sanchayanmaity/minix
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity
minix/kernel/system/do_privctl.c

412 lines
11 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

Al's system call -> kernel call renaming
2005-10-14 10:58:59 +02:00
/* The kernel call implemented in this file:
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
* m_type: SYS_PRIVCTL
*
Al's system call -> kernel call renaming
2005-10-14 10:58:59 +02:00
* The parameters for this kernel call are:
- sys_privctl: don't mix message types - sys_privctl: remove CTL_MM_PRIV (third parameter) - remove obsolete sys_svrctl.c library file
2009-09-06 14:37:13 +02:00
* m2_i1: CTL_ENDPT (process endpoint of target)
* m2_i2: CTL_REQUEST (privilege control request)
* m2_p1: CTL_ARG_PTR (pointer to request data)
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
*/
Convert kernel over to bsdmake
2010-04-02 00:22:33 +02:00
#include "kernel/system.h"
#include "kernel/ipc.h"
Cleaned up table. Moved policies to table. Small fixes to do_copy, do_privctl and do_fork.
2005-08-02 17:28:09 +02:00
#include <signal.h>
System statistical and call profiling support by Rogier Meurs <rogier@meurs.org>.
2006-10-30 16:53:38 +01:00
#include <string.h>
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
#include <minix/endpoint.h>
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
#if USE_PRIVCTL
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
#define PRIV_DEBUG 0
retire PUBLIC, PRIVATE and FORWARD
2012-03-25 20:25:53 +02:00
static int update_priv(struct proc *rp, struct priv *priv);
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* do_privctl *
*===========================================================================*/
retire PUBLIC, PRIVATE and FORWARD
2012-03-25 20:25:53 +02:00
int do_privctl(struct proc * caller, message * m_ptr)
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
{
/* Handle sys_privctl(). Update a process' privileges. If the process is not
* yet a system process, make sure it gets its own privilege structure.
*/
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
struct proc *rp;
Fixed some inconsistent strict typing declarations. Better strict typing.
2010-05-25 09:23:24 +02:00
proc_nr_t proc_nr;
sys_id_t priv_id;
Kernel/RS: fix permission computation with 32+ system processes
2010-12-07 11:32:42 +01:00
sys_map_t map;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
int ipc_to_m, kcalls;
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
int i, r;
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
struct io_range io_range;
rename struct mem_range to minix_mem_range . avoid a name clash with gdb
2012-08-15 15:16:57 +02:00
struct minix_mem_range mem_range;
Initialize priv from user supplied priv structure in SYS_PRIV_INIT. Added SYS_PRIV_USER call to downgrade a privileged process to a user process.
2006-10-20 16:42:48 +02:00
struct priv priv;
- sys_privctl: don't mix message types - sys_privctl: remove CTL_MM_PRIV (third parameter) - remove obsolete sys_svrctl.c library file
2009-09-06 14:37:13 +02:00
int irq;
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
kernel: spelling fixes Change-Id: I73c759bdef98be35be77130895ae0ec497e1b954
2013-10-09 17:28:23 +02:00
/* Check whether caller is allowed to make this call. Privileged processes
Cleaned up table. Moved policies to table. Small fixes to do_copy, do_privctl and do_fork.
2005-08-02 17:28:09 +02:00
* can only update the privileges of processes that are inhibited from
All macros defining rts flags are prefixed with RTS_ - macros used with RTS_SET group of macros to define struct proc p_rts_flags are now prefixed with RTS_ to make things clear
2009-11-10 10:11:13 +01:00
* running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. This flag is set when a privileged process
Cleaned up table. Moved policies to table. Small fixes to do_copy, do_privctl and do_fork.
2005-08-02 17:28:09 +02:00
* forks.
*/
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
if (! (priv(caller)->s_flags & SYS_PROC)) return(EPERM);
Kernel: use okendpt() to resolve stored endpoints This adds an integrity check at very little cost, and should stop Coverity from flagging array overruns on the result.
2012-08-15 10:50:30 +02:00
if(m_ptr->CTL_ENDPT == SELF) okendpt(caller->p_endpoint, &proc_nr);
- sys_privctl: don't mix message types - sys_privctl: remove CTL_MM_PRIV (third parameter) - remove obsolete sys_svrctl.c library file
2009-09-06 14:37:13 +02:00
else if(!isokendpt(m_ptr->CTL_ENDPT, &proc_nr)) return(EINVAL);
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
rp = proc_addr(proc_nr);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
switch(m_ptr->CTL_REQUEST)
{
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
case SYS_PRIV_ALLOW:
/* Allow process to run. Make sure its privilege structure has already
* been set.
*/
if (!RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV) || priv(rp)->s_proc_nr == NONE) {
return(EPERM);
}
No locking in kernel code - No locking in RTS_(UN)SET macros - No lock_notify() - Removed unused lock_send() - No lock/unlock macros anymore
2010-02-09 16:26:58 +01:00
RTS_UNSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
return(OK);
RS live update support.
2010-07-09 20:29:04 +02:00
case SYS_PRIV_YIELD:
/* Allow process to run and suspend the caller. */
if (!RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV) || priv(rp)->s_proc_nr == NONE) {
return(EPERM);
}
RTS_SET(caller, RTS_NO_PRIV);
RTS_UNSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV);
return(OK);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
case SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW:
/* Disallow process from running. */
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV)) return(EPERM);
No locking in kernel code - No locking in RTS_(UN)SET macros - No lock_notify() - Removed unused lock_send() - No lock/unlock macros anymore
2010-02-09 16:26:58 +01:00
RTS_SET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
return(OK);
case SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS:
/* Set a privilege structure of a blocked system process. */
All macros defining rts flags are prefixed with RTS_ - macros used with RTS_SET group of macros to define struct proc p_rts_flags are now prefixed with RTS_ to make things clear
2009-11-10 10:11:13 +01:00
if (! RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV)) return(EPERM);
Kernel changes: - reinstalled priority changing, now in sched() and unready() - reinstalled check on message buffer in sys_call() - reinstalled check in send masks in sys_call() - changed do_fork() to get new privilege structure for SYS_PROCs - removed some processes from boot image---will be dynamically started later
2005-07-26 14:48:34 +02:00
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Check whether a static or dynamic privilege id must be allocated. */
priv_id = NULL_PRIV_ID;
if (m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR)
{
/* Copy privilege structure from caller */
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
if((r=data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
Removal of the system task * Userspace change to use the new kernel calls - _taskcall(SYSTASK...) changed to _kernel_call(...) - int 32 reused for the kernel calls - _do_kernel_call() to make the trap to kernel - kernel_call() to make the actuall kernel call from C using _do_kernel_call() - unlike ipc call the kernel call always succeeds as kernel is always available, however, kernel may return an error * Kernel side implementation of kernel calls - the SYSTEm task does not run, only the proc table entry is preserved - every data_copy(SYSTEM is no data_copy(KERNEL - "locking" is an empty operation now as everything runs in kernel - sys_task() is replaced by kernel_call() which copies the message into kernel, dispatches the call to its handler and finishes by either copying the results back to userspace (if need be) or by suspending the process because of VM - suspended processes are later made runnable once the memory issue is resolved, picked up by the scheduler and only at this time the call is resumed (in fact restarted) which does not need to copy the message from userspace as the message is already saved in the process structure. - no ned for the vmrestart queue, the scheduler will restart the system calls - no special case in do_vmctl(), all requests remove the RTS_VMREQUEST flag
2010-02-09 16:20:09 +01:00
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &priv, sizeof(priv))) != OK)
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
return r;
/* See if the caller wants to assign a static privilege id. */
if(!(priv.s_flags & DYN_PRIV_ID)) {
priv_id = priv.s_id;
}
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
/* Make sure this process has its own privileges structure. This may
* fail, since there are only a limited number of system processes.
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
* Then copy privileges from the caller and restore some defaults.
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
*/
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if ((i=get_priv(rp, priv_id)) != OK)
Disabled code to set ipc_stats_target.
2008-02-22 11:58:27 +01:00
{
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("do_privctl: unable to allocate priv_id %d: %d\n",
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
priv_id, i);
Disabled code to set ipc_stats_target.
2008-02-22 11:58:27 +01:00
return(i);
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv_id = priv(rp)->s_id; /* backup privilege id */
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
*priv(rp) = *priv(caller); /* copy from caller */
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_id = priv_id; /* restore privilege id */
priv(rp)->s_proc_nr = proc_nr; /* reassociate process nr */
Initialization protocol for system services. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF framework now supports a new SEF Init request type from RS. 3 different callbacks are available (init_fresh, init_lu, init_restart) to specify initialization code when a service starts fresh, starts after a live update, or restarts. SYSTEM SERVICE CHANGES: - Initialization code for system services is now enclosed in a callback SEF will automatically call at init time. The return code of the callback will tell RS whether the initialization completed successfully. - Each init callback can access information passed by RS to initialize. As of now, each system service has access to the public entries of RS's system process table to gather all the information required to initialize. This design eliminates many existing or potential races at boot time and provides a uniform initialization interface to system services. The same interface will be reused for the upcoming publish/subscribe model to handle dynamic registration / deregistration of system services. VM CHANGES: - Uniform privilege management for all system services. Every service uses the same call mask format. For boot services, VM copies the call mask from init data. For dynamic services, VM still receives the call mask via rs_set_priv call that will be soon replaced by the upcoming publish/subscribe model. RS CHANGES: - The system process table has been reorganized and split into private entries and public entries. Only the latter ones are exposed to system services. - VM call masks are now entirely configured in rs/table.c - RS has now its own slot in the system process table. Only kernel tasks and user processes not included in the boot image are now left out from the system process table. - RS implements the initialization protocol for system services. - For services in the boot image, RS blocks till initialization is complete and panics when failure is reported back. Services are initialized in their order of appearance in the boot image priv table and RS blocks to implements synchronous initialization for every system service having the flag SF_SYNCH_BOOT set. - For services started dynamically, the initialization protocol is implemented as though it were the first ping for the service. In this case, if the system service fails to report back (or reports failure), RS brings the service down rather than trying to restart it.
2010-01-08 02:20:42 +01:00
for (i=0; i< NR_SYS_CHUNKS; i++) /* remove pending: */
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_notify_pending.chunk[i] = 0; /* - notifications */
priv(rp)->s_int_pending = 0; /* - interrupts */
include, kernel: minor fixes to make compiling and linking work with clang. (fixing warnings)
2010-07-06 13:59:19 +02:00
(void) sigemptyset(&priv(rp)->s_sig_pending); /* - signals */
Replacing timer_t by netbsd's timer_t * Renamed struct timer to struct minix_timer * Renamed timer_t to minix_timer_t * Ensured all the code uses the minix_timer_t typedef * Removed ifdef around _BSD_TIMER_T * Removed include/timers.h and merged it into include/minix/timers.h * Resolved prototype conflict by renaming kernel's (re)set_timer to (re)set_kernel_timer. Change-Id: I56f0f30dfed96e1a0575d92492294cf9a06468a5
2013-09-19 10:57:10 +02:00
reset_kernel_timer(&priv(rp)->s_alarm_timer); /* - alarm */
Merge of Wu's GSOC 09 branch (src.20090525.r4372.wu) Main changes: - COW optimization for safecopy. - safemap, a grant-based interface for sharing memory regions between processes. - Integration with safemap and complete rework of DS, supporting new data types natively (labels, memory ranges, memory mapped ranges). - For further information: http://wiki.minix3.org/en/SummerOfCode2009/MemoryGrants Additional changes not included in the original Wu's branch: - Fixed unhandled case in VM when using COW optimization for safecopy in case of a block that has already been shared as SMAP. - Better interface and naming scheme for sys_saferevmap and ds_retrieve_map calls. - Better input checking in syslib: check for page alignment when creating memory mapping grants. - DS notifies subscribers when an entry is deleted. - Documented the behavior of indirect grants in case of memory mapping. - Test suite in /usr/src/test/safeperf|safecopy|safemap|ds/* reworked and extended. - Minor fixes and general cleanup. - TO-DO: Grant ids should be generated and managed the way endpoints are to make sure grant slots are never misreused.
2010-01-14 16:24:16 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_asyntab= -1; /* - asynsends */
priv(rp)->s_asynsize= 0;
Kernel: make SIGKMESS target process list dynamic The set of processes to which a SIGKMESS signal is sent whenever new diagnostics messages are added to the kernel's message buffer, is now no longer hardcoded. Instead, processes can (un)register themselves to receive such notifications, by means of sys_diagctl(). Change-Id: I9d6ac006a5d9bbfad2757587a068fc1ec3cc083e
2013-09-21 15:03:20 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_diag_sig = FALSE; /* no request for diag sigs */
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Set defaults for privilege bitmaps. */
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_flags= DSRV_F; /* privilege flags */
priv(rp)->s_trap_mask= DSRV_T; /* allowed traps */
Kernel/RS: fix permission computation with 32+ system processes
2010-12-07 11:32:42 +01:00
memset(&map, 0, sizeof(map));
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
ipc_to_m = DSRV_M; /* allowed targets */
Kernel/RS: fix permission computation with 32+ system processes
2010-12-07 11:32:42 +01:00
if (ipc_to_m == ALL_M) {
for (i = 0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i++)
set_sys_bit(map, i);
}
fill_sendto_mask(rp, &map);
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
kcalls = DSRV_KC; /* allowed kernel calls */
Initialization protocol for system services. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF framework now supports a new SEF Init request type from RS. 3 different callbacks are available (init_fresh, init_lu, init_restart) to specify initialization code when a service starts fresh, starts after a live update, or restarts. SYSTEM SERVICE CHANGES: - Initialization code for system services is now enclosed in a callback SEF will automatically call at init time. The return code of the callback will tell RS whether the initialization completed successfully. - Each init callback can access information passed by RS to initialize. As of now, each system service has access to the public entries of RS's system process table to gather all the information required to initialize. This design eliminates many existing or potential races at boot time and provides a uniform initialization interface to system services. The same interface will be reused for the upcoming publish/subscribe model to handle dynamic registration / deregistration of system services. VM CHANGES: - Uniform privilege management for all system services. Every service uses the same call mask format. For boot services, VM copies the call mask from init data. For dynamic services, VM still receives the call mask via rs_set_priv call that will be soon replaced by the upcoming publish/subscribe model. RS CHANGES: - The system process table has been reorganized and split into private entries and public entries. Only the latter ones are exposed to system services. - VM call masks are now entirely configured in rs/table.c - RS has now its own slot in the system process table. Only kernel tasks and user processes not included in the boot image are now left out from the system process table. - RS implements the initialization protocol for system services. - For services in the boot image, RS blocks till initialization is complete and panics when failure is reported back. Services are initialized in their order of appearance in the boot image priv table and RS blocks to implements synchronous initialization for every system service having the flag SF_SYNCH_BOOT set. - For services started dynamically, the initialization protocol is implemented as though it were the first ping for the service. In this case, if the system service fails to report back (or reports failure), RS brings the service down rather than trying to restart it.
2010-01-08 02:20:42 +01:00
for(i = 0; i < SYS_CALL_MASK_SIZE; i++) {
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask[i] = (kcalls == NO_C ? 0 : (~0));
Separate permissions for sendrec. Actually initialize send/sendrec permissions for data supplied by rs.
2007-04-23 15:30:04 +02:00
}
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
/* Set the default signal managers. */
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_sig_mgr = DSRV_SM;
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_bak_sig_mgr = NONE;
New RS and new signal handling for system processes. UPDATING INFO: 20100317: /usr/src/etc/system.conf updated to ignore default kernel calls: copy it (or merge it) to /etc/system.conf. The hello driver (/dev/hello) added to the distribution: # cd /usr/src/commands/scripts && make clean install # cd /dev && MAKEDEV hello KERNEL CHANGES: - Generic signal handling support. The kernel no longer assumes PM as a signal manager for every process. The signal manager of a given process can now be specified in its privilege slot. When a signal has to be delivered, the kernel performs the lookup and forwards the signal to the appropriate signal manager. PM is the default signal manager for user processes, RS is the default signal manager for system processes. To enable ptrace()ing for system processes, it is sufficient to change the default signal manager to PM. This will temporarily disable crash recovery, though. - sys_exit() is now split into sys_exit() (i.e. exit() for system processes, which generates a self-termination signal), and sys_clear() (i.e. used by PM to ask the kernel to clear a process slot when a process exits). - Added a new kernel call (i.e. sys_update()) to swap two process slots and implement live update. PM CHANGES: - Posix signal handling is no longer allowed for system processes. System signals are split into two fixed categories: termination and non-termination signals. When a non-termination signaled is processed, PM transforms the signal into an IPC message and delivers the message to the system process. When a termination signal is processed, PM terminates the process. - PM no longer assumes itself as the signal manager for system processes. It now makes sure that every system signal goes through the kernel before being actually processes. The kernel will then dispatch the signal to the appropriate signal manager which may or may not be PM. SYSLIB CHANGES: - Simplified SEF init and LU callbacks. - Added additional predefined SEF callbacks to debug crash recovery and live update. - Fixed a temporary ack in the SEF init protocol. SEF init reply is now completely synchronous. - Added SEF signal event type to provide a uniform interface for system processes to deal with signals. A sef_cb_signal_handler() callback is available for system processes to handle every received signal. A sef_cb_signal_manager() callback is used by signal managers to process system signals on behalf of the kernel. - Fixed a few bugs with memory mapping and DS. VM CHANGES: - Page faults and memory requests coming from the kernel are now implemented using signals. - Added a new VM call to swap two process slots and implement live update. - The call is used by RS at update time and in turn invokes the kernel call sys_update(). RS CHANGES: - RS has been reworked with a better functional decomposition. - Better kernel call masks. com.h now defines the set of very basic kernel calls every system service is allowed to use. This makes system.conf simpler and easier to maintain. In addition, this guarantees a higher level of isolation for system libraries that use one or more kernel calls internally (e.g. printf). - RS is the default signal manager for system processes. By default, RS intercepts every signal delivered to every system process. This makes crash recovery possible before bringing PM and friends in the loop. - RS now supports fast rollback when something goes wrong while initializing the new version during a live update. - Live update is now implemented by keeping the two versions side-by-side and swapping the process slots when the old version is ready to update. - Crash recovery is now implemented by keeping the two versions side-by-side and cleaning up the old version only when the recovery process is complete. DS CHANGES: - Fixed a bug when the process doing ds_publish() or ds_delete() is not known by DS. - Fixed the completely broken support for strings. String publishing is now implemented in the system library and simply wraps publishing of memory ranges. Ideally, we should adopt a similar approach for other data types as well. - Test suite fixed. DRIVER CHANGES: - The hello driver has been added to the Minix distribution to demonstrate basic live update and crash recovery functionalities. - Other drivers have been adapted to conform the new SEF interface.
2010-03-17 02:15:29 +01:00
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Set defaults for resources: no I/O resources, no memory resources,
* no IRQs, no grant table
*/
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range= 0;
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range= 0;
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq= 0;
Changed do_devio not to require DIO_TYPE, but to extract type from DIO_REQUEST. Also do_vdevio. Also do_sdevio, but this function also supports grant id's and offsets. do_segctl: rename protected to prot. do_umap: support for GRANT_SEG umap. do_privctl: support SYS_PRIV_SET_GRANTS, which sets location and size of in-own-address-space grant table. do_safecopy: functions to verify and perform 'safe' (grant-based) copies.
2006-06-20 12:03:10 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_grant_table= 0;
priv(rp)->s_grant_entries= 0;
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Override defaults if the caller has supplied a privilege structure. */
Initialize priv from user supplied priv structure in SYS_PRIV_INIT. Added SYS_PRIV_USER call to downgrade a privileged process to a user process.
2006-10-20 16:42:48 +02:00
if (m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR)
{
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
if((r = update_priv(rp, &priv)) != OK) {
return r;
}
Initialize priv from user supplied priv structure in SYS_PRIV_INIT. Added SYS_PRIV_USER call to downgrade a privileged process to a user process.
2006-10-20 16:42:48 +02:00
}
return(OK);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
case SYS_PRIV_SET_USER:
/* Set a privilege structure of a blocked user process. */
All macros defining rts flags are prefixed with RTS_ - macros used with RTS_SET group of macros to define struct proc p_rts_flags are now prefixed with RTS_ to make things clear
2009-11-10 10:11:13 +01:00
if (!RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV)) return(EPERM);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Link the process to the privilege structure of the root user
* process all the user processes share.
*/
priv(rp) = priv_addr(USER_PRIV_ID);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return(OK);
Initialize priv from user supplied priv structure in SYS_PRIV_INIT. Added SYS_PRIV_USER call to downgrade a privileged process to a user process.
2006-10-20 16:42:48 +02:00
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
case SYS_PRIV_ADD_IO:
All macros defining rts flags are prefixed with RTS_ - macros used with RTS_SET group of macros to define struct proc p_rts_flags are now prefixed with RTS_ to make things clear
2009-11-10 10:11:13 +01:00
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV))
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return(EPERM);
/* Only system processes get I/O resources? */
if (!(priv(rp)->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
return EPERM;
Disabled code to set ipc_stats_target.
2008-02-22 11:58:27 +01:00
#if 0 /* XXX -- do we need a call for this? */
if (strcmp(rp->p_name, "fxp") == 0 ||
strcmp(rp->p_name, "rtl8139") == 0)
{
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("setting ipc_stats_target to %d\n", rp->p_endpoint);
Disabled code to set ipc_stats_target.
2008-02-22 11:58:27 +01:00
ipc_stats_target= rp->p_endpoint;
}
#endif
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
/* Get the I/O range */
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
Removal of the system task * Userspace change to use the new kernel calls - _taskcall(SYSTASK...) changed to _kernel_call(...) - int 32 reused for the kernel calls - _do_kernel_call() to make the trap to kernel - kernel_call() to make the actuall kernel call from C using _do_kernel_call() - unlike ipc call the kernel call always succeeds as kernel is always available, however, kernel may return an error * Kernel side implementation of kernel calls - the SYSTEm task does not run, only the proc table entry is preserved - every data_copy(SYSTEM is no data_copy(KERNEL - "locking" is an empty operation now as everything runs in kernel - sys_task() is replaced by kernel_call() which copies the message into kernel, dispatches the call to its handler and finishes by either copying the results back to userspace (if need be) or by suspending the process because of VM - suspended processes are later made runnable once the memory issue is resolved, picked up by the scheduler and only at this time the call is resumed (in fact restarted) which does not need to copy the message from userspace as the message is already saved in the process structure. - no ned for the vmrestart queue, the scheduler will restart the system calls - no special case in do_vmctl(), all requests remove the RTS_VMREQUEST flag
2010-02-09 16:20:09 +01:00
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &io_range, sizeof(io_range));
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_IO_PORT; /* Check I/O accesses */
KERNEL - do_privctl() fix - after a driver is restarted, do not register permissions which are already set again.
2011-10-18 20:19:24 +02:00
for (i = 0; i < priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range; i++) {
if (priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_base == io_range.ior_base &&
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_limit == io_range.ior_limit)
return OK;
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range;
kernel: more diagnostics for privctl ENOMEM conditions.
2010-04-29 10:50:52 +02:00
if (i >= NR_IO_RANGE) {
printf("do_privctl: %d already has %d i/o ranges.\n",
rp->p_endpoint, i);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return ENOMEM;
kernel: more diagnostics for privctl ENOMEM conditions.
2010-04-29 10:50:52 +02:00
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_base= io_range.ior_base;
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_limit= io_range.ior_limit;
priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range++;
return OK;
Cleaned up table. Moved policies to table. Small fixes to do_copy, do_privctl and do_fork.
2005-08-02 17:28:09 +02:00
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
case SYS_PRIV_ADD_MEM:
All macros defining rts flags are prefixed with RTS_ - macros used with RTS_SET group of macros to define struct proc p_rts_flags are now prefixed with RTS_ to make things clear
2009-11-10 10:11:13 +01:00
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV))
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return(EPERM);
/* Only system processes get memory resources? */
if (!(priv(rp)->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
return EPERM;
/* Get the memory range */
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
if((r=data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
Removal of the system task * Userspace change to use the new kernel calls - _taskcall(SYSTASK...) changed to _kernel_call(...) - int 32 reused for the kernel calls - _do_kernel_call() to make the trap to kernel - kernel_call() to make the actuall kernel call from C using _do_kernel_call() - unlike ipc call the kernel call always succeeds as kernel is always available, however, kernel may return an error * Kernel side implementation of kernel calls - the SYSTEm task does not run, only the proc table entry is preserved - every data_copy(SYSTEM is no data_copy(KERNEL - "locking" is an empty operation now as everything runs in kernel - sys_task() is replaced by kernel_call() which copies the message into kernel, dispatches the call to its handler and finishes by either copying the results back to userspace (if need be) or by suspending the process because of VM - suspended processes are later made runnable once the memory issue is resolved, picked up by the scheduler and only at this time the call is resumed (in fact restarted) which does not need to copy the message from userspace as the message is already saved in the process structure. - no ned for the vmrestart queue, the scheduler will restart the system calls - no special case in do_vmctl(), all requests remove the RTS_VMREQUEST flag
2010-02-09 16:20:09 +01:00
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &mem_range, sizeof(mem_range))) != OK)
Basic VM and other minor improvements. Not complete, probably not fully debugged or optimized.
2008-11-19 13:26:10 +01:00
return r;
- enable remembering of device memory ranges set by PCI and told to kernel - makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory) - VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left by GQ - remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
2009-11-03 12:12:23 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_MEM; /* Check memory mappings */
KERNEL - do_privctl() fix - after a driver is restarted, do not register permissions which are already set again.
2011-10-18 20:19:24 +02:00
kernel: spelling fixes Change-Id: I73c759bdef98be35be77130895ae0ec497e1b954
2013-10-09 17:28:23 +02:00
/* When restarting a driver, check if it already has the permission */
KERNEL - do_privctl() fix - after a driver is restarted, do not register permissions which are already set again.
2011-10-18 20:19:24 +02:00
for (i = 0; i < priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range; i++) {
if (priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base == mem_range.mr_base &&
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit == mem_range.mr_limit)
return OK;
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range;
kernel: more diagnostics for privctl ENOMEM conditions.
2010-04-29 10:50:52 +02:00
if (i >= NR_MEM_RANGE) {
printf("do_privctl: %d already has %d mem ranges.\n",
rp->p_endpoint, i);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return ENOMEM;
kernel: more diagnostics for privctl ENOMEM conditions.
2010-04-29 10:50:52 +02:00
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base= mem_range.mr_base;
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit= mem_range.mr_limit;
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range++;
return OK;
case SYS_PRIV_ADD_IRQ:
All macros defining rts flags are prefixed with RTS_ - macros used with RTS_SET group of macros to define struct proc p_rts_flags are now prefixed with RTS_ to make things clear
2009-11-10 10:11:13 +01:00
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV))
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return(EPERM);
/* Only system processes get IRQs? */
if (!(priv(rp)->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
return EPERM;
This patch removes the global variables who_p and who_e from the kernel (sys task). The main reason is that these would have to become cpu local variables on SMP. Once the system task is not a task but a genuine part of the kernel there is even less reason to have these extra variables as proc_ptr will already contain all neccessary information. In addition converting who_e to the process pointer and back again all the time will be avoided. Although proc_ptr will contain all important information, accessing it as a cpu local variable will be fairly expensive, hence the value would be assigned to some on stack local variable. Therefore it is better to add the 'caller' argument to the syscall handlers to pass the value on stack anyway. It also clearly denotes on who's behalf is the syscall being executed. This patch also ANSIfies the syscall function headers. Last but not least, it also fixes a potential bug in virtual_copy_f() in case the check is disabled. So far the function in case of a failure could possible reuse an old who_p in case this function had not been called from the system task. virtual_copy_f() takes the caller as a parameter too. In case the checking is disabled, the caller must be NULL and non NULL if it is enabled as we must be able to suspend the caller.
2010-02-03 10:04:48 +01:00
data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
Removal of the system task * Userspace change to use the new kernel calls - _taskcall(SYSTASK...) changed to _kernel_call(...) - int 32 reused for the kernel calls - _do_kernel_call() to make the trap to kernel - kernel_call() to make the actuall kernel call from C using _do_kernel_call() - unlike ipc call the kernel call always succeeds as kernel is always available, however, kernel may return an error * Kernel side implementation of kernel calls - the SYSTEm task does not run, only the proc table entry is preserved - every data_copy(SYSTEM is no data_copy(KERNEL - "locking" is an empty operation now as everything runs in kernel - sys_task() is replaced by kernel_call() which copies the message into kernel, dispatches the call to its handler and finishes by either copying the results back to userspace (if need be) or by suspending the process because of VM - suspended processes are later made runnable once the memory issue is resolved, picked up by the scheduler and only at this time the call is resumed (in fact restarted) which does not need to copy the message from userspace as the message is already saved in the process structure. - no ned for the vmrestart queue, the scheduler will restart the system calls - no special case in do_vmctl(), all requests remove the RTS_VMREQUEST flag
2010-02-09 16:20:09 +01:00
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &irq, sizeof(irq));
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_IRQ; /* Check IRQs */
kernel: spelling fixes Change-Id: I73c759bdef98be35be77130895ae0ec497e1b954
2013-10-09 17:28:23 +02:00
/* When restarting a driver, check if it already has the permission */
KERNEL - do_privctl() fix - after a driver is restarted, do not register permissions which are already set again.
2011-10-18 20:19:24 +02:00
for (i = 0; i < priv(rp)->s_nr_irq; i++) {
if (priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i] == irq)
return OK;
}
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_irq;
kernel: more diagnostics for privctl ENOMEM conditions.
2010-04-29 10:50:52 +02:00
if (i >= NR_IRQ) {
printf("do_privctl: %d already has %d irq's.\n",
rp->p_endpoint, i);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return ENOMEM;
kernel: more diagnostics for privctl ENOMEM conditions.
2010-04-29 10:50:52 +02:00
}
- sys_privctl: don't mix message types - sys_privctl: remove CTL_MM_PRIV (third parameter) - remove obsolete sys_svrctl.c library file
2009-09-06 14:37:13 +02:00
priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i]= irq;
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq++;
return OK;
- enable remembering of device memory ranges set by PCI and told to kernel - makes VM ask the kernel if a certain process is allowed to map in a range of physical memory (VM rounds it to page boundaries afterwards - but it's impossible to map anything smaller otherwise so I assume this is safe, i.e. there won't be anything else in that page; certainly no regular memory) - VM permission check cleanup (no more hardcoded calls, less hardcoded logic, more readable main loop), a loose end left by GQ - remove do_copy warning, as the ipc server triggers this but it's no more harmful than the special cases already excluded explicitly (VFS, PM, etc).
2009-11-03 12:12:23 +01:00
case SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM:
{
phys_bytes addr, limit;
struct priv *sp;
/* See if a certain process is allowed to map in certain physical
* memory.
*/
addr = (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_PHYSSTART;
limit = addr + (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_PHYSLEN - 1;
if(limit < addr)
return EPERM;
if(!(sp = priv(rp)))
return EPERM;
if (!(sp->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
return EPERM;
for(i = 0; i < sp->s_nr_mem_range; i++) {
if(addr >= sp->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base &&
limit <= sp->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit)
return OK;
}
return EPERM;
}
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
case SYS_PRIV_UPDATE_SYS:
/* Update the privilege structure of a system process. */
if(!m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR) return EINVAL;
/* Copy privilege structure from caller */
if((r=data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &priv, sizeof(priv))) != OK)
return r;
/* Override settings in existing privilege structure. */
if((r = update_priv(rp, &priv)) != OK) {
return r;
}
return(OK);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
default:
no more kprintf - kernel uses libsys printf now, only kputc is special to the kernel.
2010-03-03 16:45:01 +01:00
printf("do_privctl: bad request %d\n", m_ptr->CTL_REQUEST);
Store resource lists for drivers. Limited checks to enforce those lists.
2006-01-27 14:21:12 +01:00
return EINVAL;
}
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
}
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* update_priv *
*===========================================================================*/
retire PUBLIC, PRIVATE and FORWARD
2012-03-25 20:25:53 +02:00
static int update_priv(struct proc *rp, struct priv *priv)
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
{
/* Update the privilege structure of a given process. */
Kernel/RS: fix permission computation with 32+ system processes
2010-12-07 11:32:42 +01:00
int i;
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
/* Copy s_flags and signal managers. */
priv(rp)->s_flags = priv->s_flags;
priv(rp)->s_sig_mgr = priv->s_sig_mgr;
priv(rp)->s_bak_sig_mgr = priv->s_bak_sig_mgr;
/* Copy IRQs. */
if(priv->s_flags & CHECK_IRQ) {
if (priv->s_nr_irq < 0 || priv->s_nr_irq > NR_IRQ)
return EINVAL;
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq= priv->s_nr_irq;
for (i= 0; i<priv->s_nr_irq; i++)
{
priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i]= priv->s_irq_tab[i];
#if PRIV_DEBUG
printf("do_privctl: adding IRQ %d for %d\n",
priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i], rp->p_endpoint);
#endif
}
}
/* Copy I/O ranges. */
if(priv->s_flags & CHECK_IO_PORT) {
if (priv->s_nr_io_range < 0 || priv->s_nr_io_range > NR_IO_RANGE)
return EINVAL;
priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range= priv->s_nr_io_range;
for (i= 0; i<priv->s_nr_io_range; i++)
{
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i]= priv->s_io_tab[i];
#if PRIV_DEBUG
printf("do_privctl: adding I/O range [%x..%x] for %d\n",
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_base,
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_limit,
rp->p_endpoint);
#endif
}
}
/* Copy memory ranges. */
if(priv->s_flags & CHECK_MEM) {
if (priv->s_nr_mem_range < 0 || priv->s_nr_mem_range > NR_MEM_RANGE)
return EINVAL;
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range= priv->s_nr_mem_range;
for (i= 0; i<priv->s_nr_mem_range; i++)
{
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i]= priv->s_mem_tab[i];
#if PRIV_DEBUG
printf("do_privctl: adding mem range [%x..%x] for %d\n",
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base,
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit,
rp->p_endpoint);
#endif
}
}
/* Copy trap mask. */
priv(rp)->s_trap_mask = priv->s_trap_mask;
/* Copy target mask. */
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
#if PRIV_DEBUG
printf("do_privctl: Setting ipc target mask for %d:");
for (i=0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i += BITCHUNK_BITS) {
change bitchunk_t from 16-bit to 32-bit
2010-12-21 11:44:45 +01:00
printf(" %08x", get_sys_bits(priv->s_ipc_to, i));
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
}
printf("\n");
#endif
Kernel/RS: fix permission computation with 32+ system processes
2010-12-07 11:32:42 +01:00
fill_sendto_mask(rp, &priv->s_ipc_to);
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
#if PRIV_DEBUG
printf("do_privctl: Set ipc target mask for %d:");
for (i=0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i += BITCHUNK_BITS) {
change bitchunk_t from 16-bit to 32-bit
2010-12-21 11:44:45 +01:00
printf(" %08x", get_sys_bits(priv(rp)->s_ipc_to, i));
Dynamic configuration in system.conf for boot system services.
2010-07-13 23:11:44 +02:00
}
printf("\n");
#endif
RS crash recovery support.
2010-07-07 00:05:21 +02:00
/* Copy kernel call mask. */
memcpy(priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask, priv->s_k_call_mask,
sizeof(priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask));
return OK;
}
*** empty log message ***
2005-07-22 11:20:43 +02:00
#endif /* USE_PRIVCTL */
Reference in a new issue Copy permalink