kernel no longer creates a page table at all, so the vm_setbuf and pagetable writing in memory.c is gone. Minor changes in kernel are - ipc_stats thrown out, wasn't used - misc flags all renamed to MF_* - NOREC_* macros to enter and leave functions that should not be called recursively; just sanity checks really - code to fully decode segment selectors and descriptors to print on exceptions - lots of vmassert()s added, only executed if DEBUG_VMASSERT is 1
2009-09-21 16:31:52 +02:00
. replace HZ by runtime system_hz (sysenv variable 'hz') . new flag PROC_FULLVM in table indicating process wants full address space (this is then created and managed by VM)
2008-12-11 15:15:23 +01:00
/* If this process has its own page table, VM will set the
* PT up and manage it. VM will signal the kernel when it has
* done this; until then, don't let it run.
*/
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if(ip->flags & PROC_FULLVM)
SMP - CPU local run queues - each CPU has its own runqueues - processes on BSP are put on the runqueues later after a switch to the final stack when cpuid works to avoid special cases - enqueue() and dequeue() use the run queues of the cpu the process is assigned to - pick_proc() uses the local run queues - printing of per-CPU run queues ('2') on serial console
2010-09-15 16:10:18 +02:00
rp->p_rts_flags |= RTS_VMINHIBIT;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
SMP - CPU local run queues - each CPU has its own runqueues - processes on BSP are put on the runqueues later after a switch to the final stack when cpuid works to avoid special cases - enqueue() and dequeue() use the run queues of the cpu the process is assigned to - pick_proc() uses the local run queues - printing of per-CPU run queues ('2') on serial console
2010-09-15 16:10:18 +02:00
rp->p_rts_flags |= RTS_PROC_STOP;
rp->p_rts_flags &= ~RTS_SLOT_FREE;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
alloc_segments(rp);
Intermediate boot verbosity level EXTRA (2), MAX moved to 3
2010-05-10 20:07:59 +02:00
DEBUGEXTRA(("done\n"));
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
kernel - prettier output for ipc errors, call names instead of trap numbers
2010-07-16 17:36:29 +02:00
#define IPCNAME(n) { \
assert((n) >= 0 && (n) <= IPCNO_HIGHEST); \
assert(!ipc_call_names[n]); \
ipc_call_names[n] = #n; \
}
IPCNAME(SEND);
IPCNAME(RECEIVE);
IPCNAME(SENDREC);
IPCNAME(NOTIFY);
IPCNAME(SENDNB);
IPCNAME(SENDA);
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
/* Architecture-dependent initialization. */
DEBUGEXTRA(("arch_init()... "));
arch_init();
DEBUGEXTRA(("done\n"));
/* System and processes initialization */
DEBUGEXTRA(("system_init()... "));
system_init();
DEBUGEXTRA(("done\n"));
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
if (config_no_apic) {
BOOT_VERBOSE(printf("APIC disabled, disables SMP, using legacy PIC\n"));
smp_single_cpu_fallback();
} else if (config_no_smp) {
BOOT_VERBOSE(printf("SMP disabled, using legacy PIC\n"));
smp_single_cpu_fallback();
SMP - The slave CPUs turn paging on - APs wait until BSP turns paging on, it is not possible to safely execute any code on APs until we can turn paging on as well as it must be done synchronously everywhere - APs turn paging on but do not continue and wait
2010-09-15 16:10:07 +02:00
} else {
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
smp_init();
SMP - The slave CPUs turn paging on - APs wait until BSP turns paging on, it is not possible to safely execute any code on APs until we can turn paging on as well as it must be done synchronously everywhere - APs turn paging on but do not continue and wait
2010-09-15 16:10:07 +02:00
/*
* if smp_init() returns it means that it failed and we try to finish
* single CPU booting
*/
bsp_finish_booting();
}
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
#else
/*
* if configured for a single CPU, we are already on the kernel stack which we
* are going to use everytime we execute kernel code. We finish booting and we
* never return here
*/
bsp_finish_booting();
#endif
re-establish kernel assert()s. use the regular <assert.h> assert() instead of vmassert() in kernel. throw out some #if 0 code. fix a few assert() conditions. enable by default.
2010-03-10 14:00:05 +01:00
Killing Minix by typing Q on serial console - if debugging on serial console is enabled typing Q kills the system. It is handy if the system gets locked up and the timer interrupts still work. Good for remote debugging. - NOT_REACHABLE reintroduced and fixed. It should be used for marking code which is not reachable because the previous code _should_ not return. Such places are not always obvious
2010-01-14 10:46:16 +01:00
NOT_REACHABLE;
Repair errors and warnings flagged by llvm.
2010-07-06 13:29:23 +02:00
return 1;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
Andy's formatting fixes.
2005-09-11 18:44:06 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* announce *
*===========================================================================*/
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
PRIVATE void announce(void)
{
/* Display the MINIX startup banner. */
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("\nMINIX %s.%s. "
update for releases with git.
2010-11-11 03:00:12 +01:00
#ifdef _VCS_REVISION
"(" _VCS_REVISION ")\n"
include svn revision number in <minix/sys_config.h>, printed by kernel at startup, to easily identify releases.
2007-03-21 14:35:06 +01:00
#endif
bump version number to 3.1.6, copyright year to 2010.
2010-01-27 17:19:50 +01:00
"Copyright 2010, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands\n",
Various fixes and improvements. - fixed bug that caused IDLE to panic (irq hook inconsistency); - kprintf() now accepts multiple arguments; moved to utility.c; - prepare_shutdown() signals system processes with SIGKSTOP; - phys_fill() renamed to phys_memset(), argument order changed; - kmemset() removed in favor of phys_kmemset(); - kstrncpy() removed in favor of phys_copy(); - katoi, kstrncmp replaced by normal library procedure again; - rm_irq_handler() interface changed (simply pass hook pointer);
2005-07-20 17:25:38 +02:00
OS_RELEASE, OS_VERSION);
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("MINIX is open source software, see http://www.minix3.org\n");
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
Andy's formatting fixes.
2005-09-11 18:44:06 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* prepare_shutdown *
*===========================================================================*/
Lots of const correctness.
2010-03-27 15:31:00 +01:00
PUBLIC void prepare_shutdown(const int how)
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
{
AT driver is not modified (debugging only); TTY: select and revive with new notify and FS call back; kernel: removed old notify code; removed ugly prepare_shutdown timer kputc: don't send to FS if PRINTF_PROC fails
2005-07-27 16:32:16 +02:00
/* This function prepares to shutdown MINIX. */
- Fixed comments in various system call handlers. Work in progress on new sys_privctl() call to dynamically start servers and drivers. - Shutdown sequence slightly adjusted: called as watchdog timer to let the busy sys_abort() call from the PM return first. - Changed umap_bios() to have more restrictive check: BIOS memory is now allowed in BIOS_MEM_BEGIN to END (interrupt vectors) and BASE_MEM_TOP to UPPER_MEM_END. Hopefully this keeps QEMU and Bochs happy.
2005-07-21 20:36:40 +02:00
static timer_t shutdown_timer;
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
Minor bug fixes in proc.c and utility.c; Removed debug dumps on panic from main.c; Return error on exit when other process does IPC to/from exiting process.
2005-10-05 11:51:50 +02:00
/* Continue after 1 second, to give processes a chance to get scheduled to
* do shutdown work. Set a watchog timer to call shutdown(). The timer
Various fixes and improvements. - fixed bug that caused IDLE to panic (irq hook inconsistency); - kprintf() now accepts multiple arguments; moved to utility.c; - prepare_shutdown() signals system processes with SIGKSTOP; - phys_fill() renamed to phys_memset(), argument order changed; - kmemset() removed in favor of phys_kmemset(); - kstrncpy() removed in favor of phys_copy(); - katoi, kstrncmp replaced by normal library procedure again; - rm_irq_handler() interface changed (simply pass hook pointer);
2005-07-20 17:25:38 +02:00
* argument passes the shutdown status.
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
*/
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("MINIX will now be shut down ...\n");
- Fixed comments in various system call handlers. Work in progress on new sys_privctl() call to dynamically start servers and drivers. - Shutdown sequence slightly adjusted: called as watchdog timer to let the busy sys_abort() call from the PM return first. - Changed umap_bios() to have more restrictive check: BIOS memory is now allowed in BIOS_MEM_BEGIN to END (interrupt vectors) and BASE_MEM_TOP to UPPER_MEM_END. Hopefully this keeps QEMU and Bochs happy.
2005-07-21 20:36:40 +02:00
tmr_arg(&shutdown_timer)->ta_int = how;
. replace HZ by runtime system_hz (sysenv variable 'hz') . new flag PROC_FULLVM in table indicating process wants full address space (this is then created and managed by VM)
2008-12-11 15:15:23 +01:00
set_timer(&shutdown_timer, get_uptime() + system_hz, minix_shutdown);
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
Split of architecture-dependent and -independent functions for i386, mainly in the kernel and headers. This split based on work by Ingmar Alting <iaalting@cs.vu.nl> done for his Minix PowerPC architecture port. . kernel does not program the interrupt controller directly, do any other architecture-dependent operations, or contain assembly any more, but uses architecture-dependent functions in arch/$(ARCH)/. . architecture-dependent constants and types defined in arch/$(ARCH)/include. . <ibm/portio.h> moved to <minix/portio.h>, as they have become, for now, architecture-independent functions. . int86, sdevio, readbios, and iopenable are now i386-specific kernel calls and live in arch/i386/do_* now. . i386 arch now supports even less 86 code; e.g. mpx86.s and klib86.s have gone, and 'machine.protected' is gone (and always taken to be 1 in i386). If 86 support is to return, it should be a new architecture. . prototypes for the architecture-dependent functions defined in kernel/arch/$(ARCH)/*.c but used in kernel/ are in kernel/proto.h . /etc/make.conf included in makefiles and shell scripts that need to know the building architecture; it defines ARCH=<arch>, currently only i386. . some basic per-architecture build support outside of the kernel (lib) . in clock.c, only dequeue a process if it was ready . fixes for new include files files deleted: . mpx/klib.s - only for choosing between mpx/klib86 and -386 . klib86.s - only for 86 i386-specific files files moved (or arch-dependent stuff moved) to arch/i386/: . mpx386.s (entry point) . klib386.s . sconst.h . exception.c . protect.c . protect.h . i8269.c
2006-12-22 16:22:27 +01:00
Andy's formatting fixes.
2005-09-11 18:44:06 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* shutdown *
*===========================================================================*/
Lots of const correctness.
2010-03-27 15:31:00 +01:00
PUBLIC void minix_shutdown(timer_t *tp)
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
{
/* This function is called from prepare_shutdown or stop_sequence to bring
Cleaned up process table structure: removed p_type, p_pendcount. Removed stop sequence when MINIX is shut down. Disabled send mask checks --- to be replaced by proper mechanism. Fixed bug relating to 'shutdown -x'. Simplified clock accounting of realtime. Updated Makefiles for mkdept script.
2005-06-24 18:24:40 +02:00
* down MINIX. How to shutdown is in the argument: RBT_HALT (return to the
* monitor), RBT_MONITOR (execute given code), RBT_RESET (hard reset).
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
*/
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* FIXME
*
* we will need to stop timers on all cpus if SMP is enabled and put them in
* such a state that we can perform the whole boot process once restarted from
* monitor again
*/
if (ncpus > 1)
SMP - BSP halts APs before shutting down
2010-09-15 16:10:54 +02:00
smp_shutdown_aps();
SMP - We boot APs - kernel detects CPUs by searching ACPI tables for local apic nodes - each CPU has its own TSS that points to its own stack. All cpus boot on the same boot stack (in sequence) but switch to its private stack as soon as they can. - final booting code in main() placed in bsp_finish_booting() which is executed only after the BSP switches to its final stack - apic functions to send startup interrupts - assembler functions to handle CPU features not needed for single cpu mode like memory barries, HT detection etc. - new files kernel/smp.[ch], kernel/arch/i386/arch_smp.c and kernel/arch/i386/include/arch_smp.h - 16-bit trampoline code for the APs. It is executed by each AP after receiving startup IPIs it brings up the CPUs to 32bit mode and let them spin in an infinite loop so they don't do any damage. - implementation of kernel spinlock - CONFIG_SMP and CONFIG_MAX_CPUS set by the build system
2010-09-15 16:09:52 +02:00
#endif
APIC mode uses IO APICs - kernel turns on IO APICs if no_apic is _not_ set or is equal 0 - pci driver must use the acpi driver to setup IRQ routing otherwise the system cannot work correctly except systems like KVM that use only legacy (E)ISA IRQs 0-15
2010-09-07 09:18:11 +02:00
hw_intr_disable_all();
SMP - Single shot local timer - APIC timer always reprogrammed if expired - timer tick never happens when in kernel => never immediate return from userspace to kernel because of a buffered interrupt - renamed argument to lapic_set_timer_one_shot() - removed arch_ prefix from timer functions
2010-09-15 16:11:06 +02:00
stop_local_timer();
Local APIC - local APIC timer used as the source of time - PIC is still used as the hw interrupt controller as we don't have enough info without ACPI or MPS to set up IO APICs - remapping of APIC when switching paging on, uses the new mechanism to tell VM what phys areas to map in kernel's virtual space - one more step to SMP based on code by Arun C.
2009-11-16 22:41:44 +01:00
intr_init(INTS_ORIG, 0);
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
arch_shutdown(tp ? tmr_arg(tp)->ta_int : RBT_PANIC);
Initial revision
2005-04-21 16:53:53 +02:00
}
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