565f13088f
Change the kernel to add features to vircopy and safecopies so that transparent copy fixing won't happen to avoid deadlocks, and such copies fail with EFAULT. Transparently making copying work from filesystems (as normally done by the kernel & VM when copying fails because of missing/readonly memory) is problematic as it can happen that, for file-mapped ranges, that that same filesystem that is blocked on the copy request is needed to satisfy the memory range, leading to deadlock. Dito for VFS itself, if done with a blocking call. This change makes the copying done from a filesystem fail in such cases with EFAULT by VFS adding the CPF_TRY flag to the grants. If a FS call fails with EFAULT, VFS will then request the range to be made available to VM after the FS is unblocked, allowing it to be used to satisfy the range if need be in another VFS thread. Similarly, for datacopies that VFS itself does, it uses the failable vircopy variant and callers use a wrapper that talk to VM if necessary to get the copy to work. . kernel: add CPF_TRY flag to safecopies . kernel: only request writable ranges to VM for the target buffer when copying fails . do copying in VFS TRY-first . some fixes in VM to build SANITYCHECK mode . add regression test for the cases where - a FS system call needs memory mapped in a process that the FS itself must map. - such a range covers more than one file-mapped region. . add 'try' mode to vircopy, physcopy . add flags field to copy kernel call messages . if CP_FLAG_TRY is set, do not transparently try to fix memory ranges . for use by VFS when accessing user buffers to avoid deadlock . remove some obsolete backwards compatability assignments . VFS: let thread scheduling work for VM requests too Allows VFS to make calls to VM while suspending and resuming the currently running thread. Does currently not work for the main thread. . VM: add fix memory range call for use by VFS Change-Id: I295794269cea51a3163519a9cfe5901301d90b32
390 lines
11 KiB
C
390 lines
11 KiB
C
/* The kernel call implemented in this file:
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* m_type: SYS_SAFECOPYFROM or SYS_SAFECOPYTO or SYS_VSAFECOPY
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*
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* The parameters for this kernel call are:
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* SCP_FROM_TO other endpoint
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* SCP_GID grant id
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* SCP_OFFSET offset within granted space
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* SCP_ADDRESS address in own address space
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* SCP_BYTES bytes to be copied
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*
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* For the vectored variant (do_vsafecopy):
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* VSCP_VEC_ADDR address of vector
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* VSCP_VEC_SIZE number of significant elements in vector
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*/
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "kernel/system.h"
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#include "kernel/kernel.h"
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#include "kernel/vm.h"
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#define MAX_INDIRECT_DEPTH 5 /* up to how many indirect grants to follow? */
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#define MEM_TOP 0xFFFFFFFFUL
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static int safecopy(struct proc *, endpoint_t, endpoint_t,
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cp_grant_id_t, size_t, vir_bytes, vir_bytes, int);
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#define HASGRANTTABLE(gr) \
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(priv(gr) && priv(gr)->s_grant_table)
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/*===========================================================================*
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* verify_grant *
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*===========================================================================*/
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int verify_grant(granter, grantee, grant, bytes, access,
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offset_in, offset_result, e_granter, flags)
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endpoint_t granter, grantee; /* copyee, copyer */
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cp_grant_id_t grant; /* grant id */
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vir_bytes bytes; /* copy size */
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int access; /* direction (read/write) */
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vir_bytes offset_in; /* copy offset within grant */
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vir_bytes *offset_result; /* copy offset within virtual address space */
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endpoint_t *e_granter; /* new granter (magic grants) */
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u32_t *flags; /* CPF_* */
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{
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static cp_grant_t g;
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static int proc_nr;
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static const struct proc *granter_proc;
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int depth = 0;
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do {
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/* Get granter process slot (if valid), and check range of
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* grant id.
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*/
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if(!isokendpt(granter, &proc_nr) ) {
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printf(
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"grant verify failed: invalid granter %d\n", (int) granter);
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return(EINVAL);
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}
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if(!GRANT_VALID(grant)) {
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printf(
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"grant verify failed: invalid grant %d\n", (int) grant);
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return(EINVAL);
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}
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granter_proc = proc_addr(proc_nr);
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/* If there is no priv. structure, or no grant table in the
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* priv. structure, or the grant table in the priv. structure
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* is too small for the grant, return EPERM.
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*/
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if(!HASGRANTTABLE(granter_proc)) {
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printf(
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"grant verify failed: granter %d has no grant table\n",
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granter);
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return(EPERM);
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}
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if(priv(granter_proc)->s_grant_entries <= grant) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: grant verify failed in ep %d "
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"proc %d: grant %d out of range "
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"for table size %d\n",
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granter, proc_nr, grant,
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priv(granter_proc)->s_grant_entries);
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return(EPERM);
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}
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/* Copy the grant entry corresponding to this id to see what it
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* looks like. If it fails, hide the fact that granter has
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* (presumably) set an invalid grant table entry by returning
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* EPERM, just like with an invalid grant id.
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*/
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if(data_copy(granter,
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priv(granter_proc)->s_grant_table + sizeof(g)*grant,
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KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &g, sizeof(g)) != OK) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: grant verify: data_copy failed\n");
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return EPERM;
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}
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if(flags) *flags = g.cp_flags;
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/* Check validity. */
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if((g.cp_flags & (CPF_USED | CPF_VALID)) !=
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(CPF_USED | CPF_VALID)) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: grant failed: invalid (%d flags 0x%lx)\n",
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grant, g.cp_flags);
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* The given grant may be an indirect grant, that is, a grant
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* that provides permission to use a grant given to the
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* granter (i.e., for which it is the grantee). This can lead
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* to a chain of indirect grants which must be followed back.
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*/
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if((g.cp_flags & CPF_INDIRECT)) {
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/* Stop after a few iterations. There may be a loop. */
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if (depth == MAX_INDIRECT_DEPTH) {
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printf(
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"verify grant: indirect grant verify "
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"failed: exceeded maximum depth\n");
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return ELOOP;
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}
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depth++;
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/* Verify actual grantee. */
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if(g.cp_u.cp_indirect.cp_who_to != grantee &&
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grantee != ANY &&
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g.cp_u.cp_indirect.cp_who_to != ANY) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: indirect grant verify "
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"failed: bad grantee\n");
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Start over with new granter, grant, and grantee. */
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grantee = granter;
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granter = g.cp_u.cp_indirect.cp_who_from;
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grant = g.cp_u.cp_indirect.cp_grant;
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}
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} while(g.cp_flags & CPF_INDIRECT);
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/* Check access of grant. */
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if(((g.cp_flags & access) != access)) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: grant verify failed: access invalid; want 0x%x, have 0x%x\n",
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access, g.cp_flags);
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return EPERM;
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}
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if((g.cp_flags & CPF_DIRECT)) {
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/* Don't fiddle around with grants that wrap, arithmetic
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* below may be confused.
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*/
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if(MEM_TOP - g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_len + 1 <
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g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_start) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: direct grant verify failed: len too long\n");
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Verify actual grantee. */
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if(g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_who_to != grantee && grantee != ANY
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&& g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_who_to != ANY) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: direct grant verify failed: bad grantee\n");
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Verify actual copy range. */
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if((offset_in+bytes < offset_in) ||
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offset_in+bytes > g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_len) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: direct grant verify failed: bad size or range. "
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"granted %d bytes @ 0x%lx; wanted %d bytes @ 0x%lx\n",
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g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_len,
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g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_start,
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bytes, offset_in);
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Verify successful - tell caller what address it is. */
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*offset_result = g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_start + offset_in;
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*e_granter = granter;
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} else if(g.cp_flags & CPF_MAGIC) {
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/* Currently, it is hardcoded that only FS may do
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* magic grants.
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*/
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if(granter != VFS_PROC_NR) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: magic grant verify failed: granter (%d) "
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"is not FS (%d)\n", granter, VFS_PROC_NR);
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Verify actual grantee. */
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if(g.cp_u.cp_magic.cp_who_to != grantee && grantee != ANY
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&& g.cp_u.cp_direct.cp_who_to != ANY) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: magic grant verify failed: bad grantee\n");
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Verify actual copy range. */
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if((offset_in+bytes < offset_in) ||
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offset_in+bytes > g.cp_u.cp_magic.cp_len) {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: magic grant verify failed: bad size or range. "
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"granted %d bytes @ 0x%lx; wanted %d bytes @ 0x%lx\n",
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g.cp_u.cp_magic.cp_len,
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g.cp_u.cp_magic.cp_start,
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bytes, offset_in);
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return EPERM;
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}
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/* Verify successful - tell caller what address it is. */
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*offset_result = g.cp_u.cp_magic.cp_start + offset_in;
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*e_granter = g.cp_u.cp_magic.cp_who_from;
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} else {
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printf(
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"verify_grant: grant verify failed: unknown grant type\n");
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return EPERM;
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}
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return OK;
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}
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/*===========================================================================*
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* safecopy *
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*===========================================================================*/
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static int safecopy(caller, granter, grantee, grantid, bytes,
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g_offset, addr, access)
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struct proc * caller;
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endpoint_t granter, grantee;
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cp_grant_id_t grantid;
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size_t bytes;
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vir_bytes g_offset, addr;
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int access; /* CPF_READ for a copy from granter to grantee, CPF_WRITE
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* for a copy from grantee to granter.
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*/
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{
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static struct vir_addr v_src, v_dst;
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static vir_bytes v_offset;
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endpoint_t new_granter, *src, *dst;
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struct proc *granter_p;
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int r;
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u32_t flags;
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#if PERF_USE_COW_SAFECOPY
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vir_bytes size;
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#endif
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if(granter == NONE || grantee == NONE) {
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printf("safecopy: nonsense processes\n");
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return EFAULT;
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}
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/* See if there is a reasonable grant table. */
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if(!(granter_p = endpoint_lookup(granter))) return EINVAL;
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if(!HASGRANTTABLE(granter_p)) {
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printf(
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"safecopy failed: granter %d has no grant table\n", granter);
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return(EPERM);
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}
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/* Decide who is src and who is dst. */
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if(access & CPF_READ) {
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src = &granter;
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dst = &grantee;
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} else {
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src = &grantee;
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dst = &granter;
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}
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/* Verify permission exists. */
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if((r=verify_grant(granter, grantee, grantid, bytes, access,
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g_offset, &v_offset, &new_granter, &flags)) != OK) {
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printf(
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"grant %d verify to copy %d->%d by %d failed: err %d\n",
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grantid, *src, *dst, grantee, r);
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return r;
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}
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/* verify_grant() can redirect the grantee to someone else,
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* meaning the source or destination changes.
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*/
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granter = new_granter;
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/* Now it's a regular copy. */
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v_src.proc_nr_e = *src;
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v_dst.proc_nr_e = *dst;
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/* Now the offset in virtual addressing is known in 'offset'.
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* Depending on the access, this is the source or destination
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* address.
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*/
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if(access & CPF_READ) {
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v_src.offset = v_offset;
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v_dst.offset = (vir_bytes) addr;
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} else {
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v_src.offset = (vir_bytes) addr;
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v_dst.offset = v_offset;
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}
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/* Do the regular copy. */
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if(flags & CPF_TRY) {
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int r;
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/* Try copy without transparently faulting in pages. */
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r = virtual_copy(&v_src, &v_dst, bytes);
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if(r == EFAULT_SRC || r == EFAULT_DST) return EFAULT;
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return r;
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}
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return virtual_copy_vmcheck(caller, &v_src, &v_dst, bytes);
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}
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/*===========================================================================*
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* do_safecopy_to *
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*===========================================================================*/
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int do_safecopy_to(struct proc * caller, message * m_ptr)
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{
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return safecopy(caller, m_ptr->SCP_FROM_TO, caller->p_endpoint,
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(cp_grant_id_t) m_ptr->SCP_GID,
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m_ptr->SCP_BYTES, m_ptr->SCP_OFFSET,
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(vir_bytes) m_ptr->SCP_ADDRESS, CPF_WRITE);
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}
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/*===========================================================================*
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* do_safecopy_from *
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*===========================================================================*/
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int do_safecopy_from(struct proc * caller, message * m_ptr)
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{
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return safecopy(caller, m_ptr->SCP_FROM_TO, caller->p_endpoint,
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(cp_grant_id_t) m_ptr->SCP_GID,
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m_ptr->SCP_BYTES, m_ptr->SCP_OFFSET,
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(vir_bytes) m_ptr->SCP_ADDRESS, CPF_READ);
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}
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/*===========================================================================*
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* do_vsafecopy *
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*===========================================================================*/
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int do_vsafecopy(struct proc * caller, message * m_ptr)
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{
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static struct vscp_vec vec[SCPVEC_NR];
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static struct vir_addr src, dst;
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int r, i, els;
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size_t bytes;
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/* Set vector copy parameters. */
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src.proc_nr_e = caller->p_endpoint;
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assert(src.proc_nr_e != NONE);
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src.offset = (vir_bytes) m_ptr->VSCP_VEC_ADDR;
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dst.proc_nr_e = KERNEL;
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dst.offset = (vir_bytes) vec;
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/* No. of vector elements. */
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els = m_ptr->VSCP_VEC_SIZE;
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bytes = els * sizeof(struct vscp_vec);
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/* Obtain vector of copies. */
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if((r=virtual_copy_vmcheck(caller, &src, &dst, bytes)) != OK)
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return r;
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/* Perform safecopies. */
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for(i = 0; i < els; i++) {
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int access;
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endpoint_t granter;
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if(vec[i].v_from == SELF) {
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access = CPF_WRITE;
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granter = vec[i].v_to;
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} else if(vec[i].v_to == SELF) {
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access = CPF_READ;
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granter = vec[i].v_from;
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} else {
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printf("vsafecopy: %d: element %d/%d: no SELF found\n",
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caller->p_endpoint, i, els);
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return EINVAL;
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}
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/* Do safecopy for this element. */
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if((r=safecopy(caller, granter, caller->p_endpoint,
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vec[i].v_gid,
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vec[i].v_bytes, vec[i].v_offset,
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vec[i].v_addr, access)) != OK) {
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return r;
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}
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}
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return OK;
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}
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