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minix/usr.sbin/syslogd/tls.c
Lionel Sambuc ebfedea0ce Importing crypto libraries 
- crypto/external/bsd/heimdal
 - crypto/external/bsd/libsaslc
 - crypto/external/bsd/netpgp
 - crypto/external/bsd/openssl

Change-Id: I91dbf05f33e637edf5b9bb408d5baddd7ba8cf75
2015-10-07 23:37:12 +02:00

2191 lines
63 KiB
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/* $NetBSD: tls.c,v 1.11 2013/05/27 23:15:51 christos Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2008 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Martin Schütte.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the NetBSD
* Foundation, Inc. and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* tls.c TLS related code for syslogd
*
* implements the TLS init and handshake callbacks with all required
* checks from http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls-13
*
* Martin Schütte
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__RCSID("$NetBSD: tls.c,v 1.11 2013/05/27 23:15:51 christos Exp $");
#ifndef DISABLE_TLS
#include "syslogd.h"
#include "tls.h"
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <ifaddrs.h>
#include "extern.h"
static unsigned getVerifySetting(const char *x509verifystring);
/* to output SSL error codes */
static const char *SSL_ERRCODE[] = {
"SSL_ERROR_NONE",
"SSL_ERROR_SSL",
"SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ",
"SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE",
"SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP",
"SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL",
"SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN",
"SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT",
"SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT"};
/* TLS connection states -- keep in sync with symbols in .h */
static const char *TLS_CONN_STATES[] = {
"ST_NONE",
"ST_TLS_EST",
"ST_TCP_EST",
"ST_CONNECTING",
"ST_ACCEPTING",
"ST_READING",
"ST_WRITING",
"ST_EOF",
"ST_CLOSING0",
"ST_CLOSING1",
"ST_CLOSING2"};
DH *get_dh1024(void);
/* DH parameter precomputed with "openssl dhparam -C -2 1024" */
#ifndef HEADER_DH_H
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
DH *
get_dh1024(void)
{
static const unsigned char dh1024_p[]={
0x94,0xBC,0xC4,0x71,0xD4,0xD3,0x2B,0x17,0x69,0xEA,0x82,0x1B,
0x0F,0x86,0x45,0x57,0xF8,0x86,0x2C,0xC8,0xF5,0x37,0x1F,0x1F,
0x12,0xDA,0x2C,0x62,0x4C,0xF6,0x95,0xF0,0xE4,0x6A,0x63,0x00,
0x32,0x54,0x5F,0xA9,0xAA,0x2E,0xD2,0xD3,0xA5,0x7A,0x4E,0xCF,
0xE8,0x2A,0xF6,0xAB,0xAF,0xD3,0x71,0x3E,0x75,0x9E,0x6B,0xF3,
0x2E,0x6D,0x97,0x42,0xC2,0x45,0xC0,0x03,0xE1,0x17,0xA4,0x39,
0xF6,0x36,0xA7,0x11,0xBD,0x30,0xF6,0x6F,0x21,0xBF,0x28,0xE4,
0xF9,0xE1,0x1E,0x48,0x72,0x58,0xA9,0xC8,0x61,0x65,0xDB,0x66,
0x36,0xA3,0x77,0x0A,0x81,0x79,0x2C,0x45,0x1E,0x97,0xA6,0xB1,
0xD9,0x25,0x9C,0x28,0x96,0x91,0x40,0xF8,0xF6,0x86,0x11,0x9C,
0x88,0xEC,0xA6,0xBA,0x9F,0x4F,0x85,0x43 };
static const unsigned char dh1024_g[]={ 0x02 };
DH *dh;
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL)) {
DH_free(dh);
return NULL;
}
return dh;
}
#define ST_CHANGE(x, y) do { \
if ((x) != (y)) { \
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Change state: %s --> %s\n", \
TLS_CONN_STATES[x], TLS_CONN_STATES[y]); \
(x) = (y); \
} \
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/0)
static unsigned
getVerifySetting(const char *x509verifystring)
{
if (!x509verifystring)
return X509VERIFY_ALWAYS;
if (!strcasecmp(x509verifystring, "off"))
return X509VERIFY_NONE;
else if (!strcasecmp(x509verifystring, "opt"))
return X509VERIFY_IFPRESENT;
else
return X509VERIFY_ALWAYS;
}
/*
* init OpenSSL lib and one context.
* returns NULL if global context already exists.
* returns a status message on successfull init (to be free()d by caller).
* calls die() on serious error.
*/
char*
init_global_TLS_CTX(void)
{
const char *keyfilename = tls_opt.keyfile;
const char *certfilename = tls_opt.certfile;
const char *CAfile = tls_opt.CAfile;
const char *CApath = tls_opt.CAdir;
SSL_CTX *ctx;
unsigned x509verify = X509VERIFY_ALWAYS;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
FILE *certfile = NULL;
FILE *keyfile = NULL;
unsigned long err;
char *fp = NULL, *cn = NULL;
char statusmsg[1024];
if (tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX) /* already initialized */
return NULL;
x509verify = getVerifySetting(tls_opt.x509verify);
if (x509verify != X509VERIFY_ALWAYS)
loginfo("insecure configuration, peer authentication disabled");
if (!(ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method()))) {
logerror("Unable to initialize OpenSSL: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
die(0,0,NULL);
}
if (!keyfilename)
keyfilename = DEFAULT_X509_KEYFILE;
if (!certfilename)
certfilename = DEFAULT_X509_CERTFILE;
/* TODO: would it be better to use stat() for access checking? */
if (!(keyfile = fopen(keyfilename, "r"))
&& !(certfile = fopen(certfilename, "r"))) {
errno = 0;
if (!tls_opt.gen_cert) {
logerror("TLS certificate files \"%s\" and \"%s\""
"not readable. Please configure them with "
"\"tls_cert\" and \"tls_key\" or set "
"\"tls_gen_cert=1\" to generate a new "
"certificate", keyfilename, certfilename);
die(0,0,NULL);
}
loginfo("Generating a self-signed certificate and writing "
"files \"%s\" and \"%s\"", keyfilename, certfilename);
if (!mk_x509_cert(&cert, &pkey, TLS_GENCERT_BITS,
TLS_GENCERT_SERIAL, TLS_GENCERT_DAYS)) {
logerror("Unable to generate new certificate.");
die(0,0,NULL);
}
if (!write_x509files(pkey, cert,
keyfilename, certfilename)) {
logerror("Unable to write certificate to files \"%s\""
" and \"%s\"", keyfilename, certfilename);
/* not fatal */
}
}
if (keyfile)
(void)fclose(keyfile);
if (certfile)
(void)fclose(certfile);
errno = 0;
/* if generated, then use directly */
if (cert && pkey) {
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey)
|| !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, cert)) {
logerror("Unable to use generated private "
"key and certificate: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
die(0,0,NULL); /* any better reaction? */
}
} else {
/* load keys and certs from files */
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, keyfilename,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
|| !SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, certfilename)) {
logerror("Unable to load private key and "
"certificate from files \"%s\" and \"%s\": %s",
keyfilename, certfilename,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
die(0,0,NULL); /* any better reaction? */
}
}
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
logerror("Private key \"%s\" does not match "
"certificate \"%s\": %s",
keyfilename, certfilename,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
die(0,0,NULL);
}
if (CAfile || CApath) {
if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath) != 1) {
if (CAfile && CApath)
logerror("unable to load trust anchors from "
"\"%s\" and \"%s\": %s\n",
CAfile, CApath, ERR_error_string(
ERR_get_error(), NULL));
else
logerror("unable to load trust anchors from "
"\"%s\": %s\n", (CAfile?CAfile:CApath),
ERR_error_string(
ERR_get_error(), NULL));
} else {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "loaded trust anchors\n");
}
}
/* options */
(void)SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
(void)SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
/* peer verification */
if ((x509verify == X509VERIFY_NONE)
|| (x509verify == X509VERIFY_IFPRESENT))
/* ask for cert, but a client does not have to send one */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, check_peer_cert);
else
/* default: ask for cert and check it */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT,
check_peer_cert);
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, get_dh1024()) != 1)
logerror("SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() failed: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
/* make sure the OpenSSL error queue is empty */
while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
logerror("Unexpected OpenSSL error: %s",
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
/* On successful init the status message is not logged immediately
* but passed to the caller. The reason is that init() can continue
* to initialize syslog-sign. When the status message is logged
* after that it will get a valid signature and not cause errors
* with signature verification.
*/
if (cert || read_certfile(&cert, certfilename)) {
get_fingerprint(cert, &fp, NULL);
get_commonname(cert, &cn);
}
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "loaded and checked own certificate\n");
snprintf(statusmsg, sizeof(statusmsg),
"Initialized TLS settings using library \"%s\". "
"Use certificate from file \"%s\" with CN \"%s\" "
"and fingerprint \"%s\"", SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION),
certfilename, cn, fp);
free(cn);
free(fp);
tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX = ctx;
return strdup(statusmsg);
}
/*
* get fingerprint of cert
* returnstring will be allocated and should be free()d by the caller
* alg_name selects an algorithm, if it is NULL then DEFAULT_FINGERPRINT_ALG
* (should be "sha-1") will be used
* return value and non-NULL *returnstring indicate success
*/
bool
get_fingerprint(const X509 *cert, char **returnstring, const char *alg_name)
{
#define MAX_ALG_NAME_LENGTH 8
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
char fp_val[4];
size_t memsize, i;
unsigned len;
const EVP_MD *digest;
const char *openssl_algname;
/* RFC nnnn uses hash function names from
* http://www.iana.org/assignments/hash-function-text-names/
* in certificate fingerprints.
* We have to map them to the hash function names used by OpenSSL.
* Actually we use the union of both namespaces to be RFC compliant
* and to let the user use "openssl -fingerprint ..."
*
* Intended behaviour is to prefer the IANA names,
* but allow the user to use OpenSSL names as well
* (e.g. for "RIPEMD160" wich has no IANA name)
*/
static const struct hash_alg_namemap {
const char *iana;
const char *openssl;
} hash_alg_namemap[] = {
{"md2", "MD2" },
{"md5", "MD5" },
{"sha-1", "SHA1" },
{"sha-224", "SHA224"},
{"sha-256", "SHA256"},
{"sha-384", "SHA384"},
{"sha-512", "SHA512"}
};
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "get_fingerprint(cert@%p, return@%p, alg \"%s\")\n",
cert, returnstring, alg_name);
*returnstring = NULL;
if (!alg_name)
alg_name = DEFAULT_FINGERPRINT_ALG;
openssl_algname = alg_name;
for (i = 0; i < A_CNT(hash_alg_namemap); i++)
if (!strcasecmp(alg_name, hash_alg_namemap[i].iana))
openssl_algname = hash_alg_namemap[i].openssl;
if (!(digest = (const EVP_MD *) EVP_get_digestbyname(
__UNCONST(openssl_algname)))) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "unknown digest algorithm %s\n",
openssl_algname);
return false;
}
if (!X509_digest(cert, digest, md, &len)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "cannot get %s digest\n", openssl_algname);
return false;
}
/* 'normalise' and translate back to IANA name */
alg_name = openssl_algname = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_type(digest));
for (i = 0; i < A_CNT(hash_alg_namemap); i++)
if (!strcasecmp(openssl_algname, hash_alg_namemap[i].openssl))
alg_name = hash_alg_namemap[i].iana;
/* needed memory: 3 string bytes for every binary byte with delimiter
* + max_iana_strlen with delimiter */
memsize = (len * 3) + strlen(alg_name) + 1;
MALLOC(*returnstring, memsize);
(void)strlcpy(*returnstring, alg_name, memsize);
(void)strlcat(*returnstring, ":", memsize);
/* append the fingeprint data */
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
(void)snprintf(fp_val, sizeof(fp_val),
"%02X:", (unsigned) md[i]);
(void)strlcat(*returnstring, fp_val, memsize);
}
return true;
}
/*
* gets first CN from cert in returnstring (has to be freed by caller)
* on failure it returns false and *returnstring is NULL
*/
bool
get_commonname(X509 *cert, char **returnstring)
{
X509_NAME *x509name;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
unsigned char *ubuf;
int len, i;
x509name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509name, NID_commonName, -1);
if (i != -1) {
entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(x509name, i);
len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&ubuf,
X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry));
if (len > 0) {
MALLOC(*returnstring, (size_t)len+1);
strlcpy(*returnstring, (const char*)ubuf, len+1);
OPENSSL_free(ubuf);
return true;
}
OPENSSL_free(ubuf);
}
*returnstring = NULL;
return false;
}
/*
* test if cert matches as configured hostname or IP
* checks a 'really used' hostname and optionally a second expected subject
* against iPAddresses, dnsNames and commonNames
*
* TODO: wildcard matching for dnsNames is not implemented.
* in transport-tls that is a MAY, and I do not trust them anyway.
* but there might be demand for, so it's a todo item.
*/
bool
match_hostnames(X509 *cert, const char *hostname, const char *subject)
{
int i, len, num;
char *buf;
unsigned char *ubuf;
GENERAL_NAMES *gennames;
GENERAL_NAME *gn;
X509_NAME *x509name;
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *asn1_ip, *asn1_cn_ip;
int crit, idx;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "match_hostnames(%p, \"%s\", \"%s\")\n",
cert, hostname, subject);
/* see if hostname is an IP */
if ((subject && (asn1_ip = a2i_IPADDRESS(subject )))
|| (hostname && (asn1_ip = a2i_IPADDRESS(hostname))))
/* nothing */;
else
asn1_ip = NULL;
if (!(gennames = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
&crit, &idx))) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "X509_get_ext_d2i() returned (%p,%d,%d) "
"--> no subjectAltName\n", gennames, crit, idx);
} else {
num = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gennames);
if (asn1_ip) {
/* first loop: check IPs */
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gennames, i);
if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD
&& !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(asn1_ip,
gn->d.iPAddress))
return true;
}
}
/* second loop: check DNS names */
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gennames, i);
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
buf = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
len = ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
if (!strncasecmp(subject, buf, len)
|| !strncasecmp(hostname, buf, len))
return true;
}
}
}
/* check commonName; not sure if more than one CNs possible, but we
* will look at all of them */
x509name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509name, NID_commonName, -1);
while (i != -1) {
entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(x509name, i);
len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&ubuf,
X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry));
if (len > 0) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "found CN: %.*s\n", len, ubuf);
/* hostname */
if ((subject && !strncasecmp(subject,
(const char*)ubuf, len))
|| (hostname && !strncasecmp(hostname,
(const char*)ubuf, len))) {
OPENSSL_free(ubuf);
return true;
}
OPENSSL_free(ubuf);
/* IP -- convert to ASN1_OCTET_STRING and compare then
* so that "10.1.2.3" and "10.01.02.03" are equal */
if ((asn1_ip)
&& subject
&& (asn1_cn_ip = a2i_IPADDRESS(subject))
&& !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(asn1_ip, asn1_cn_ip)) {
return true;
}
}
i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(x509name, NID_commonName, i);
}
return false;
}
/*
* check if certificate matches given fingerprint
*/
bool
match_fingerprint(const X509 *cert, const char *fingerprint)
{
#define MAX_ALG_NAME_LENGTH 8
char alg[MAX_ALG_NAME_LENGTH];
char *certfingerprint;
char *p;
const char *q;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "match_fingerprint(cert@%p, fp \"%s\")\n",
cert, fingerprint);
if (!fingerprint)
return false;
/* get algorithm */
p = alg;
q = fingerprint;
while (*q != ':' && *q != '\0' && p < alg + MAX_ALG_NAME_LENGTH)
*p++ = *q++;
*p = '\0';
if (!get_fingerprint(cert, &certfingerprint, alg)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "cannot get %s digest\n", alg);
return false;
}
if (strncmp(certfingerprint, fingerprint, strlen(certfingerprint))) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "fail: fingerprints do not match\n");
free(certfingerprint);
return false;
}
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "accepted: fingerprints match\n");
free(certfingerprint);
return true;
}
/*
* check if certificate matches given certificate file
*/
bool
match_certfile(const X509 *cert1, const char *certfilename)
{
X509 *cert2;
char *fp1, *fp2;
bool rc = false;
errno = 0;
if (read_certfile(&cert2, certfilename)
&& get_fingerprint(cert1, &fp1, NULL)
&& get_fingerprint(cert2, &fp2, NULL)) {
if (!strcmp(fp1, fp2))
rc = true;
FREEPTR(fp1);
FREEPTR(fp2);
}
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "match_certfile(cert@%p, file \"%s\") "
"returns %d\n", cert1, certfilename, rc);
return rc;
}
/*
* reads X.509 certificate from file
* caller has to free it later with 'OPENSSL_free(cert);'
*/
bool
read_certfile(X509 **cert, const char *certfilename)
{
FILE *certfile;
errno = 0;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "read_certfile(%p, \"%s\")\n",
cert, certfilename);
if (!cert || !certfilename)
return false;
if (!(certfile = fopen(certfilename, "rb"))) {
logerror("Unable to open certificate file: %s", certfilename);
return false;
}
/* either PEM or DER */
if (!(*cert = PEM_read_X509(certfile, NULL, NULL, NULL))
&& !(*cert = d2i_X509_fp(certfile, NULL))) {
DPRINTF((D_TLS), "Unable to read certificate from %s\n",
certfilename);
(void)fclose(certfile);
return false;
}
else {
DPRINTF((D_TLS), "Read certificate from %s\n", certfilename);
(void)fclose(certfile);
return true;
}
}
/* used for incoming connections in check_peer_cert() */
int
accept_cert(const char* reason, struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info,
char *cur_fingerprint, char *cur_subjectline)
{
/* When using DSA keys the callback gets called twice.
* This flag avoids multiple log messages for the same connection.
*/
if (!conn_info->accepted)
loginfo("Established connection and accepted %s certificate "
"from %s due to %s. Subject is \"%s\", fingerprint is"
" \"%s\"", conn_info->incoming ? "server" : "client",
conn_info->hostname, reason, cur_subjectline,
cur_fingerprint);
if (cur_fingerprint && !conn_info->fingerprint)
conn_info->fingerprint = cur_fingerprint;
else
FREEPTR(cur_fingerprint);
if (cur_subjectline && !conn_info->subject)
conn_info->subject = cur_subjectline;
else
FREEPTR(cur_subjectline);
conn_info->accepted = true;
return 1;
}
int
deny_cert(struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info,
char *cur_fingerprint, char *cur_subjectline)
{
if (!conn_info->accepted)
loginfo("Deny %s certificate from %s. "
"Subject is \"%s\", fingerprint is \"%s\"",
conn_info->incoming ? "client" : "server",
conn_info->hostname,
cur_subjectline, cur_fingerprint);
else
logerror("Error with TLS %s certificate authentication, "
"already approved certificate became invalid. "
"Subject is \"%s\", fingerprint is \"%s\"",
conn_info->incoming ? "client" : "server",
cur_subjectline, cur_fingerprint);
FREEPTR(cur_fingerprint);
FREEPTR(cur_subjectline);
return 0;
}
/*
* Callback after OpenSSL has verified a peer certificate,
* gets called for every certificate in a chain (starting with root CA).
* preverify_ok indicates a valid trust path (necessary),
* then we check whether the hostname or configured subject matches the cert.
*/
int
check_peer_cert(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char *cur_subjectline = NULL;
char *cur_fingerprint = NULL;
char cur_issuerline[256];
SSL *ssl;
X509 *cur_cert;
int cur_err, cur_depth;
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info;
struct peer_cred *cred, *tmp_cred;
/* read context info */
cur_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
cur_err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
cur_depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
conn_info = SSL_get_app_data(ssl);
/* some info */
(void)get_commonname(cur_cert, &cur_subjectline);
(void)get_fingerprint(cur_cert, &cur_fingerprint, NULL);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "check cert for connection with %s. "
"depth is %d, preverify is %d, subject is %s, fingerprint "
"is %s, conn_info@%p%s\n", conn_info->hostname, cur_depth,
preverify_ok, cur_subjectline, cur_fingerprint, conn_info,
(conn_info->accepted ? ", cb was already called" : ""));
if (Debug && !preverify_ok) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "openssl verify error:"
"num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\t\n", cur_err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(cur_err),
cur_depth, cur_subjectline);
if (cur_err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT) {
X509_NAME_oneline(
X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
cur_issuerline, sizeof(cur_issuerline));
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "openssl verify error:missing "
"cert for issuer=%s\n", cur_issuerline);
}
}
/*
* quite a lot of variables here,
* the big if/elseif covers all possible combinations.
*
* here is a list, ordered like the conditions below:
* - conn_info->x509verify
* X509VERIFY_NONE: do not verify certificates,
* only log its subject and fingerprint
* X509VERIFY_IFPRESENT: if we got her, then a cert is present,
* so check it normally
* X509VERIFY_ALWAYS: normal certificate check
* - cur_depth:
* > 0: peer provided CA cert. remember if its valid,
* but always accept, because most checks work on depth 0
* == 0: the peer's own cert. check this for final decision
* - preverify_ok:
* true: valid certificate chain from a trust anchor to this cert
* false: no valid and trusted certificate chain
* - conn_info->incoming:
* true: we are the server, means we authenticate against all
* allowed attributes in tls_opt
* false: otherwise we are client and conn_info has all attributes
* to check
* - conn_info->fingerprint (only if !conn_info->incoming)
* NULL: no fingerprint configured, only check certificate chain
* !NULL: a peer cert with this fingerprint is trusted
*
*/
/* shortcut */
if (cur_depth != 0) {
FREEPTR(cur_fingerprint);
FREEPTR(cur_subjectline);
return 1;
}
if (conn_info->x509verify == X509VERIFY_NONE)
return accept_cert("disabled verification", conn_info,
cur_fingerprint, cur_subjectline);
/* implicit: (cur_depth == 0)
* && (conn_info->x509verify != X509VERIFY_NONE) */
if (conn_info->incoming) {
if (preverify_ok)
return accept_cert("valid certificate chain",
conn_info, cur_fingerprint, cur_subjectline);
/* else: now check allowed client fingerprints/certs */
SLIST_FOREACH(cred, &tls_opt.fprint_head, entries) {
if (match_fingerprint(cur_cert, cred->data)) {
return accept_cert("matching fingerprint",
conn_info, cur_fingerprint,
cur_subjectline);
}
}
SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(cred, &tls_opt.cert_head,
entries, tmp_cred) {
if (match_certfile(cur_cert, cred->data))
return accept_cert("matching certfile",
conn_info, cur_fingerprint,
cur_subjectline);
}
return deny_cert(conn_info, cur_fingerprint, cur_subjectline);
}
/* implicit: (cur_depth == 0)
* && (conn_info->x509verify != X509VERIFY_NONE)
* && !conn_info->incoming */
if (!conn_info->incoming && preverify_ok) {
/* certificate chain OK. check subject/hostname */
if (match_hostnames(cur_cert, conn_info->hostname,
conn_info->subject))
return accept_cert("matching hostname/subject",
conn_info, cur_fingerprint, cur_subjectline);
else
return deny_cert(conn_info, cur_fingerprint,
cur_subjectline);
} else if (!conn_info->incoming && !preverify_ok) {
/* chain not OK. check fingerprint/subject/hostname */
if (match_fingerprint(cur_cert, conn_info->fingerprint))
return accept_cert("matching fingerprint", conn_info,
cur_fingerprint, cur_subjectline);
else if (match_certfile(cur_cert, conn_info->certfile))
return accept_cert("matching certfile", conn_info,
cur_fingerprint, cur_subjectline);
else
return deny_cert(conn_info, cur_fingerprint,
cur_subjectline);
}
FREEPTR(cur_fingerprint);
FREEPTR(cur_subjectline);
return 0;
}
/*
* Create TCP sockets for incoming TLS connections.
* To be used like socksetup(), hostname and port are optional,
* returns bound stream sockets.
*/
struct socketEvent *
socksetup_tls(const int af, const char *bindhostname, const char *port)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *res, *r;
int error, maxs;
const int on = 1;
struct socketEvent *s, *socks;
if(!tls_opt.server
|| !tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX)
return NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
hints.ai_family = af;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
error = getaddrinfo(bindhostname, (port ? port : "syslog-tls"),
&hints, &res);
if (error) {
logerror("%s", gai_strerror(error));
errno = 0;
die(0, 0, NULL);
}
/* Count max number of sockets we may open */
for (maxs = 0, r = res; r; r = r->ai_next, maxs++)
continue;
socks = malloc((maxs+1) * sizeof(*socks));
if (!socks) {
logerror("Unable to allocate memory for sockets");
die(0, 0, NULL);
}
socks->fd = 0; /* num of sockets counter at start of array */
s = socks + 1;
for (r = res; r; r = r->ai_next) {
if ((s->fd = socket(r->ai_family, r->ai_socktype,
r->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
logerror("socket() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
s->af = r->ai_family;
#if defined(__minix) && defined(INET6)
if (r->ai_family == AF_INET6
&& setsockopt(s->fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY,
&on, sizeof(on)) == -1) {
logerror("setsockopt(IPV6_V6ONLY) failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
close(s->fd);
continue;
}
#endif /* defined(__minix) && defined(INET6) */
if (setsockopt(s->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
&on, sizeof(on)) == -1) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "Unable to setsockopt(): %s\n",
strerror(errno));
}
if ((error = bind(s->fd, r->ai_addr, r->ai_addrlen)) == -1) {
logerror("bind() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
/* is there a better way to handle a EADDRINUSE? */
close(s->fd);
continue;
}
if (listen(s->fd, TLSBACKLOG) == -1) {
logerror("listen() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
close(s->fd);
continue;
}
s->ev = allocev();
event_set(s->ev, s->fd, EV_READ | EV_PERSIST,
dispatch_socket_accept, s->ev);
EVENT_ADD(s->ev);
socks->fd = socks->fd + 1; /* num counter */
s++;
}
if (socks->fd == 0) {
free (socks);
if(Debug)
return NULL;
else
die(0, 0, NULL);
}
if (res)
freeaddrinfo(res);
return socks;
}
/*
* Dispatch routine for non-blocking SSL_connect()
* Has to be idempotent in case of TLS_RETRY (~ EAGAIN),
* so we can continue a slow handshake.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
dispatch_SSL_connect(int fd, short event, void *arg)
{
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info = (struct tls_conn_settings *) arg;
SSL *ssl = conn_info->sslptr;
int rc, error;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
struct timeval tv;
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "dispatch_SSL_connect(conn_info@%p, fd %d)\n",
conn_info, fd);
assert(conn_info->state == ST_TCP_EST
|| conn_info->state == ST_CONNECTING);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_CONNECTING);
rc = SSL_connect(ssl);
if (0 >= rc) {
error = tls_examine_error("SSL_connect()",
conn_info->sslptr, NULL, rc);
switch (error) {
case TLS_RETRY_READ:
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_READ,
dispatch_SSL_connect, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
break;
case TLS_RETRY_WRITE:
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_WRITE,
dispatch_SSL_connect, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
break;
default: /* should not happen,
* ... but does if the cert is not accepted */
logerror("Cannot establish TLS connection "
"to \"%s\" -- TLS handshake aborted "
"before certificate authentication.",
conn_info->hostname);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_NONE);
conn_info->reconnect = 5 * TLS_RECONNECT_SEC;
tv.tv_sec = conn_info->reconnect;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
schedule_event(&conn_info->event, &tv,
tls_reconnect, conn_info);
break;
}
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
/* else */
conn_info->reconnect = TLS_RECONNECT_SEC;
event_set(conn_info->event, fd, EV_READ, dispatch_tls_eof, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->event);
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "TLS connection established.\n");
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TLS_EST);
send_queue(0, 0, get_f_by_conninfo(conn_info));
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
}
/*
* establish TLS connection
*/
bool
tls_connect(struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res1;
int error, rc, sock;
const int one = 1;
char buf[MAXLINE];
SSL *ssl = NULL;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "tls_connect(conn_info@%p)\n", conn_info);
assert(conn_info->state == ST_NONE);
if(!tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX)
return false;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = 0;
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
error = getaddrinfo(conn_info->hostname,
(conn_info->port ? conn_info->port : "syslog-tls"), &hints, &res);
if (error) {
logerror("%s", gai_strerror(error));
return false;
}
sock = -1;
for (res1 = res; res1; res1 = res1->ai_next) {
if ((sock = socket(res1->ai_family, res1->ai_socktype,
res1->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "Unable to open socket.\n");
continue;
}
if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
&one, sizeof(one)) == -1) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "Unable to setsockopt(): %s\n",
strerror(errno));
}
if (connect(sock, res1->ai_addr, res1->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "Unable to connect() to %s: %s\n",
res1->ai_canonname, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
sock = -1;
continue;
}
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TCP_EST);
if (!(ssl = SSL_new(tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX))) {
ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf));
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Unable to establish TLS: %s\n", buf);
close(sock);
sock = -1;
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_NONE);
continue;
}
if (!SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock)) {
ERR_error_string_n(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf));
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Unable to connect TLS to socket: %s\n",
buf);
FREE_SSL(ssl);
close(sock);
sock = -1;
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_NONE);
continue;
}
SSL_set_app_data(ssl, conn_info);
SSL_set_connect_state(ssl);
while ((rc = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
ERR_error_string_n(rc, buf, sizeof(buf));
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Found SSL error in queue: %s\n", buf);
}
errno = 0; /* reset to be sure we get the right one later on */
if ((fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "Unable to fcntl(sock, O_NONBLOCK): "
"%s\n", strerror(errno));
}
/* now we have a TCP connection, so assume we can
* use that and do not have to try another res */
conn_info->sslptr = ssl;
assert(conn_info->state == ST_TCP_EST);
assert(conn_info->event);
assert(conn_info->retryevent);
freeaddrinfo(res);
dispatch_SSL_connect(sock, 0, conn_info);
return true;
}
/* still no connection after for loop */
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_NET), "Unable to establish a TCP connection to %s\n",
conn_info->hostname);
freeaddrinfo(res);
assert(conn_info->state == ST_NONE);
if (sock != -1)
close(sock);
if (ssl) {
SSL_shutdown(ssl);
SSL_free(ssl);
}
return false;
}
int
tls_examine_error(const char *functionname, const SSL *ssl,
struct tls_conn_settings *tls_conn, const int rc)
{
int ssl_error, err_error;
ssl_error = SSL_get_error(ssl, rc);
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "%s returned rc %d and error %s: %s\n", functionname,
rc, SSL_ERRCODE[ssl_error], ERR_error_string(ssl_error, NULL));
switch (ssl_error) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
return TLS_RETRY_READ;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
return TLS_RETRY_WRITE;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: ");
err_error = ERR_get_error();
if ((rc == -1) && (err_error == 0)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "socket I/O error: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
} else if ((rc == 0) && (err_error == 0)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "unexpected EOF from %s\n",
tls_conn ? tls_conn->hostname : NULL);
} else {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "no further info\n");
}
return TLS_PERM_ERROR;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
logerror("TLS connection closed by %s",
tls_conn ? tls_conn->hostname : NULL);
return TLS_PERM_ERROR;
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
logerror("internal SSL error, error queue gives %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return TLS_PERM_ERROR;
default:
break;
}
if (tls_conn)
tls_conn->errorcount++;
/* TODO: is this ever reached? */
return TLS_TEMP_ERROR;
}
bool
parse_tls_destination(const char *p, struct filed *f, size_t linenum)
{
const char *q;
if ((*p++ != '@') || *p++ != '[') {
logerror("parse_tls_destination() on non-TLS action "
"in config line %zu", linenum);
return false;
}
if (!(q = strchr(p, ']'))) {
logerror("Unterminated [ "
"in config line %zu", linenum);
return false;
}
if (!(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn =
calloc(1, sizeof(*f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn)))
|| !(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->event = allocev())
|| !(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->retryevent = allocev())) {
if (f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn)
free(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->event);
free(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn);
logerror("Couldn't allocate memory for TLS config");
return false;
}
/* default values */
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->x509verify = X509VERIFY_ALWAYS;
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->reconnect = TLS_RECONNECT_SEC;
if (!(copy_string(&(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->hostname), p, q))) {
logerror("Unable to read TLS server name"
"in config line %zu", linenum);
free_tls_conn(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn);
return false;
}
p = ++q;
if (*p == ':') {
p++; q++;
while (isalnum((unsigned char)*q))
q++;
if (!(copy_string(&(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->port), p, q))) {
logerror("Unable to read TLS port or service name"
" after ':' in config line %zu", linenum);
free_tls_conn(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn);
return false;
}
p = q;
}
/* allow whitespace for readability? */
while (isblank((unsigned char)*p))
p++;
if (*p == '(') {
p++;
while (*p != ')') {
if (copy_config_value_quoted("subject=\"",
&(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->subject), &p)
|| copy_config_value_quoted("fingerprint=\"",
&(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->fingerprint), &p)
|| copy_config_value_quoted("cert=\"",
&(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->certfile), &p)) {
/* nothing */
} else if (!strcmp(p, "verify=")) {
q = p += sizeof("verify=")-1;
/* "" are optional */
if (*p == '\"') { p++; q++; }
while (isalpha((unsigned char)*q)) q++;
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->x509verify =
getVerifySetting(p);
if (*q == '\"') q++; /* "" are optional */
p = q;
} else {
logerror("unknown keyword %s "
"in config line %zu", p, linenum);
}
while (*p == ',' || isblank((unsigned char)*p))
p++;
if (*p == '\0') {
logerror("unterminated ("
"in config line %zu", linenum);
}
}
}
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_PARSE),
"got TLS config: host %s, port %s, "
"subject: %s, certfile: %s, fingerprint: %s\n",
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->hostname,
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->port,
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->subject,
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->certfile,
f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->fingerprint);
return true;
}
/*
* Dispatch routine (triggered by timer) to reconnect to a lost TLS server
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
tls_reconnect(int fd, short event, void *arg)
{
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info = (struct tls_conn_settings *) arg;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL|D_EVENT), "tls_reconnect(conn_info@%p, "
"server %s)\n", conn_info, conn_info->hostname);
if (conn_info->sslptr) {
conn_info->shutdown = true;
free_tls_sslptr(conn_info);
}
assert(conn_info->state == ST_NONE);
if (!tls_connect(conn_info)) {
if (conn_info->reconnect > TLS_RECONNECT_GIVEUP) {
logerror("Unable to connect to TLS server %s, "
"giving up now", conn_info->hostname);
message_queue_freeall(get_f_by_conninfo(conn_info));
/* free the message queue; but do not free the
* tls_conn_settings nor change the f_type to F_UNUSED.
* that way one can still trigger a reconnect
* with a SIGUSR1
*/
} else {
struct timeval tv;
logerror("Unable to connect to TLS server %s, "
"try again in %d sec", conn_info->hostname,
conn_info->reconnect);
tv.tv_sec = conn_info->reconnect;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
schedule_event(&conn_info->event, &tv,
tls_reconnect, conn_info);
TLS_RECONNECT_BACKOFF(conn_info->reconnect);
}
} else {
assert(conn_info->state == ST_TLS_EST
|| conn_info->state == ST_CONNECTING
|| conn_info->state == ST_NONE);
}
}
/*
* Dispatch routine for accepting TLS connections.
* Has to be idempotent in case of TLS_RETRY (~ EAGAIN),
* so we can continue a slow handshake.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
dispatch_tls_accept(int fd, short event, void *arg)
{
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info = (struct tls_conn_settings *) arg;
int rc, error;
struct TLS_Incoming_Conn *tls_in;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL),
"dispatch_tls_accept(conn_info@%p, fd %d)\n", conn_info, fd);
assert(conn_info->event);
assert(conn_info->retryevent);
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_ACCEPTING);
rc = SSL_accept(conn_info->sslptr);
if (0 >= rc) {
error = tls_examine_error("SSL_accept()",
conn_info->sslptr, NULL, rc);
switch (error) {
case TLS_RETRY_READ:
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_READ,
dispatch_tls_accept, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
break;
case TLS_RETRY_WRITE:
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_WRITE,
dispatch_tls_accept, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
break;
default: /* should not happen */
free_tls_conn(conn_info);
break;
}
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
/* else */
CALLOC(tls_in, sizeof(*tls_in));
CALLOC(tls_in->inbuf, (size_t)TLS_MIN_LINELENGTH);
tls_in->tls_conn = conn_info;
tls_in->socket = SSL_get_fd(conn_info->sslptr);
tls_in->inbuf[0] = '\0';
tls_in->inbuflen = TLS_MIN_LINELENGTH;
SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&TLS_Incoming_Head, tls_in, entries);
event_set(conn_info->event, tls_in->socket, EV_READ | EV_PERSIST,
dispatch_tls_read, tls_in);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->event);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TLS_EST);
loginfo("established TLS connection from %s with certificate "
"%s (%s)", conn_info->hostname, conn_info->subject,
conn_info->fingerprint);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
/*
* We could also listen to EOF kevents -- but I do not think
* that would be useful, because we still had to read() the buffer
* before closing the socket.
*/
}
/*
* Dispatch routine for accepting TCP connections and preparing
* the tls_conn_settings object for a following SSL_accept().
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
dispatch_socket_accept(int fd, short event, void *ev)
{
#ifdef LIBWRAP
struct request_info req;
#endif
struct sockaddr_storage frominet;
socklen_t addrlen;
int newsock, rc;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
SSL *ssl;
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info;
char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
char *peername;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_NET), "incoming TCP connection\n");
if (!tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX) {
logerror("global_TLS_CTX not initialized!");
return;
}
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
addrlen = sizeof(frominet);
if ((newsock = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&frominet,
&addrlen)) == -1) {
logerror("Error in accept(): %s", strerror(errno));
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
/* TODO: do we want an IP or a hostname? maybe even both? */
if ((rc = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&frominet, addrlen,
hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "could not get peername: %s", gai_strerror(rc));
peername = NULL;
}
else {
size_t len = strlen(hbuf) + 1;
MALLOC(peername, len);
(void)memcpy(peername, hbuf, len);
}
#ifdef LIBWRAP
request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, appname, RQ_FILE, newsock, NULL);
fromhost(&req);
if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
logerror("access from %s denied by hosts_access", peername);
shutdown(newsock, SHUT_RDWR);
close(newsock);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
#endif
if ((fcntl(newsock, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
DPRINTF(D_NET, "Unable to fcntl(sock, O_NONBLOCK): %s\n",
strerror(errno));
}
if (!(ssl = SSL_new(tls_opt.global_TLS_CTX))) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Unable to establish TLS: %s\n",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
close(newsock);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
if (!SSL_set_fd(ssl, newsock)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Unable to connect TLS to socket %d: %s\n",
newsock, ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
SSL_free(ssl);
close(newsock);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
if (!(conn_info = calloc(1, sizeof(*conn_info)))
|| !(conn_info->event = allocev())
|| !(conn_info->retryevent = allocev())) {
if (conn_info)
free(conn_info->event);
free(conn_info);
SSL_free(ssl);
close(newsock);
logerror("Unable to allocate memory to accept incoming "
"TLS connection from %s", peername);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
}
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_NONE);
/* store connection details inside ssl object, used to verify
* cert and immediately match against hostname */
conn_info->hostname = peername;
conn_info->sslptr = ssl;
conn_info->x509verify = getVerifySetting(tls_opt.x509verify);
conn_info->incoming = true;
SSL_set_app_data(ssl, conn_info);
SSL_set_accept_state(ssl);
assert(conn_info->event);
assert(conn_info->retryevent);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TCP_EST);
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "socket connection from %s accept()ed with fd %d, "
"calling SSL_accept()...\n", peername, newsock);
dispatch_tls_accept(newsock, 0, conn_info);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
}
/*
* Dispatch routine to read from outgoing TCP/TLS sockets.
*
* I do not know if libevent can tell us the difference
* between available data and an EOF. But it does not matter
* because there should not be any incoming data.
* So we close the connection either because the peer closed its
* side or because the peer broke the protocol by sending us stuff ;-)
*/
void
dispatch_tls_eof(int fd, short event, void *arg)
{
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info = (struct tls_conn_settings *) arg;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
struct timeval tv;
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_EVENT|D_CALL), "dispatch_eof_tls(%d, %d, %p)\n",
fd, event, arg);
assert(conn_info->state == ST_TLS_EST);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_EOF);
DEL_EVENT(conn_info->event);
free_tls_sslptr(conn_info);
/* this overwrites the EV_READ event */
tv.tv_sec = conn_info->reconnect;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
schedule_event(&conn_info->event, &tv, tls_reconnect, conn_info);
TLS_RECONNECT_BACKOFF(conn_info->reconnect);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
}
/*
* Dispatch routine to read from TCP/TLS sockets.
* NB: This gets called when the TCP socket has data available, thus
* we can call SSL_read() on it. But that does not mean the SSL buffer
* holds a complete record and SSL_read() lets us read any data now.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
dispatch_tls_read(int fd_lib, short event, void *arg)
{
struct TLS_Incoming_Conn *c = (struct TLS_Incoming_Conn *) arg;
int fd = c->socket;
int error;
int rc;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
bool retrying;
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_EVENT|D_CALL), "active TLS socket %d\n", fd);
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "calling SSL_read(%p, %p, %zu)\n", c->tls_conn->sslptr,
&(c->inbuf[c->read_pos]), c->inbuflen - c->read_pos);
retrying = (c->tls_conn->state == ST_READING);
ST_CHANGE(c->tls_conn->state, ST_READING);
rc = SSL_read(c->tls_conn->sslptr, &(c->inbuf[c->read_pos]),
c->inbuflen - c->read_pos);
if (rc <= 0) {
error = tls_examine_error("SSL_read()", c->tls_conn->sslptr,
c->tls_conn, rc);
switch (error) {
case TLS_RETRY_READ:
/* normal event loop will call us again */
break;
case TLS_RETRY_WRITE:
if (!retrying)
event_del(c->tls_conn->event);
event_set(c->tls_conn->retryevent, fd,
EV_WRITE, dispatch_tls_read, c);
EVENT_ADD(c->tls_conn->retryevent);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
case TLS_TEMP_ERROR:
if (c->tls_conn->errorcount < TLS_MAXERRORCOUNT)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case TLS_PERM_ERROR:
/* there might be data in the inbuf, so only
* mark for closing after message retrieval */
c->closenow = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "SSL_read() returned %d\n", rc);
c->errorcount = 0;
c->read_pos += rc;
}
if (retrying)
EVENT_ADD(c->tls_conn->event);
tls_split_messages(c);
if (c->closenow) {
free_tls_conn(c->tls_conn);
FREEPTR(c->inbuf);
SLIST_REMOVE(&TLS_Incoming_Head, c, TLS_Incoming_Conn, entries);
free(c);
} else
ST_CHANGE(c->tls_conn->state, ST_TLS_EST);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
}
/* moved message splitting out of dispatching function.
* now we can call it recursively.
*
* TODO: the code for oversized messages still needs testing,
* especially for the skipping case.
*/
void
tls_split_messages(struct TLS_Incoming_Conn *c)
{
/* define only to make it better readable */
#define MSG_END_OFFSET (c->cur_msg_start + c->cur_msg_len)
size_t offset = 0;
size_t msglen = 0;
char *newbuf;
char buf_char;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL|D_DATA), "tls_split_messages() -- "
"incoming status is msg_start %zu, msg_len %zu, pos %zu\n",
c->cur_msg_start, c->cur_msg_len, c->read_pos);
if (!c->read_pos)
return;
if (c->dontsave && c->read_pos < MSG_END_OFFSET) {
c->cur_msg_len -= c->read_pos;
c->read_pos = 0;
} else if (c->dontsave && c->read_pos == MSG_END_OFFSET) {
c->cur_msg_start = c->cur_msg_len = c->read_pos = 0;
c->dontsave = false;
} else if (c->dontsave && c->read_pos > MSG_END_OFFSET) {
/* move remaining input to start of buffer */
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "move inbuf of length %zu by %zu chars\n",
c->read_pos - (MSG_END_OFFSET),
MSG_END_OFFSET);
memmove(&c->inbuf[0],
&c->inbuf[MSG_END_OFFSET],
c->read_pos - (MSG_END_OFFSET));
c->read_pos -= (MSG_END_OFFSET);
c->cur_msg_start = c->cur_msg_len = 0;
c->dontsave = false;
}
if (c->read_pos < MSG_END_OFFSET) {
return;
}
/* read length prefix, always at start of buffer */
while (isdigit((unsigned char)c->inbuf[offset])
&& offset < c->read_pos) {
msglen *= 10;
msglen += c->inbuf[offset] - '0';
offset++;
}
if (offset == c->read_pos) {
/* next invocation will have more data */
return;
}
if (c->inbuf[offset] == ' ') {
c->cur_msg_len = msglen;
c->cur_msg_start = offset + 1;
if (MSG_END_OFFSET+1 > c->inbuflen) { /* +1 for the '\0' */
newbuf = realloc(c->inbuf, MSG_END_OFFSET+1);
if (newbuf) {
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "Reallocated inbuf\n");
c->inbuflen = MSG_END_OFFSET+1;
c->inbuf = newbuf;
} else {
logerror("Couldn't reallocate buffer, "
"will skip this message");
c->dontsave = true;
c->cur_msg_len -= c->read_pos;
c->cur_msg_start = 0;
c->read_pos = 0;
}
}
} else {
/* found non-digit in prefix */
/* Question: would it be useful to skip this message and
* try to find next message by looking for its beginning?
* IMHO not.
*/
logerror("Unable to handle TLS length prefix. "
"Protocol error? Closing connection now.");
/* only set flag -- caller has to close then */
c->closenow = true;
return;
}
/* read one syslog message */
if (c->read_pos >= MSG_END_OFFSET) {
/* process complete msg */
assert(MSG_END_OFFSET+1 <= c->inbuflen);
/* message in c->inbuf is not NULL-terminated,
* so this avoids a complete copy */
buf_char = c->inbuf[MSG_END_OFFSET];
c->inbuf[MSG_END_OFFSET] = '\0';
printline(c->tls_conn->hostname, &c->inbuf[c->cur_msg_start],
RemoteAddDate ? ADDDATE : 0);
c->inbuf[MSG_END_OFFSET] = buf_char;
if (MSG_END_OFFSET == c->read_pos) {
/* no unprocessed data in buffer --> reset to empty */
c->cur_msg_start = c->cur_msg_len = c->read_pos = 0;
} else {
/* move remaining input to start of buffer */
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "move inbuf of length %zu by %zu "
"chars\n", c->read_pos - (MSG_END_OFFSET),
MSG_END_OFFSET);
memmove(&c->inbuf[0], &c->inbuf[MSG_END_OFFSET],
c->read_pos - (MSG_END_OFFSET));
c->read_pos -= (MSG_END_OFFSET);
c->cur_msg_start = c->cur_msg_len = 0;
}
}
/* shrink inbuf if too large */
if ((c->inbuflen > TLS_PERSIST_LINELENGTH)
&& (c->read_pos < TLS_LARGE_LINELENGTH)) {
newbuf = realloc(c->inbuf, TLS_LARGE_LINELENGTH);
if (newbuf) {
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "Shrink inbuf\n");
c->inbuflen = TLS_LARGE_LINELENGTH;
c->inbuf = newbuf;
} else {
logerror("Couldn't shrink inbuf");
/* no change necessary */
}
}
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "return with status: msg_start %zu, msg_len %zu, "
"pos %zu\n", c->cur_msg_start, c->cur_msg_len, c->read_pos);
/* try to read another message */
if (c->read_pos > 10)
tls_split_messages(c);
return;
}
/*
* wrapper for dispatch_tls_send()
*
* send one line with tls
* f has to be of typ TLS
*
* returns false if message cannot be sent right now,
* caller is responsible to enqueue it
* returns true if message passed to dispatch_tls_send()
* delivery is not garantueed, but likely
*/
#define DEBUG_LINELENGTH 40
bool
tls_send(struct filed *f, char *line, size_t len, struct buf_queue *qentry)
{
struct tls_send_msg *smsg;
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "tls_send(f=%p, line=\"%.*s%s\", "
"len=%zu) to %sconnected dest.\n", f,
(int)(len > DEBUG_LINELENGTH ? DEBUG_LINELENGTH : len),
line, (len > DEBUG_LINELENGTH ? "..." : ""),
len, f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->sslptr ? "" : "un");
if(f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn->state == ST_TLS_EST) {
/* send now */
if (!(smsg = calloc(1, sizeof(*smsg)))) {
logerror("Unable to allocate memory, drop message");
return false;
}
smsg->f = f;
smsg->line = line;
smsg->linelen = len;
(void)NEWREF(qentry->msg);
smsg->qentry = qentry;
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "now sending line: \"%.*s\"\n",
(int)smsg->linelen, smsg->line);
dispatch_tls_send(0, 0, smsg);
return true;
} else {
/* other socket operation active, send later */
DPRINTF(D_DATA, "connection not ready to send: \"%.*s\"\n",
(int)len, line);
return false;
}
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
dispatch_tls_send(int fd, short event, void *arg)
{
struct tls_send_msg *smsg = (struct tls_send_msg *) arg;
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info = smsg->f->f_un.f_tls.tls_conn;
struct filed *f = smsg->f;
int rc, error;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
bool retrying;
struct timeval tv;
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL), "dispatch_tls_send(f=%p, buffer=%p, "
"line@%p, len=%zu, offset=%zu) to %sconnected dest.\n",
smsg->f, smsg->qentry->msg, smsg->line,
smsg->linelen, smsg->offset,
conn_info->sslptr ? "" : "un");
assert(conn_info->state == ST_TLS_EST
|| conn_info->state == ST_WRITING);
retrying = (conn_info->state == ST_WRITING);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_WRITING);
rc = SSL_write(conn_info->sslptr,
(smsg->line + smsg->offset),
(smsg->linelen - smsg->offset));
if (0 >= rc) {
error = tls_examine_error("SSL_write()",
conn_info->sslptr,
conn_info, rc);
switch (error) {
case TLS_RETRY_READ:
/* collides with eof event */
if (!retrying)
event_del(conn_info->event);
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_READ,
dispatch_tls_send, smsg);
RETRYEVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
break;
case TLS_RETRY_WRITE:
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_WRITE,
dispatch_tls_send, smsg);
RETRYEVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
break;
case TLS_PERM_ERROR:
/* no need to check active events */
free_tls_send_msg(smsg);
free_tls_sslptr(conn_info);
tv.tv_sec = conn_info->reconnect;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
schedule_event(&conn_info->event, &tv,
tls_reconnect, conn_info);
TLS_RECONNECT_BACKOFF(conn_info->reconnect);
break;
default:
break;
}
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
} else if ((size_t)rc < smsg->linelen) {
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_DATA), "TLS: SSL_write() wrote %d out of %zu "
"bytes\n", rc, (smsg->linelen - smsg->offset));
smsg->offset += rc;
/* try again */
if (retrying)
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->event);
dispatch_tls_send(0, 0, smsg);
return;
} else if ((size_t)rc == (smsg->linelen - smsg->offset)) {
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_DATA), "TLS: SSL_write() complete\n");
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TLS_EST);
free_tls_send_msg(smsg);
send_queue(0, 0, f);
} else {
/* should not be reached */
/*LINTED constcond */
assert(0);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_DATA), "unreachable code after SSL_write()\n");
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TLS_EST);
free_tls_send_msg(smsg);
send_queue(0, 0, f);
}
if (retrying && conn_info->event->ev_events)
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->event);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
}
/*
* Close a SSL connection and its queue and its tls_conn.
*/
void
free_tls_conn(struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info)
{
DPRINTF(D_MEM, "free_tls_conn(conn_info@%p) with sslptr@%p\n",
conn_info, conn_info->sslptr);
if (conn_info->sslptr) {
conn_info->shutdown = true;
free_tls_sslptr(conn_info);
}
assert(conn_info->state == ST_NONE);
FREEPTR(conn_info->port);
FREEPTR(conn_info->subject);
FREEPTR(conn_info->hostname);
FREEPTR(conn_info->certfile);
FREEPTR(conn_info->fingerprint);
DEL_EVENT(conn_info->event);
DEL_EVENT(conn_info->retryevent);
FREEPTR(conn_info->event);
FREEPTR(conn_info->retryevent);
FREEPTR(conn_info);
DPRINTF(D_MEM2, "free_tls_conn(conn_info@%p) returns\n", conn_info);
}
/*
* Dispatch routine for non-blocking TLS shutdown
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
void
dispatch_SSL_shutdown(int fd, short event, void *arg)
{
struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info = (struct tls_conn_settings *) arg;
int rc, error;
sigset_t newmask, omask;
bool retrying;
BLOCK_SIGNALS(omask, newmask);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_CALL),
"dispatch_SSL_shutdown(conn_info@%p, fd %d)\n", conn_info, fd);
retrying = ((conn_info->state == ST_CLOSING0)
|| (conn_info->state == ST_CLOSING1)
|| (conn_info->state == ST_CLOSING2));
if (!retrying)
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_CLOSING0);
rc = SSL_shutdown(conn_info->sslptr);
if (rc == 1) { /* shutdown complete */
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_NET), "Closed TLS connection to %s\n",
conn_info->hostname);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TCP_EST); /* check this */
conn_info->accepted = false;
/* closing TCP comes below */
} else if (rc == 0) { /* unidirectional, now call a 2nd time */
/* problem: when connecting as a client to rsyslogd this
* loops and I keep getting rc == 0
* maybe I hit this bug?
* http://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-dev@openssl.org/msg24105.html
*
* anyway, now I use three closing states to make sure I abort
* after two rc = 0.
*/
if (conn_info->state == ST_CLOSING0) {
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_CLOSING1);
dispatch_SSL_shutdown(fd, 0, conn_info);
} else if (conn_info->state == ST_CLOSING1) {
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_CLOSING2);
dispatch_SSL_shutdown(fd, 0, conn_info);
} else if (conn_info->state == ST_CLOSING2) {
/* abort shutdown, jump to close TCP below */
} else
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "Unexpected connection state %d\n",
conn_info->state);
/* and abort here too*/
} else if (rc == -1 && conn_info->shutdown ) {
(void)tls_examine_error("SSL_shutdown()",
conn_info->sslptr, NULL, rc);
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_NET), "Ignore error in SSL_shutdown()"
" and force connection shutdown.");
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TCP_EST);
conn_info->accepted = false;
} else if (rc == -1 && !conn_info->shutdown ) {
error = tls_examine_error("SSL_shutdown()",
conn_info->sslptr, NULL, rc);
switch (error) {
case TLS_RETRY_READ:
if (!retrying)
event_del(conn_info->event);
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_READ,
dispatch_SSL_shutdown, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
case TLS_RETRY_WRITE:
if (!retrying)
event_del(conn_info->event);
event_set(conn_info->retryevent, fd, EV_WRITE,
dispatch_SSL_shutdown, conn_info);
EVENT_ADD(conn_info->retryevent);
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
return;
default:
/* force close() on the TCP connection */
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_TCP_EST);
conn_info->accepted = false;
break;
}
}
if ((conn_info->state != ST_TLS_EST)
&& (conn_info->state != ST_NONE)
&& (conn_info->state != ST_CLOSING0)
&& (conn_info->state != ST_CLOSING1)) {
int sock = SSL_get_fd(conn_info->sslptr);
if (shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR) == -1)
logerror("Cannot shutdown socket");
DEL_EVENT(conn_info->retryevent);
DEL_EVENT(conn_info->event);
if (close(sock) == -1)
logerror("Cannot close socket");
DPRINTF((D_TLS|D_NET), "Closed TCP connection to %s\n",
conn_info->hostname);
ST_CHANGE(conn_info->state, ST_NONE);
FREE_SSL(conn_info->sslptr);
}
RESTORE_SIGNALS(omask);
}
/*
* Close a SSL object
*/
void
free_tls_sslptr(struct tls_conn_settings *conn_info)
{
int sock;
DPRINTF(D_MEM, "free_tls_sslptr(conn_info@%p)\n", conn_info);
if (!conn_info->sslptr) {
assert(conn_info->incoming == 1
|| conn_info->state == ST_NONE);
return;
} else {
sock = SSL_get_fd(conn_info->sslptr);
dispatch_SSL_shutdown(sock, 0, conn_info);
}
}
/* write self-generated certificates */
bool
write_x509files(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
const char *keyfilename, const char *certfilename)
{
FILE *certfile, *keyfile;
if (!(umask(0177),(keyfile = fopen(keyfilename, "a")))) {
logerror("Unable to write to file \"%s\"", keyfilename);
return false;
}
if (!(umask(0122),(certfile = fopen(certfilename, "a")))) {
logerror("Unable to write to file \"%s\"", certfilename);
(void)fclose(keyfile);
return false;
}
if (!PEM_write_PrivateKey(keyfile, pkey, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
logerror("Unable to write key to \"%s\"", keyfilename);
if (!X509_print_fp(certfile, cert)
|| !PEM_write_X509(certfile, cert))
logerror("Unable to write certificate to \"%s\"",
certfilename);
(void)fclose(keyfile);
(void)fclose(certfile);
return true;
}
/* adds all local IP addresses as subjectAltNames to cert x.
* getifaddrs() should be quite portable among BSDs and Linux
* but if not available the whole function can simply be removed.
*/
bool
x509_cert_add_subjectAltName(X509 *cert, X509V3_CTX *ctx)
{
struct ifaddrs *ifa = NULL, *ifp = NULL;
char ip[100];
char subjectAltName[2048];
int idx = 0;
socklen_t salen;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
#ifdef notdef
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extlist;
extlist = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null();
#endif
if (getifaddrs (&ifp) == -1) {
logerror("Unable to get list of local interfaces");
return false;
}
idx = snprintf(subjectAltName, sizeof(subjectAltName),
"DNS:%s", LocalFQDN);
for (ifa = ifp; ifa; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
if(!ifa->ifa_addr)
continue;
/* only IP4 and IP6 addresses, but filter loopbacks */
if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *addr =
(struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr;
if (addr->sin_addr.s_addr == htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK))
continue;
salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
} else if (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
struct in6_addr *addr6 =
&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr)->sin6_addr;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(addr6))
continue;
salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
} else
continue;
if (getnameinfo(ifa->ifa_addr, salen, ip, sizeof(ip),
NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
continue;
}
/* add IP to list */
idx += snprintf(&subjectAltName[idx],
sizeof(subjectAltName)-idx, ", IP:%s", ip);
}
freeifaddrs (ifp);
ext = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, ctx,
NID_subject_alt_name, subjectAltName);
X509_add_ext(cert, ext, -1);
X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
return true;
}
/*
* generates a private key and a X.509 certificate
*/
bool
mk_x509_cert(X509 **x509p, EVP_PKEY **pkeyp, int bits, int serial, int days)
{
X509 *cert;
EVP_PKEY *pk;
DSA *dsa;
X509_NAME *name = NULL;
X509_EXTENSION *ex = NULL;
X509V3_CTX ctx;
DPRINTF((D_CALL|D_TLS), "mk_x509_cert(%p, %p, %d, %d, %d)\n",
x509p, pkeyp, bits, serial, days);
if (pkeyp && *pkeyp)
pk = *pkeyp;
else if ((pk = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "EVP_PKEY_new() failed\n");
return false;
}
if (x509p && *x509p)
cert = *x509p;
else if ((cert = X509_new()) == NULL) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "X509_new() failed\n");
return false;
}
dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, NULL, 0,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!DSA_generate_key(dsa)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "DSA_generate_key() failed\n");
return false;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pk, dsa)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA() failed\n");
return false;
}
X509_set_version(cert, 3);
ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(cert), serial);
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), 0);
X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), (long)60 * 60 * 24 * days);
if (!X509_set_pubkey(cert, pk)) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "X509_set_pubkey() failed\n");
return false;
}
/*
* This function creates and adds the entry, working out the correct
* string type and performing checks on its length. Normally we'd check
* the return value for errors...
*/
name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
/*
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "O", MBSTRING_ASC,
(unsigned char *)"The NetBSD Project", -1, -1, 0);
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "OU", MBSTRING_ASC,
(unsigned char *)"syslogd", -1, -1, 0);
*/
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(name, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC,
(unsigned char *) LocalFQDN, -1, -1, 0);
X509_set_issuer_name(cert, name);
/*
* Add extension using V3 code: we can set the config file as NULL
* because we wont reference any other sections.
*/
X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, cert, cert, NULL, NULL, 0);
ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_netscape_comment,
__UNCONST("auto-generated by the NetBSD syslogd"));
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
X509_EXTENSION_free(ex);
ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_netscape_ssl_server_name,
LocalFQDN);
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
X509_EXTENSION_free(ex);
ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_netscape_cert_type,
__UNCONST("server, client"));
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
X509_EXTENSION_free(ex);
ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_key_usage,
__UNCONST("keyAgreement, keyEncipherment, "
"nonRepudiation, digitalSignature"));
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
X509_EXTENSION_free(ex);
ex = X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(NULL, &ctx, NID_basic_constraints,
__UNCONST("critical,CA:FALSE"));
X509_add_ext(cert, ex, -1);
X509_EXTENSION_free(ex);
(void)x509_cert_add_subjectAltName(cert, &ctx);
if (!X509_sign(cert, pk, EVP_dss1())) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "X509_sign() failed\n");
return false;
}
if (X509_verify(cert, pk) != 1) {
DPRINTF(D_TLS, "X509_verify() failed\n");
return false;
}
*x509p = cert;
*pkeyp = pk;
return true;
}
void
free_tls_send_msg(struct tls_send_msg *msg)
{
if (!msg) {
DPRINTF((D_DATA), "invalid tls_send_msg_free(NULL)\n");
return;
}
DELREF(msg->qentry->msg);
(void)message_queue_remove(msg->f, msg->qentry);
FREEPTR(msg->line);
FREEPTR(msg);
}
#endif /* !DISABLE_TLS */
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