minix/kernel/priv.h

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#ifndef PRIV_H
#define PRIV_H
/* Declaration of the system privileges structure. It defines flags, system
* call masks, an synchronous alarm timer, I/O privileges, pending hardware
* interrupts and notifications, and so on.
* System processes each get their own structure with properties, whereas all
* user processes share one structure. This setup provides a clear separation
* between common and privileged process fields and is very space efficient.
*
* Changes:
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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* Nov 22, 2009 rewrite of privilege management (Cristiano Giuffrida)
* Jul 01, 2005 Created. (Jorrit N. Herder)
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*/
#include <minix/com.h>
#include "const.h"
#include "type.h"
/* Max. number of I/O ranges that can be assigned to a process */
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#define NR_IO_RANGE 32
/* Max. number of device memory ranges that can be assigned to a process */
#define NR_MEM_RANGE 10
/* Max. number of IRQs that can be assigned to a process */
#define NR_IRQ 4
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struct priv {
proc_nr_t s_proc_nr; /* number of associated process */
sys_id_t s_id; /* index of this system structure */
short s_flags; /* PREEMTIBLE, BILLABLE, etc. */
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/* Asynchronous sends */
vir_bytes s_asyntab; /* addr. of table in process' address space */
size_t s_asynsize; /* number of elements in table. 0 when not in
* use
*/
short s_trap_mask; /* allowed system call traps */
sys_map_t s_ipc_to; /* allowed destination processes */
/* allowed kernel calls */
Initialization protocol for system services. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF framework now supports a new SEF Init request type from RS. 3 different callbacks are available (init_fresh, init_lu, init_restart) to specify initialization code when a service starts fresh, starts after a live update, or restarts. SYSTEM SERVICE CHANGES: - Initialization code for system services is now enclosed in a callback SEF will automatically call at init time. The return code of the callback will tell RS whether the initialization completed successfully. - Each init callback can access information passed by RS to initialize. As of now, each system service has access to the public entries of RS's system process table to gather all the information required to initialize. This design eliminates many existing or potential races at boot time and provides a uniform initialization interface to system services. The same interface will be reused for the upcoming publish/subscribe model to handle dynamic registration / deregistration of system services. VM CHANGES: - Uniform privilege management for all system services. Every service uses the same call mask format. For boot services, VM copies the call mask from init data. For dynamic services, VM still receives the call mask via rs_set_priv call that will be soon replaced by the upcoming publish/subscribe model. RS CHANGES: - The system process table has been reorganized and split into private entries and public entries. Only the latter ones are exposed to system services. - VM call masks are now entirely configured in rs/table.c - RS has now its own slot in the system process table. Only kernel tasks and user processes not included in the boot image are now left out from the system process table. - RS implements the initialization protocol for system services. - For services in the boot image, RS blocks till initialization is complete and panics when failure is reported back. Services are initialized in their order of appearance in the boot image priv table and RS blocks to implements synchronous initialization for every system service having the flag SF_SYNCH_BOOT set. - For services started dynamically, the initialization protocol is implemented as though it were the first ping for the service. In this case, if the system service fails to report back (or reports failure), RS brings the service down rather than trying to restart it.
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bitchunk_t s_k_call_mask[SYS_CALL_MASK_SIZE];
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sys_map_t s_notify_pending; /* bit map with pending notifications */
irq_id_t s_int_pending; /* pending hardware interrupts */
sigset_t s_sig_pending; /* pending signals */
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timer_t s_alarm_timer; /* synchronous alarm timer */
struct far_mem s_farmem[NR_REMOTE_SEGS]; /* remote memory map */
reg_t *s_stack_guard; /* stack guard word for kernel tasks */
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int s_nr_io_range; /* allowed I/O ports */
struct io_range s_io_tab[NR_IO_RANGE];
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int s_nr_mem_range; /* allowed memory ranges */
struct mem_range s_mem_tab[NR_MEM_RANGE];
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int s_nr_irq; /* allowed IRQ lines */
int s_irq_tab[NR_IRQ];
vir_bytes s_grant_table; /* grant table address of process, or 0 */
int s_grant_entries; /* no. of entries, or 0 */
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};
/* Guard word for task stacks. */
#define STACK_GUARD ((reg_t) (sizeof(reg_t) == 2 ? 0xBEEF : 0xDEADBEEF))
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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/* Static privilege id definitions. */
#define NR_STATIC_PRIV_IDS NR_BOOT_PROCS
#define is_static_priv_id(id) (id >= 0 && id < NR_STATIC_PRIV_IDS)
#define static_priv_id(n) (NR_TASKS + (n))
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/* Magic system structure table addresses. */
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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#define BEG_PRIV_ADDR (&priv[0])
#define END_PRIV_ADDR (&priv[NR_SYS_PROCS])
#define BEG_STATIC_PRIV_ADDR BEG_PRIV_ADDR
#define END_STATIC_PRIV_ADDR (BEG_STATIC_PRIV_ADDR + NR_STATIC_PRIV_IDS)
#define BEG_DYN_PRIV_ADDR END_STATIC_PRIV_ADDR
#define END_DYN_PRIV_ADDR END_PRIV_ADDR
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#define priv_addr(i) (ppriv_addr)[(i)]
#define priv_id(rp) ((rp)->p_priv->s_id)
#define priv(rp) ((rp)->p_priv)
#define id_to_nr(id) priv_addr(id)->s_proc_nr
#define nr_to_id(nr) priv(proc_addr(nr))->s_id
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IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
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#define may_send_to(rp, nr) (get_sys_bit(priv(rp)->s_ipc_to, nr_to_id(nr)))
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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/* Privilege management shorthands. */
#define spi_to(n) (1 << (static_priv_id(n)))
#define unset_usr_to(m) ((m) & ~(1 << USER_PRIV_ID))
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/* The system structures table and pointers to individual table slots. The
* pointers allow faster access because now a process entry can be found by
* indexing the psys_addr array, while accessing an element i requires a
* multiplication with sizeof(struct sys) to determine the address.
*/
EXTERN struct priv priv[NR_SYS_PROCS]; /* system properties table */
EXTERN struct priv *ppriv_addr[NR_SYS_PROCS]; /* direct slot pointers */
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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/* Unprivileged user processes all share the privilege structure of the
* root user process.
* This id must be fixed because it is used to check send mask entries.
*/
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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#define USER_PRIV_ID static_priv_id(ROOT_USR_PROC_NR)
/* Specifies a null privilege id.
*/
#define NULL_PRIV_ID (-1)
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/* Make sure the system can boot. The following sanity check verifies that
* the system privileges table is large enough for the number of processes
* in the boot image.
*/
#if (NR_BOOT_PROCS > NR_SYS_PROCS)
#error NR_SYS_PROCS must be larger than NR_BOOT_PROCS
#endif
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
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/*
* Privileges masks used by the kernel.
*/
#define IDL_F (SYS_PROC | BILLABLE) /* idle task is not preemptible as we
* don't want it to interfere with the
* timer tick interrupt handler code.
* Unlike other processes idle task is
* handled in a special way and is
* preempted always if timer tick occurs
* and there is another runnable process
*/
#define TSK_F (SYS_PROC) /* other kernel tasks */
#define RSYS_F (SYS_PROC | PREEMPTIBLE) /* root system proc */
#define DEF_SYS_F (RSYS_F | DYN_PRIV_ID) /* default sys proc */
/* allowed traps */
#define CSK_T (1 << RECEIVE) /* clock and system */
#define TSK_T 0 /* other kernel tasks */
#define RSYS_T (~0) /* root system proc */
#define DEF_SYS_T RSYS_T /* default sys proc */
/* allowed targets */
#define TSK_M 0 /* all kernel tasks */
#define RSYS_M (~0) /* root system proc */
#define DEF_SYS_M unset_usr_to(RSYS_M) /* default sys proc */
/* allowed kernel calls */
#define NO_C 0 /* no calls allowed */
#define ALL_C 1 /* all calls allowed */
#define TSK_KC NO_C /* all kernel tasks */
#define RSYS_KC ALL_C /* root system proc */
#define DEF_SYS_KC RSYS_KC /* default sys proc */
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#endif /* PRIV_H */