cb176df60f
UPDATING INFO: 20100317: /usr/src/etc/system.conf updated to ignore default kernel calls: copy it (or merge it) to /etc/system.conf. The hello driver (/dev/hello) added to the distribution: # cd /usr/src/commands/scripts && make clean install # cd /dev && MAKEDEV hello KERNEL CHANGES: - Generic signal handling support. The kernel no longer assumes PM as a signal manager for every process. The signal manager of a given process can now be specified in its privilege slot. When a signal has to be delivered, the kernel performs the lookup and forwards the signal to the appropriate signal manager. PM is the default signal manager for user processes, RS is the default signal manager for system processes. To enable ptrace()ing for system processes, it is sufficient to change the default signal manager to PM. This will temporarily disable crash recovery, though. - sys_exit() is now split into sys_exit() (i.e. exit() for system processes, which generates a self-termination signal), and sys_clear() (i.e. used by PM to ask the kernel to clear a process slot when a process exits). - Added a new kernel call (i.e. sys_update()) to swap two process slots and implement live update. PM CHANGES: - Posix signal handling is no longer allowed for system processes. System signals are split into two fixed categories: termination and non-termination signals. When a non-termination signaled is processed, PM transforms the signal into an IPC message and delivers the message to the system process. When a termination signal is processed, PM terminates the process. - PM no longer assumes itself as the signal manager for system processes. It now makes sure that every system signal goes through the kernel before being actually processes. The kernel will then dispatch the signal to the appropriate signal manager which may or may not be PM. SYSLIB CHANGES: - Simplified SEF init and LU callbacks. - Added additional predefined SEF callbacks to debug crash recovery and live update. - Fixed a temporary ack in the SEF init protocol. SEF init reply is now completely synchronous. - Added SEF signal event type to provide a uniform interface for system processes to deal with signals. A sef_cb_signal_handler() callback is available for system processes to handle every received signal. A sef_cb_signal_manager() callback is used by signal managers to process system signals on behalf of the kernel. - Fixed a few bugs with memory mapping and DS. VM CHANGES: - Page faults and memory requests coming from the kernel are now implemented using signals. - Added a new VM call to swap two process slots and implement live update. - The call is used by RS at update time and in turn invokes the kernel call sys_update(). RS CHANGES: - RS has been reworked with a better functional decomposition. - Better kernel call masks. com.h now defines the set of very basic kernel calls every system service is allowed to use. This makes system.conf simpler and easier to maintain. In addition, this guarantees a higher level of isolation for system libraries that use one or more kernel calls internally (e.g. printf). - RS is the default signal manager for system processes. By default, RS intercepts every signal delivered to every system process. This makes crash recovery possible before bringing PM and friends in the loop. - RS now supports fast rollback when something goes wrong while initializing the new version during a live update. - Live update is now implemented by keeping the two versions side-by-side and swapping the process slots when the old version is ready to update. - Crash recovery is now implemented by keeping the two versions side-by-side and cleaning up the old version only when the recovery process is complete. DS CHANGES: - Fixed a bug when the process doing ds_publish() or ds_delete() is not known by DS. - Fixed the completely broken support for strings. String publishing is now implemented in the system library and simply wraps publishing of memory ranges. Ideally, we should adopt a similar approach for other data types as well. - Test suite fixed. DRIVER CHANGES: - The hello driver has been added to the Minix distribution to demonstrate basic live update and crash recovery functionalities. - Other drivers have been adapted to conform the new SEF interface.
316 lines
8.7 KiB
C
316 lines
8.7 KiB
C
/* The kernel call implemented in this file:
|
|
* m_type: SYS_PRIVCTL
|
|
*
|
|
* The parameters for this kernel call are:
|
|
* m2_i1: CTL_ENDPT (process endpoint of target)
|
|
* m2_i2: CTL_REQUEST (privilege control request)
|
|
* m2_p1: CTL_ARG_PTR (pointer to request data)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "../system.h"
|
|
#include "../ipc.h"
|
|
#include <signal.h>
|
|
#include <string.h>
|
|
#include <minix/endpoint.h>
|
|
|
|
#if USE_PRIVCTL
|
|
|
|
/*===========================================================================*
|
|
* do_privctl *
|
|
*===========================================================================*/
|
|
PUBLIC int do_privctl(struct proc * caller, message * m_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Handle sys_privctl(). Update a process' privileges. If the process is not
|
|
* yet a system process, make sure it gets its own privilege structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct proc *rp;
|
|
int proc_nr;
|
|
int priv_id;
|
|
int ipc_to_m, kcalls;
|
|
int i, r;
|
|
struct io_range io_range;
|
|
struct mem_range mem_range;
|
|
struct priv priv;
|
|
int irq;
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether caller is allowed to make this call. Privileged proceses
|
|
* can only update the privileges of processes that are inhibited from
|
|
* running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. This flag is set when a privileged process
|
|
* forks.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (! (priv(caller)->s_flags & SYS_PROC)) return(EPERM);
|
|
if(m_ptr->CTL_ENDPT == SELF) proc_nr = _ENDPOINT_P(caller->p_endpoint);
|
|
else if(!isokendpt(m_ptr->CTL_ENDPT, &proc_nr)) return(EINVAL);
|
|
rp = proc_addr(proc_nr);
|
|
|
|
switch(m_ptr->CTL_REQUEST)
|
|
{
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_ALLOW:
|
|
/* Allow process to run. Make sure its privilege structure has already
|
|
* been set.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV) || priv(rp)->s_proc_nr == NONE) {
|
|
return(EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
RTS_UNSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV);
|
|
return(OK);
|
|
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW:
|
|
/* Disallow process from running. */
|
|
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV)) return(EPERM);
|
|
RTS_SET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV);
|
|
return(OK);
|
|
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS:
|
|
/* Set a privilege structure of a blocked system process. */
|
|
if (! RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV)) return(EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/* Check whether a static or dynamic privilege id must be allocated. */
|
|
priv_id = NULL_PRIV_ID;
|
|
if (m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Copy privilege structure from caller */
|
|
if((r=data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
|
|
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &priv, sizeof(priv))) != OK)
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
/* See if the caller wants to assign a static privilege id. */
|
|
if(!(priv.s_flags & DYN_PRIV_ID)) {
|
|
priv_id = priv.s_id;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure this process has its own privileges structure. This may
|
|
* fail, since there are only a limited number of system processes.
|
|
* Then copy privileges from the caller and restore some defaults.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((i=get_priv(rp, priv_id)) != OK)
|
|
{
|
|
printf("do_privctl: unable to allocate priv_id %d: %d\n",
|
|
priv_id, i);
|
|
return(i);
|
|
}
|
|
priv_id = priv(rp)->s_id; /* backup privilege id */
|
|
*priv(rp) = *priv(caller); /* copy from caller */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_id = priv_id; /* restore privilege id */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_proc_nr = proc_nr; /* reassociate process nr */
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i< NR_SYS_CHUNKS; i++) /* remove pending: */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_notify_pending.chunk[i] = 0; /* - notifications */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_int_pending = 0; /* - interrupts */
|
|
sigemptyset(&priv(rp)->s_sig_pending); /* - signals */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_asyntab= -1; /* - asynsends */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_asynsize= 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Set defaults for privilege bitmaps. */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_flags= DEF_SYS_F; /* privilege flags */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_trap_mask= DEF_SYS_T; /* allowed traps */
|
|
ipc_to_m = DEF_SYS_M; /* allowed targets */
|
|
kcalls = DEF_SYS_KC; /* allowed kernel calls */
|
|
for(i = 0; i < SYS_CALL_MASK_SIZE; i++) {
|
|
priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask[i] = (kcalls == NO_C ? 0 : (~0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set the default signal manager. */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_sig_mgr = DEF_SYS_SM;
|
|
|
|
/* Set defaults for resources: no I/O resources, no memory resources,
|
|
* no IRQs, no grant table
|
|
*/
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range= 0;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range= 0;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq= 0;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_grant_table= 0;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_grant_entries= 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Override defaults if the caller has supplied a privilege structure. */
|
|
if (m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Copy s_flags and signal manager. */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_flags = priv.s_flags;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_sig_mgr = priv.s_sig_mgr;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy IRQs */
|
|
if(priv.s_flags & CHECK_IRQ) {
|
|
if (priv.s_nr_irq < 0 || priv.s_nr_irq > NR_IRQ)
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq= priv.s_nr_irq;
|
|
for (i= 0; i<priv.s_nr_irq; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i]= priv.s_irq_tab[i];
|
|
#if 0
|
|
printf("do_privctl: adding IRQ %d for %d\n",
|
|
priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i], rp->p_endpoint);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy I/O ranges */
|
|
if(priv.s_flags & CHECK_IO_PORT) {
|
|
if (priv.s_nr_io_range < 0 || priv.s_nr_io_range > NR_IO_RANGE)
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range= priv.s_nr_io_range;
|
|
for (i= 0; i<priv.s_nr_io_range; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i]= priv.s_io_tab[i];
|
|
#if 0
|
|
printf("do_privctl: adding I/O range [%x..%x] for %d\n",
|
|
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_base,
|
|
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_limit,
|
|
rp->p_endpoint);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy memory ranges */
|
|
if(priv.s_flags & CHECK_MEM) {
|
|
if (priv.s_nr_mem_range < 0 || priv.s_nr_mem_range > NR_MEM_RANGE)
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range= priv.s_nr_mem_range;
|
|
for (i= 0; i<priv.s_nr_mem_range; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i]= priv.s_mem_tab[i];
|
|
#if 0
|
|
printf("do_privctl: adding mem range [%x..%x] for %d\n",
|
|
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base,
|
|
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit,
|
|
rp->p_endpoint);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy trap mask. */
|
|
priv(rp)->s_trap_mask = priv.s_trap_mask;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy target mask. */
|
|
memcpy(&ipc_to_m, &priv.s_ipc_to, sizeof(ipc_to_m));
|
|
|
|
/* Copy kernel call mask. */
|
|
memcpy(priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask, priv.s_k_call_mask,
|
|
sizeof(priv(rp)->s_k_call_mask));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fill in target mask. */
|
|
for (i=0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i++) {
|
|
if (ipc_to_m & (1 << i))
|
|
set_sendto_bit(rp, i);
|
|
else
|
|
unset_sendto_bit(rp, i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(OK);
|
|
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_SET_USER:
|
|
/* Set a privilege structure of a blocked user process. */
|
|
if (!RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV)) return(EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/* Link the process to the privilege structure of the root user
|
|
* process all the user processes share.
|
|
*/
|
|
priv(rp) = priv_addr(USER_PRIV_ID);
|
|
|
|
return(OK);
|
|
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_ADD_IO:
|
|
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV))
|
|
return(EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/* Only system processes get I/O resources? */
|
|
if (!(priv(rp)->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* XXX -- do we need a call for this? */
|
|
if (strcmp(rp->p_name, "fxp") == 0 ||
|
|
strcmp(rp->p_name, "rtl8139") == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
printf("setting ipc_stats_target to %d\n", rp->p_endpoint);
|
|
ipc_stats_target= rp->p_endpoint;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Get the I/O range */
|
|
data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
|
|
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &io_range, sizeof(io_range));
|
|
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_IO_PORT; /* Check I/O accesses */
|
|
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range;
|
|
if (i >= NR_IO_RANGE)
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_base= io_range.ior_base;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_io_tab[i].ior_limit= io_range.ior_limit;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_io_range++;
|
|
|
|
return OK;
|
|
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_ADD_MEM:
|
|
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV))
|
|
return(EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/* Only system processes get memory resources? */
|
|
if (!(priv(rp)->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the memory range */
|
|
if((r=data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
|
|
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &mem_range, sizeof(mem_range))) != OK)
|
|
return r;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_MEM; /* Check memory mappings */
|
|
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range;
|
|
if (i >= NR_MEM_RANGE)
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base= mem_range.mr_base;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit= mem_range.mr_limit;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_mem_range++;
|
|
|
|
return OK;
|
|
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_ADD_IRQ:
|
|
if (RTS_ISSET(rp, RTS_NO_PRIV))
|
|
return(EPERM);
|
|
|
|
/* Only system processes get IRQs? */
|
|
if (!(priv(rp)->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
|
|
data_copy(caller->p_endpoint, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_ARG_PTR,
|
|
KERNEL, (vir_bytes) &irq, sizeof(irq));
|
|
priv(rp)->s_flags |= CHECK_IRQ; /* Check IRQs */
|
|
|
|
i= priv(rp)->s_nr_irq;
|
|
if (i >= NR_IRQ)
|
|
return ENOMEM;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_irq_tab[i]= irq;
|
|
priv(rp)->s_nr_irq++;
|
|
|
|
return OK;
|
|
case SYS_PRIV_QUERY_MEM:
|
|
{
|
|
phys_bytes addr, limit;
|
|
struct priv *sp;
|
|
/* See if a certain process is allowed to map in certain physical
|
|
* memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
addr = (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_PHYSSTART;
|
|
limit = addr + (phys_bytes) m_ptr->CTL_PHYSLEN - 1;
|
|
if(limit < addr)
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
if(!(sp = priv(rp)))
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
if (!(sp->s_flags & SYS_PROC))
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
for(i = 0; i < sp->s_nr_mem_range; i++) {
|
|
if(addr >= sp->s_mem_tab[i].mr_base &&
|
|
limit <= sp->s_mem_tab[i].mr_limit)
|
|
return OK;
|
|
}
|
|
return EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
printf("do_privctl: bad request %d\n", m_ptr->CTL_REQUEST);
|
|
return EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* USE_PRIVCTL */
|
|
|