minix/servers/rs/manager.c

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/*
* Changes:
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
* Nov 22, 2009: added basic live update support (Cristiano Giuffrida)
* Mar 02, 2009: Extended isolation policies (Jorrit N. Herder)
* Jul 22, 2005: Created (Jorrit N. Herder)
*/
#include "inc.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/vm.h>
#include <minix/vm.h>
#include <lib.h>
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
#include <minix/sysutil.h>
/* Prototypes for internal functions that do the hard work. */
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int caller_is_root, (endpoint_t endpoint) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int caller_can_control, (endpoint_t endpoint,
char *label) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int copy_label, (endpoint_t src_e,
struct rss_label *src_label, char *dst_label, size_t dst_len) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int start_service, (struct rproc *rp, int flags,
endpoint_t *ep) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int stop_service, (struct rproc *rp,int how) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int fork_nb, (void) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int read_exec, (struct rproc *rp) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( int share_exec, (struct rproc *rp_src,
struct rproc *rp_dst) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void free_slot, (struct rproc *rp) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void run_script, (struct rproc *rp) );
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( char *get_next_label, (char *ptr, char *label,
char *caller_label) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void add_forward_ipc, (struct rproc *rp,
struct priv *privp) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void add_backward_ipc, (struct rproc *rp,
struct priv *privp) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void init_privs, (struct rproc *rp, struct priv *privp) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void init_pci, (struct rproc *rp, int endpoint) );
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void update_period, (message *m_ptr) );
FORWARD _PROTOTYPE( void end_update, (clock_t now) );
PRIVATE int shutting_down = FALSE;
/*===========================================================================*
* caller_is_root *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int caller_is_root(endpoint)
endpoint_t endpoint; /* caller endpoint */
{
uid_t euid;
/* Check if caller has root user ID. */
euid = getnuid(endpoint);
if (rs_verbose && euid != 0)
{
printf("RS: got unauthorized request from endpoint %d\n", endpoint);
}
return euid == 0;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* caller_can_control *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int caller_can_control(endpoint, label)
endpoint_t endpoint;
char *label;
{
int control_allowed = 0;
register struct rproc *rp;
int c;
char *progname;
/* Find name of binary for given label. */
for (rp = BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp < END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if (strcmp(rp->r_label, label) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (rp == END_RPROC_ADDR) return 0;
progname = strrchr(rp->r_argv[0], '/');
if (progname != NULL)
progname++;
else
progname = rp->r_argv[0];
/* Check if label is listed in caller's isolation policy. */
for (rp = BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp < END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if (rp->r_proc_nr_e == endpoint) {
break;
}
}
if (rp == END_RPROC_ADDR) return 0;
if (rp->r_nr_control > 0) {
for (c = 0; c < rp->r_nr_control; c++) {
if (strcmp(rp->r_control[c], progname) == 0)
control_allowed = 1;
}
}
if (rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: allowing %u control over %s via policy: %s\n",
endpoint, label, control_allowed ? "yes" : "no");
}
return control_allowed;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* copy_label *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int copy_label(src_e, src_label, dst_label, dst_len)
endpoint_t src_e;
struct rss_label *src_label;
char *dst_label;
size_t dst_len;
{
int s, len;
len = MIN(dst_len-1, src_label->l_len);
s = sys_datacopy(src_e, (vir_bytes) src_label->l_addr,
SELF, (vir_bytes) dst_label, len);
if (s != OK) return s;
dst_label[len] = 0;
return OK;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_up *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_up(m_ptr)
message *m_ptr; /* request message pointer */
{
/* A request was made to start a new system service.
*/
register struct rproc *rp; /* system process table */
int slot_nr; /* local table entry */
int arg_count; /* number of arguments */
char *cmd_ptr; /* parse command string */
char *label; /* unique name of command */
enum dev_style dev_style; /* device style */
int s; /* status variable */
int len; /* length of string */
int i;
int r;
endpoint_t ep;
struct rproc *tmp_rp;
struct rs_start rs_start;
/* This call requires special privileges. */
if (!caller_is_root(m_ptr->m_source)) return(EPERM);
/* See if there is a free entry in the table with system processes. */
for (slot_nr = 0; slot_nr < NR_SYS_PROCS; slot_nr++) {
rp = &rproc[slot_nr]; /* get pointer to slot */
if (!(rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE)) /* check if available */
break;
}
if (slot_nr >= NR_SYS_PROCS)
{
printf("RS: do_up: system process table full\n");
return ENOMEM;
}
/* Ok, there is space. Get the request structure. */
s= sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->RS_CMD_ADDR,
SELF, (vir_bytes) &rs_start, sizeof(rs_start));
if (s != OK) return(s);
/* Obtain command name and parameters. This is a space-separated string
* that looks like "/sbin/service arg1 arg2 ...". Arguments are optional.
*/
if (rs_start.rss_cmdlen > MAX_COMMAND_LEN-1) return(E2BIG);
s=sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) rs_start.rss_cmd,
SELF, (vir_bytes) rp->r_cmd, rs_start.rss_cmdlen);
if (s != OK) return(s);
rp->r_cmd[rs_start.rss_cmdlen] = '\0'; /* ensure it is terminated */
if (rp->r_cmd[0] != '/') return(EINVAL); /* insist on absolute path */
/* Build argument vector to be passed to execute call. The format of the
* arguments vector is: path, arguments, NULL.
*/
arg_count = 0; /* initialize arg count */
rp->r_argv[arg_count++] = rp->r_cmd; /* start with path */
cmd_ptr = rp->r_cmd; /* do some parsing */
while(*cmd_ptr != '\0') { /* stop at end of string */
if (*cmd_ptr == ' ') { /* next argument */
*cmd_ptr = '\0'; /* terminate previous */
while (*++cmd_ptr == ' ') ; /* skip spaces */
if (*cmd_ptr == '\0') break; /* no arg following */
if (arg_count>MAX_NR_ARGS+1) break; /* arg vector full */
rp->r_argv[arg_count++] = cmd_ptr; /* add to arg vector */
}
cmd_ptr ++; /* continue parsing */
}
rp->r_argv[arg_count] = NULL; /* end with NULL pointer */
rp->r_argc = arg_count;
/* Process name for the service. */
cmd_ptr = strrchr(rp->r_argv[0], '/');
if (cmd_ptr)
cmd_ptr++;
else
cmd_ptr= rp->r_argv[0];
len= strlen(cmd_ptr);
if (len > P_NAME_LEN-1)
len= P_NAME_LEN-1; /* truncate name */
memcpy(rp->r_proc_name, cmd_ptr, len);
rp->r_proc_name[len]= '\0';
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: using proc_name (from binary %s) '%s'\n",
rp->r_argv[0], rp->r_proc_name);
if(rs_start.rss_label.l_len > 0) {
/* RS_UP caller has supplied a custom label for this service. */
int s = copy_label(m_ptr->m_source, &rs_start.rss_label,
rp->r_label, sizeof(rp->r_label));
if(s != OK)
return s;
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: using label (custom) '%s'\n", rp->r_label);
} else {
/* Default label for the service. */
label = rp->r_proc_name;
len= strlen(label);
if (len > MAX_LABEL_LEN-1)
len= MAX_LABEL_LEN-1; /* truncate name */
memcpy(rp->r_label, label, len);
rp->r_label[len]= '\0';
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: using label (from proc_name) '%s'\n",
rp->r_label);
}
if(rs_start.rss_nr_control > 0) {
int i, s;
if (rs_start.rss_nr_control > RSS_NR_CONTROL)
{
printf("RS: do_up: too many control labels\n");
return EINVAL;
}
for (i=0; i<rs_start.rss_nr_control; i++) {
s = copy_label(m_ptr->m_source, &rs_start.rss_control[i],
rp->r_control[i], sizeof(rp->r_control[i]));
if(s != OK)
return s;
}
rp->r_nr_control = rs_start.rss_nr_control;
if (rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: do_up: control labels:");
for (i=0; i<rp->r_nr_control; i++)
printf(" %s", rp->r_control[i]);
printf("\n");
}
}
/* Check for duplicates */
for (slot_nr = 0; slot_nr < NR_SYS_PROCS; slot_nr++) {
tmp_rp = &rproc[slot_nr]; /* get pointer to slot */
if (!(tmp_rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE)) /* check if available */
continue;
if (tmp_rp == rp)
continue; /* Our slot */
if (strcmp(tmp_rp->r_label, rp->r_label) == 0)
{
printf("RS: found duplicate label '%s': slot %d\n",
rp->r_label, slot_nr);
return EBUSY;
}
}
rp->r_script[0]= '\0';
if (rs_start.rss_scriptlen > MAX_SCRIPT_LEN-1) return(E2BIG);
if (rs_start.rss_script != NULL)
{
s=sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) rs_start.rss_script,
SELF, (vir_bytes) rp->r_script, rs_start.rss_scriptlen);
if (s != OK) return(s);
rp->r_script[rs_start.rss_scriptlen] = '\0';
}
rp->r_uid= rs_start.rss_uid;
rp->r_nice= rs_start.rss_nice;
if (rs_start.rss_flags & RF_IPC_VALID)
{
if (rs_start.rss_ipclen+1 > sizeof(rp->r_ipc_list))
{
printf("rs: ipc list too long for '%s'\n", rp->r_label);
return EINVAL;
}
s=sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) rs_start.rss_ipc,
SELF, (vir_bytes) rp->r_ipc_list, rs_start.rss_ipclen);
if (s != OK) return(s);
rp->r_ipc_list[rs_start.rss_ipclen]= '\0';
}
else
rp->r_ipc_list[0]= '\0';
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
rp->r_sys_flags = DSRV_SF;
rp->r_exec= NULL;
if (rs_start.rss_flags & RF_COPY) {
int exst_cpy;
struct rproc *rp2;
exst_cpy = 0;
if(rs_start.rss_flags & RF_REUSE) {
int i;
for(i = 0; i < NR_SYS_PROCS; i++) {
rp2 = &rproc[i];
if(strcmp(rp->r_proc_name, rp2->r_proc_name) == 0 &&
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
(rp2->r_sys_flags & SF_USE_COPY)) {
/* We have found the same binary that's
* already been copied */
exst_cpy = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if(!exst_cpy)
s = read_exec(rp);
else
s = share_exec(rp, rp2);
if (s != OK)
return s;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
rp->r_sys_flags |= SF_USE_COPY;
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* All dynamically created services get the same privilege flags, and
* allowed traps. Other privilege settings can be specified at runtime.
* The privilege id is dynamically allocated by the kernel.
*/
rp->r_priv.s_flags = DSRV_F; /* privilege flags */
rp->r_priv.s_trap_mask = DSRV_T; /* allowed traps */
/* Copy granted resources */
if (rs_start.rss_nr_irq > NR_IRQ)
{
printf("RS: do_up: too many IRQs requested\n");
return EINVAL;
}
rp->r_priv.s_nr_irq= rs_start.rss_nr_irq;
for (i= 0; i<rp->r_priv.s_nr_irq; i++)
{
rp->r_priv.s_irq_tab[i]= rs_start.rss_irq[i];
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: IRQ %d\n", rp->r_priv.s_irq_tab[i]);
}
if (rs_start.rss_nr_io > NR_IO_RANGE)
{
printf("RS: do_up: too many I/O ranges requested\n");
return EINVAL;
}
rp->r_priv.s_nr_io_range= rs_start.rss_nr_io;
for (i= 0; i<rp->r_priv.s_nr_io_range; i++)
{
rp->r_priv.s_io_tab[i].ior_base= rs_start.rss_io[i].base;
rp->r_priv.s_io_tab[i].ior_limit=
rs_start.rss_io[i].base+rs_start.rss_io[i].len-1;
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: I/O [%x..%x]\n",
rp->r_priv.s_io_tab[i].ior_base,
rp->r_priv.s_io_tab[i].ior_limit);
}
if (rs_start.rss_nr_pci_id > RSS_NR_PCI_ID)
{
printf("RS: do_up: too many PCI device IDs\n");
return EINVAL;
}
rp->r_nr_pci_id= rs_start.rss_nr_pci_id;
for (i= 0; i<rp->r_nr_pci_id; i++)
{
rp->r_pci_id[i].vid= rs_start.rss_pci_id[i].vid;
rp->r_pci_id[i].did= rs_start.rss_pci_id[i].did;
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: PCI %04x/%04x\n",
rp->r_pci_id[i].vid, rp->r_pci_id[i].did);
}
if (rs_start.rss_nr_pci_class > RSS_NR_PCI_CLASS)
{
printf("RS: do_up: too many PCI class IDs\n");
return EINVAL;
}
rp->r_nr_pci_class= rs_start.rss_nr_pci_class;
for (i= 0; i<rp->r_nr_pci_class; i++)
{
rp->r_pci_class[i].class= rs_start.rss_pci_class[i].class;
rp->r_pci_class[i].mask= rs_start.rss_pci_class[i].mask;
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_up: PCI class %06x mask %06x\n",
rp->r_pci_class[i].class, rp->r_pci_class[i].mask);
}
/* Copy 'system' call number bits */
if (sizeof(rs_start.rss_system[0]) == sizeof(rp->r_call_mask[0]) &&
sizeof(rs_start.rss_system) == sizeof(rp->r_call_mask))
{
for (i= 0; i<RSS_NR_SYSTEM; i++)
rp->r_call_mask[i]= rs_start.rss_system[i];
}
else
{
printf(
"RS: do_up: internal inconsistency: bad size of r_call_mask\n");
memset(rp->r_call_mask, '\0', sizeof(rp->r_call_mask));
}
/* Initialize some fields. */
rp->r_period = rs_start.rss_period;
rp->r_dev_nr = rs_start.rss_major;
rp->r_dev_style = STYLE_DEV;
rp->r_restarts = -1; /* will be incremented */
rp->r_set_resources= 1; /* set resources */
if (sizeof(rp->r_vm) == sizeof(rs_start.rss_vm) &&
sizeof(rp->r_vm[0]) == sizeof(rs_start.rss_vm[0]))
{
memcpy(rp->r_vm, rs_start.rss_vm, sizeof(rp->r_vm));
}
else
{
printf("RS: do_up: internal inconsistency: bad size of r_vm\n");
memset(rp->r_vm, '\0', sizeof(rp->r_vm));
}
/* All information was gathered. Now try to start the system service. */
r = start_service(rp, 0, &ep);
m_ptr->RS_ENDPOINT = ep;
return r;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_down *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_down(message *m_ptr)
{
register struct rproc *rp;
size_t len;
int s, proc;
char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN];
/* This call requires special privileges. */
if (!caller_is_root(m_ptr->m_source)) return(EPERM);
len= m_ptr->RS_CMD_LEN;
if (len >= sizeof(label))
return EINVAL; /* Too long */
s= sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->RS_CMD_ADDR,
SELF, (vir_bytes) label, len);
if (s != OK) return(s);
label[len]= '\0';
for (rp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if (rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE && strcmp(rp->r_label, label) == 0) {
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: stopping '%s' (%d)\n", label, rp->r_pid);
stop_service(rp,RS_EXITING);
if (rp->r_pid == -1)
{
/* Process is already gone, release slot. */
free_slot(rp);
return(OK);
}
/* Late reply - send a reply when process dies. */
rp->r_flags |= RS_LATEREPLY;
rp->r_caller = m_ptr->m_source;
return EDONTREPLY;
}
}
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: do_down: '%s' not found\n", label);
return(ESRCH);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_restart *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_restart(message *m_ptr)
{
register struct rproc *rp;
size_t len;
int s, proc, r;
char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN];
endpoint_t ep;
len= m_ptr->RS_CMD_LEN;
if (len >= sizeof(label))
return EINVAL; /* Too long */
s= sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->RS_CMD_ADDR,
SELF, (vir_bytes) label, len);
if (s != OK) return(s);
label[len]= '\0';
/* This call requires special privileges. */
if (! (caller_can_control(m_ptr->m_source, label) ||
caller_is_root(m_ptr->m_source))) {
return(EPERM);
}
for (rp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if ((rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE) && strcmp(rp->r_label, label) == 0) {
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: restarting '%s' (%d)\n", label, rp->r_pid);
if (rp->r_pid >= 0)
{
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: do_restart: '%s' is (still) running, pid = %d\n",
rp->r_pid);
return EBUSY;
}
rp->r_flags &= ~(RS_REFRESHING|RS_NOPINGREPLY);
r = start_service(rp, 0, &ep);
if (r != OK) printf("do_restart: start_service failed: %d\n", r);
m_ptr->RS_ENDPOINT = ep;
return(r);
}
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: do_restart: '%s' not found\n", label);
}
return(ESRCH);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_refresh *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_refresh(message *m_ptr)
{
register struct rproc *rp;
size_t len;
int s;
char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN];
len= m_ptr->RS_CMD_LEN;
if (len >= sizeof(label))
return EINVAL; /* Too long */
s= sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->RS_CMD_ADDR,
SELF, (vir_bytes) label, len);
if (s != OK) return(s);
label[len]= '\0';
/* This call requires special privileges. */
if (! (caller_can_control(m_ptr->m_source, label) ||
caller_is_root(m_ptr->m_source))) {
return(EPERM);
}
for (rp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if (rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE && strcmp(rp->r_label, label) == 0) {
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: refreshing %s (%d)\n", rp->r_label, rp->r_pid);
}
stop_service(rp,RS_REFRESHING);
return(OK);
}
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: do_refresh: '%s' not found\n", label);
}
return(ESRCH);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_shutdown *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_shutdown(message *m_ptr)
{
/* This call requires special privileges. */
if (m_ptr != NULL && !caller_is_root(m_ptr->m_source)) return(EPERM);
/* Set flag so that RS server knows services shouldn't be restarted. */
shutting_down = TRUE;
return(OK);
}
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/*===========================================================================*
* do_update *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_update(message *m_ptr)
{
register struct rproc *rp;
size_t len;
int s;
char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN];
int lu_state;
int prepare_maxtime;
/* Retrieve label. */
len= m_ptr->RS_CMD_LEN;
if (len >= sizeof(label))
return EINVAL; /* Too long */
s= sys_datacopy(m_ptr->m_source, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->RS_CMD_ADDR,
SELF, (vir_bytes) label, len);
if (s != OK) return(s);
label[len]= '\0';
/* Retrieve live update state. */
lu_state = m_ptr->RS_LU_STATE;
if(lu_state == SEF_LU_STATE_NULL) {
return(EINVAL);
}
/* Retrieve prepare max time. */
prepare_maxtime = m_ptr->RS_LU_PREPARE_MAXTIME;
if(prepare_maxtime) {
if(prepare_maxtime < 0 || prepare_maxtime > RS_MAX_PREPARE_MAXTIME) {
return(EINVAL);
}
}
else {
prepare_maxtime = RS_DEFAULT_PREPARE_MAXTIME;
}
/* Make sure we are not already updating. */
if(rupdate.flags & RS_UPDATING) {
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: do_update: an update is already in progress");
}
return(EBUSY);
}
/* Try to start the update process. */
for (rp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if (rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE && strcmp(rp->r_label, label) == 0) {
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: updating %s (%d)\n", rp->r_label, rp->r_pid);
}
rp->r_flags |= RS_UPDATING;
rupdate.flags |= RS_UPDATING;
getuptime(&rupdate.prepare_tm);
rupdate.prepare_maxtime = prepare_maxtime;
rupdate.rp = rp;
m_ptr->m_type = RS_LU_PREPARE;
asynsend(rp->r_proc_nr_e, m_ptr); /* request to prepare for update */
return(OK);
}
}
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: do_update: '%s' not found\n", label);
}
return(ESRCH);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_upd_ready *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_upd_ready(message *m_ptr)
{
register struct rproc *rp;
int who_p;
clock_t now = m_ptr->NOTIFY_TIMESTAMP;
int result;
who_p = _ENDPOINT_P(m_ptr->m_source);
rp = rproc_ptr[who_p];
result = m_ptr->RS_LU_RESULT;
/* Make sure the originating process was requested to prepare for update. */
if(! (rp->r_flags & RS_UPDATING) ) {
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: do_upd_ready: got unexpected update ready msg from %d\n",
m_ptr->m_source);
}
return(EINVAL);
}
/* Check if something went wrong and the process failed to prepare
* for the update. In that case, end the update process.
*/
if(result != OK) {
end_update(now);
switch(result) {
case EACCES:
printf("RS: update failed: %s\n",
"process does not support live update");
break;
case EINVAL:
printf("RS: update failed: %s\n",
"process does not support the required state");
break;
case EBUSY:
printf("RS: update failed: %s\n",
"process is not able to prepare for the update now");
break;
case EGENERIC:
printf("RS: update failed: %s\n",
"a generic error occurred while preparing for the update");
break;
default:
printf("RS: update failed: %s (%d)\n",
"an unknown error occurred while preparing for the update\n",
result);
break;
}
return ENOTREADY;
}
/* Kill the process now and mark it for refresh, the new version will
* be automatically restarted.
*/
rp->r_flags &= ~RS_EXITING;
rp->r_flags |= RS_REFRESHING;
kill(rp->r_pid, SIGKILL);
return(OK);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* update_period *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void update_period(message *m_ptr)
{
clock_t now = m_ptr->NOTIFY_TIMESTAMP;
short has_update_timed_out;
message m;
/* See if a timeout has occurred. */
has_update_timed_out = (now - rupdate.prepare_tm > rupdate.prepare_maxtime);
/* If an update timed out, end the update process and notify the service. */
if(has_update_timed_out) {
end_update(now);
printf("RS: update failed: maximum prepare time reached\n");
/* Prepare cancel request. */
m.m_type = RS_LU_PREPARE;
m.RS_LU_STATE = SEF_LU_STATE_NULL;
asynsend(rupdate.rp->r_proc_nr_e, &m);
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
* end_update *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void end_update(clock_t now)
{
/* End the update process and mark the affected service as no longer under
* update. Eventual late ready to update message (if any) will simply be
* ignored and the service can continue executing.
* Also, if the service has a period, update the alive and check timestamps
* of the service to force a status request in the next period.
*/
rupdate.flags &= ~RS_UPDATING;
rupdate.rp->r_flags &= ~RS_UPDATING;
if(rupdate.rp->r_period > 0 ) {
rupdate.rp->r_alive_tm = now;
rupdate.rp->r_check_tm = now - rupdate.rp->r_period - 1;
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
2005-09-11 18:45:46 +02:00
* do_exit *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC void do_exit(message *m_ptr)
{
register struct rproc *rp;
pid_t exit_pid;
int exit_status, r, slot_nr;
endpoint_t ep;
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
clock_t now = m_ptr->NOTIFY_TIMESTAMP;
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: got SIGCHLD signal, doing wait to get exited child.\n");
/* See which child exited and what the exit status is. This is done in a
* loop because multiple children may have exited, all reported by one
* SIGCHLD signal. The WNOHANG options is used to prevent blocking if,
* somehow, no exited child can be found.
*/
while ( (exit_pid = waitpid(-1, &exit_status, WNOHANG)) != 0 ) {
if(rs_verbose) {
#if 0
printf("RS: pid %d, ", exit_pid);
#endif
if (WIFSIGNALED(exit_status)) {
#if 0
printf("killed, signal number %d\n", WTERMSIG(exit_status));
#endif
}
else if (WIFEXITED(exit_status)) {
#if 0
printf("normal exit, status %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(exit_status));
#endif
}
}
/* Read from the exec pipe */
for (;;)
{
r= read(exec_pipe[0], &slot_nr, sizeof(slot_nr));
if (r == -1)
{
break; /* No data */
}
if (r != sizeof(slot_nr))
{
panic("RS", "do_exit: unaligned read from exec pipe",
r);
}
printf("do_exit: got slot %d\n", slot_nr);
if (slot_nr < 0 || slot_nr >= NR_SYS_PROCS)
{
panic("RS", "do_exit: bad slot number from exec pipe",
slot_nr);
}
rp= &rproc[slot_nr];
rp->r_flags |= RS_EXITING;
}
/* Search the system process table to see who exited.
* This should always succeed.
*/
for (rp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
if ((rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE) && rp->r_pid == exit_pid) {
2006-03-08 15:38:35 +01:00
int proc;
proc = _ENDPOINT_P(rp->r_proc_nr_e);
2006-03-08 15:38:35 +01:00
rproc_ptr[proc] = NULL; /* invalidate */
rp->r_pid= -1;
/* If PCI properties are set, inform the PCI driver. */
if(rp->r_nr_pci_id || rp->r_nr_pci_class) {
pci_del_acl(rp->r_proc_nr_e);
}
if ((rp->r_flags & RS_EXITING) || shutting_down) {
/* No reply sent to RS_DOWN yet. */
if(rp->r_flags & RS_LATEREPLY) {
message rsm;
rsm.m_type = OK;
send(rp->r_caller, &rsm);
}
/* Release slot. */
free_slot(rp);
}
else if(rp->r_flags & RS_REFRESHING) {
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
short is_updating = rp->r_flags & RS_UPDATING;
/* Refresh */
rp->r_restarts = -1; /* reset counter */
if (rp->r_script[0] != '\0')
run_script(rp);
else {
start_service(rp, 0, &ep); /* direct restart */
if(m_ptr)
m_ptr->RS_ENDPOINT = ep;
}
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/* If updating, end the update process. */
if(is_updating) {
end_update(now);
printf("RS: update succeeded\n");
}
}
else {
/* Determine what to do. If this is the first unexpected
* exit, immediately restart this service. Otherwise use
* a binary exponential backoff.
*/
#if 0
rp->r_restarts= 0;
#endif
if (WIFSIGNALED(exit_status)) {
switch(WTERMSIG(exit_status))
{
case SIGKILL: rp->r_flags |= RS_KILLED; break;
default: rp->r_flags |= RS_SIGNALED; break;
}
}
else
rp->r_flags |= RS_CRASHED;
if (rp->r_script[0] != '\0') {
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: running restart script for %s\n",
rp->r_cmd);
run_script(rp);
} else if (rp->r_restarts > 0) {
printf("RS: restarting %s, restarts %d\n",
rp->r_cmd, rp->r_backoff);
rp->r_backoff = 1 << MIN(rp->r_restarts,(BACKOFF_BITS-2));
rp->r_backoff = MIN(rp->r_backoff,MAX_BACKOFF);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if ((rp->r_sys_flags & SF_USE_COPY) && rp->r_backoff > 1)
rp->r_backoff= 1;
}
else {
printf("RS: restarting %s\n", rp->r_cmd);
start_service(rp, 0, &ep); /* direct restart */
if(m_ptr)
m_ptr->RS_ENDPOINT = ep;
/* Do this even if no I/O happens with the ioctl, in
* order to disambiguate requests with DEV_IOCTL_S.
*/
}
}
break;
}
}
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_period *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC void do_period(m_ptr)
message *m_ptr;
{
register struct rproc *rp;
clock_t now = m_ptr->NOTIFY_TIMESTAMP;
int s;
endpoint_t ep;
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/* If an update is in progress, check its status. */
if(rupdate.flags & RS_UPDATING) {
update_period(m_ptr);
}
/* Search system services table. Only check slots that are in use and not
* updating.
*/
for (rp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rp++) {
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
if ((rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE) && !(rp->r_flags & RS_UPDATING)) {
/* If the service is to be revived (because it repeatedly exited,
* and was not directly restarted), the binary backoff field is
* greater than zero.
*/
if (rp->r_backoff > 0) {
rp->r_backoff -= 1;
if (rp->r_backoff == 0) {
start_service(rp, 0, &ep);
m_ptr->RS_ENDPOINT = ep;
}
}
/* If the service was signaled with a SIGTERM and fails to respond,
* kill the system service with a SIGKILL signal.
*/
else if (rp->r_stop_tm > 0 && now - rp->r_stop_tm > 2*RS_DELTA_T
&& rp->r_pid > 0) {
kill(rp->r_pid, SIGKILL); /* terminate */
}
/* There seems to be no special conditions. If the service has a
* period assigned check its status.
*/
else if (rp->r_period > 0) {
/* Check if an answer to a status request is still pending. If
* the service didn't respond within time, kill it to simulate
* a crash. The failure will be detected and the service will
* be restarted automatically.
*/
if (rp->r_alive_tm < rp->r_check_tm) {
if (now - rp->r_alive_tm > 2*rp->r_period &&
rp->r_pid > 0 && !(rp->r_flags & RS_NOPINGREPLY)) {
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: service %d reported late\n",
rp->r_proc_nr_e);
rp->r_flags |= RS_NOPINGREPLY;
kill(rp->r_pid, SIGKILL); /* simulate crash */
}
}
/* No answer pending. Check if a period expired since the last
* check and, if so request the system service's status.
*/
else if (now - rp->r_check_tm > rp->r_period) {
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
#if 0
if(rs_verbose)
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
printf("RS: status request sent to %d\n", rp->r_proc_nr_e);
#endif
endpoint-aware conversion of servers. 'who', indicating caller number in pm and fs and some other servers, has been removed in favour of 'who_e' (endpoint) and 'who_p' (proc nr.). In both PM and FS, isokendpt() convert endpoints to process slot numbers, returning OK if it was a valid and consistent endpoint number. okendpt() does the same but panic()s if it doesn't succeed. (In PM, this is pm_isok..) pm and fs keep their own records of process endpoints in their proc tables, which are needed to make kernel calls about those processes. message field names have changed. fs drivers are endpoints. fs now doesn't try to get out of driver deadlock, as the protocol isn't supposed to let that happen any more. (A warning is printed if ELOCKED is detected though.) fproc[].fp_task (indicating which driver the process is suspended on) became an int. PM and FS now get endpoint numbers of initial boot processes from the kernel. These happen to be the same as the old proc numbers, to let user processes reach them with the old numbers, but FS and PM don't know that. All new processes after INIT, even after the generation number wraps around, get endpoint numbers with generation 1 and higher, so the first instances of the boot processes are the only processes ever to have endpoint numbers in the old proc number range. More return code checks of sys_* functions have been added. IS has become endpoint-aware. Ditched the 'text' and 'data' fields in the kernel dump (which show locations, not sizes, so aren't terribly useful) in favour of the endpoint number. Proc number is still visible. Some other dumps (e.g. dmap, rs) show endpoint numbers now too which got the formatting changed. PM reading segments using rw_seg() has changed - it uses other fields in the message now instead of encoding the segment and process number and fd in the fd field. For that it uses _read_pm() and _write_pm() which to _taskcall()s directly in pm/misc.c. PM now sys_exit()s itself on panic(), instead of sys_abort(). RS also talks in endpoints instead of process numbers.
2006-03-03 11:20:58 +01:00
notify(rp->r_proc_nr_e); /* request status */
rp->r_check_tm = now; /* mark time */
}
}
}
}
/* Reschedule a synchronous alarm for the next period. */
if (OK != (s=sys_setalarm(RS_DELTA_T, 0)))
panic("RS", "couldn't set alarm", s);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* start_service *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int start_service(rp, flags, endpoint)
struct rproc *rp;
int flags;
endpoint_t *endpoint;
{
/* Try to execute the given system service. Fork a new process. The child
* process will be inhibited from running by the NO_PRIV flag. Only let the
* child run once its privileges have been set by the parent.
*/
endpoint-aware conversion of servers. 'who', indicating caller number in pm and fs and some other servers, has been removed in favour of 'who_e' (endpoint) and 'who_p' (proc nr.). In both PM and FS, isokendpt() convert endpoints to process slot numbers, returning OK if it was a valid and consistent endpoint number. okendpt() does the same but panic()s if it doesn't succeed. (In PM, this is pm_isok..) pm and fs keep their own records of process endpoints in their proc tables, which are needed to make kernel calls about those processes. message field names have changed. fs drivers are endpoints. fs now doesn't try to get out of driver deadlock, as the protocol isn't supposed to let that happen any more. (A warning is printed if ELOCKED is detected though.) fproc[].fp_task (indicating which driver the process is suspended on) became an int. PM and FS now get endpoint numbers of initial boot processes from the kernel. These happen to be the same as the old proc numbers, to let user processes reach them with the old numbers, but FS and PM don't know that. All new processes after INIT, even after the generation number wraps around, get endpoint numbers with generation 1 and higher, so the first instances of the boot processes are the only processes ever to have endpoint numbers in the old proc number range. More return code checks of sys_* functions have been added. IS has become endpoint-aware. Ditched the 'text' and 'data' fields in the kernel dump (which show locations, not sizes, so aren't terribly useful) in favour of the endpoint number. Proc number is still visible. Some other dumps (e.g. dmap, rs) show endpoint numbers now too which got the formatting changed. PM reading segments using rw_seg() has changed - it uses other fields in the message now instead of encoding the segment and process number and fd in the fd field. For that it uses _read_pm() and _write_pm() which to _taskcall()s directly in pm/misc.c. PM now sys_exit()s itself on panic(), instead of sys_abort(). RS also talks in endpoints instead of process numbers.
2006-03-03 11:20:58 +01:00
int child_proc_nr_e, child_proc_nr_n; /* child process slot */
pid_t child_pid; /* child's process id */
2005-10-21 15:28:26 +02:00
char *file_only;
int s, use_copy, slot_nr;
bitchunk_t *vm_mask;
message m;
char * null_env = NULL;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
use_copy= (rp->r_sys_flags & SF_USE_COPY);
/* See if we are not using a copy but we do need one to start the service. */
if(!use_copy && (rp->r_sys_flags & SF_NEED_COPY)) {
printf("RS: unable to start service %s without an in-memory copy\n",
rp->r_label);
return(EPERM);
}
/* Now fork and branch for parent and child process (and check for error). */
if (use_copy) {
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: fork_nb..\n");
child_pid= fork_nb();
} else {
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: fork regular..\n");
child_pid = fork();
}
switch(child_pid) { /* see fork(2) */
case -1: /* fork failed */
report("RS", "warning, fork() failed", errno); /* shouldn't happen */
return(errno); /* return error */
case 0: /* child process */
2005-10-21 15:28:26 +02:00
/* Try to execute the binary that has an absolute path. If this fails,
* e.g., because the root file system cannot be read, try to strip off
2005-10-21 15:28:26 +02:00
* the path, and see if the command is in RS' current working dir.
*/
nice(rp->r_nice); /* Nice before setuid, to allow negative
* nice values.
*/
setuid(rp->r_uid);
cpf_reload(); /* Tell kernel about grant table */
if (!use_copy)
{
execve(rp->r_argv[0], rp->r_argv, &null_env); /* POSIX execute */
file_only = strrchr(rp->r_argv[0], '/') + 1;
execve(file_only, rp->r_argv, &null_env); /* POSIX execute */
}
2005-10-21 15:28:26 +02:00
printf("RS: exec failed for %s: %d\n", rp->r_argv[0], errno);
slot_nr= rp-rproc;
s= write(exec_pipe[1], &slot_nr, sizeof(slot_nr));
if (s != sizeof(slot_nr))
printf("RS: write to exec pipe failed: %d/%d\n", s, errno);
exit(1); /* terminate child */
default: /* parent process */
#if 0
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: parent forked, pid %d..\n", child_pid);
#endif
endpoint-aware conversion of servers. 'who', indicating caller number in pm and fs and some other servers, has been removed in favour of 'who_e' (endpoint) and 'who_p' (proc nr.). In both PM and FS, isokendpt() convert endpoints to process slot numbers, returning OK if it was a valid and consistent endpoint number. okendpt() does the same but panic()s if it doesn't succeed. (In PM, this is pm_isok..) pm and fs keep their own records of process endpoints in their proc tables, which are needed to make kernel calls about those processes. message field names have changed. fs drivers are endpoints. fs now doesn't try to get out of driver deadlock, as the protocol isn't supposed to let that happen any more. (A warning is printed if ELOCKED is detected though.) fproc[].fp_task (indicating which driver the process is suspended on) became an int. PM and FS now get endpoint numbers of initial boot processes from the kernel. These happen to be the same as the old proc numbers, to let user processes reach them with the old numbers, but FS and PM don't know that. All new processes after INIT, even after the generation number wraps around, get endpoint numbers with generation 1 and higher, so the first instances of the boot processes are the only processes ever to have endpoint numbers in the old proc number range. More return code checks of sys_* functions have been added. IS has become endpoint-aware. Ditched the 'text' and 'data' fields in the kernel dump (which show locations, not sizes, so aren't terribly useful) in favour of the endpoint number. Proc number is still visible. Some other dumps (e.g. dmap, rs) show endpoint numbers now too which got the formatting changed. PM reading segments using rw_seg() has changed - it uses other fields in the message now instead of encoding the segment and process number and fd in the fd field. For that it uses _read_pm() and _write_pm() which to _taskcall()s directly in pm/misc.c. PM now sys_exit()s itself on panic(), instead of sys_abort(). RS also talks in endpoints instead of process numbers.
2006-03-03 11:20:58 +01:00
child_proc_nr_e = getnprocnr(child_pid); /* get child slot */
#if 0
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: forked into %d..\n", child_proc_nr_e);
#endif
break; /* continue below */
}
/* Regardless of any following failures, there is now a child process.
* Update the system process table that is maintained by the RS server.
*/
child_proc_nr_n = _ENDPOINT_P(child_proc_nr_e);
rp->r_flags = RS_IN_USE | flags; /* mark slot in use */
rp->r_restarts += 1; /* raise nr of restarts */
rp->r_proc_nr_e = child_proc_nr_e; /* set child details */
rp->r_pid = child_pid;
rp->r_check_tm = 0; /* not checked yet */
getuptime(&rp->r_alive_tm); /* currently alive */
rp->r_stop_tm = 0; /* not exiting yet */
rp->r_backoff = 0; /* not to be restarted */
rproc_ptr[child_proc_nr_n] = rp; /* mapping for fast access */
/* If any of the calls below fail, the RS_EXITING flag is set. This implies
* that the process will be removed from RS's process table once it has
* terminated. The assumption is that it is not useful to try to restart the
* process later in these failure cases.
*/
if (use_copy)
{
extern char **environ;
/* Copy the executable image into the child process. If this call
* fails, the child process may or may not be killed already. If it is
* not killed, it's blocked because of NO_PRIV. Kill it now either way.
*/
s = dev_execve(child_proc_nr_e, rp->r_exec, rp->r_exec_len, rp->r_argv,
environ);
if (s != OK) {
report("RS", "dev_execve call failed", s);
kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
rp->r_flags |= RS_EXITING; /* don't try again */
return(s);
}
}
/* Set resources when asked to. */
if (rp->r_set_resources)
{
/* Initialize privilege structure. */
init_privs(rp, &rp->r_priv);
/* Tell VM about allowed calls. */
vm_mask = &rp->r_vm[0];
if ((s = vm_set_priv(child_proc_nr_e, vm_mask)) < 0) {
report("RS", "vm_set_priv call failed", s);
kill(child_pid, SIGKILL);
rp->r_flags |= RS_EXITING;
return (s);
}
}
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/* Set and synch the privilege structure for the new service. */
if ((s = sys_privctl(child_proc_nr_e, SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS, &rp->r_priv)) != OK
|| (s = sys_getpriv(&rp->r_priv, child_proc_nr_e)) != OK) {
report("RS","unable to set privileges", s);
kill(child_pid, SIGKILL); /* kill the service */
rp->r_flags |= RS_EXITING; /* expect exit */
return(s); /* return error */
}
/* If PCI properties are set, inform the PCI driver about the new service. */
if(rp->r_nr_pci_id || rp->r_nr_pci_class) {
init_pci(rp, child_proc_nr_e);
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
/* Publish the new system service. */
s = publish_service(rp);
if (s != OK) {
printf("RS: warning: publish_service failed: %d\n", s);
}
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/* Allow the service to run.
* XXX FIXME: we should let the service run only after publishing information
* about the new system service, but this is not currently possible due to
* the blocking nature of mapdriver() that expects the service to be running.
* The current solution is not race-free. This hack can go once service
* publishing is made fully asynchronous in RS.
*/
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
if ((s = sys_privctl(child_proc_nr_e, SYS_PRIV_ALLOW, NULL)) != OK) {
report("RS","unable to allow the service to run", s);
kill(child_pid, SIGKILL); /* kill the service */
rp->r_flags |= RS_EXITING; /* expect exit */
return(s); /* return error */
}
2009-12-23 17:26:28 +01:00
/* The purpose of non-blocking forks is to avoid involving VFS in the forking
* process, because VFS may be blocked on a sendrec() to a MFS that is
* waiting for a endpoint update for a dead driver. We have just published
* that update, but VFS may still be blocked. As a result, VFS may not yet
* have received PM's fork message. Hence, if we call mapdriver()
2009-12-23 17:26:28 +01:00
* immediately, VFS may not know about the process and thus refuse to add the
* driver entry. The following temporary hack works around this by forcing
* blocking communication from PM to VFS. Once VFS has been made non-blocking
* towards MFS instances, this hack and the entire fork_nb() call can go.
*/
if (use_copy)
setuid(0);
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/* Map the new service. */
if (rp->r_dev_nr > 0) { /* set driver map */
if ((s=mapdriver(rp->r_label,
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
rp->r_dev_nr, rp->r_dev_style, !!use_copy /* force */)) < 0) {
report("RS", "couldn't map driver (continuing)", errno);
}
}
if(rs_verbose)
endpoint-aware conversion of servers. 'who', indicating caller number in pm and fs and some other servers, has been removed in favour of 'who_e' (endpoint) and 'who_p' (proc nr.). In both PM and FS, isokendpt() convert endpoints to process slot numbers, returning OK if it was a valid and consistent endpoint number. okendpt() does the same but panic()s if it doesn't succeed. (In PM, this is pm_isok..) pm and fs keep their own records of process endpoints in their proc tables, which are needed to make kernel calls about those processes. message field names have changed. fs drivers are endpoints. fs now doesn't try to get out of driver deadlock, as the protocol isn't supposed to let that happen any more. (A warning is printed if ELOCKED is detected though.) fproc[].fp_task (indicating which driver the process is suspended on) became an int. PM and FS now get endpoint numbers of initial boot processes from the kernel. These happen to be the same as the old proc numbers, to let user processes reach them with the old numbers, but FS and PM don't know that. All new processes after INIT, even after the generation number wraps around, get endpoint numbers with generation 1 and higher, so the first instances of the boot processes are the only processes ever to have endpoint numbers in the old proc number range. More return code checks of sys_* functions have been added. IS has become endpoint-aware. Ditched the 'text' and 'data' fields in the kernel dump (which show locations, not sizes, so aren't terribly useful) in favour of the endpoint number. Proc number is still visible. Some other dumps (e.g. dmap, rs) show endpoint numbers now too which got the formatting changed. PM reading segments using rw_seg() has changed - it uses other fields in the message now instead of encoding the segment and process number and fd in the fd field. For that it uses _read_pm() and _write_pm() which to _taskcall()s directly in pm/misc.c. PM now sys_exit()s itself on panic(), instead of sys_abort(). RS also talks in endpoints instead of process numbers.
2006-03-03 11:20:58 +01:00
printf("RS: started '%s', major %d, pid %d, endpoint %d, proc %d\n",
rp->r_cmd, rp->r_dev_nr, child_pid,
child_proc_nr_e, child_proc_nr_n);
/* The system service now has been successfully started. The only thing
* that can go wrong now, is that execution fails at the child. If that's
* the case, the child will exit.
*/
if(endpoint) *endpoint = child_proc_nr_e; /* send back child endpoint */
2007-04-27 15:03:33 +02:00
return(OK);
}
2005-08-23 13:31:32 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* stop_service *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int stop_service(rp,how)
struct rproc *rp;
int how;
{
/* Try to stop the system service. First send a SIGTERM signal to ask the
* system service to terminate. If the service didn't install a signal
* handler, it will be killed. If it did and ignores the signal, we'll
* find out because we record the time here and send a SIGKILL.
*/
if(rs_verbose) printf("RS tries to stop %s (pid %d)\n", rp->r_cmd, rp->r_pid);
rp->r_flags |= how; /* what to on exit? */
if(rp->r_pid > 0) kill(rp->r_pid, SIGTERM); /* first try friendly */
else if(rs_verbose) printf("RS: no process to kill\n");
getuptime(&rp->r_stop_tm); /* record current time */
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_getsysinfo *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_getsysinfo(m_ptr)
message *m_ptr;
{
vir_bytes src_addr, dst_addr;
int dst_proc;
size_t len;
int s;
/* This call requires special privileges. */
if (!caller_is_root(m_ptr->m_source)) return(EPERM);
switch(m_ptr->m1_i1) {
case SI_PROC_TAB:
src_addr = (vir_bytes) rproc;
len = sizeof(struct rproc) * NR_SYS_PROCS;
break;
default:
return(EINVAL);
}
dst_proc = m_ptr->m_source;
dst_addr = (vir_bytes) m_ptr->m1_p1;
if (OK != (s=sys_datacopy(SELF, src_addr, dst_proc, dst_addr, len)))
return(s);
return(OK);
}
/*===========================================================================*
* fork_nb *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE pid_t fork_nb()
{
message m;
return(_syscall(PM_PROC_NR, FORK_NB, &m));
}
/*===========================================================================*
* share_exec *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int share_exec(rp_dst, rp_src)
struct rproc *rp_dst, *rp_src;
{
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: share_exec: sharing exec image from %s to %s\n",
rp_src->r_label, rp_dst->r_label);
}
/* Share exec image from rp_src to rp_dst. */
rp_dst->r_exec_len = rp_src->r_exec_len;
rp_dst->r_exec = rp_src->r_exec;
return OK;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* read_exec *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE int read_exec(rp)
struct rproc *rp;
{
int e, r, fd;
char *e_name;
struct stat sb;
e_name= rp->r_argv[0];
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: read_exec: copying exec image from: %s\n", e_name);
}
r= stat(e_name, &sb);
if (r != 0)
return -errno;
fd= open(e_name, O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
return -errno;
rp->r_exec_len= sb.st_size;
rp->r_exec= malloc(rp->r_exec_len);
if (rp->r_exec == NULL)
{
printf("RS: read_exec: unable to allocate %d bytes\n",
rp->r_exec_len);
close(fd);
return ENOMEM;
}
r= read(fd, rp->r_exec, rp->r_exec_len);
e= errno;
close(fd);
if (r == rp->r_exec_len)
return OK;
printf("RS: read_exec: read failed %d, errno %d\n", r, e);
free(rp->r_exec);
rp->r_exec= NULL;
if (r >= 0)
return EIO;
else
return -e;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* free_slot *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void free_slot(rp)
struct rproc *rp;
{
int slot_nr, has_shared_exec;
struct rproc *other_rp;
/* Free memory if necessary. */
if(rp->r_sys_flags & SF_USE_COPY) {
/* Search for some other slot sharing the same exec image. */
has_shared_exec = FALSE;
for (slot_nr = 0; slot_nr < NR_SYS_PROCS; slot_nr++) {
other_rp = &rproc[slot_nr]; /* get pointer to slot */
if (other_rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE && other_rp != rp
&& other_rp->r_exec == rp->r_exec) { /* found! */
has_shared_exec = TRUE;
}
}
/* If nobody uses our copy of the exec image, we can get rid of it. */
if(!has_shared_exec) {
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: free_slot: free exec image from %s\n", rp->r_label);
}
free(rp->r_exec);
rp->r_exec = NULL;
rp->r_exec_len = 0;
}
}
/* Mark slot as no longer in use.. */
rp->r_flags = 0;
rproc_ptr[_ENDPOINT_P(rp->r_proc_nr_e)] = NULL;
}
/*===========================================================================*
* run_script *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void run_script(rp)
struct rproc *rp;
{
int r, proc_nr_e;
pid_t pid;
char *reason;
char incarnation_str[20]; /* Enough for a counter? */
char *envp[1] = { NULL };
if (rp->r_flags & RS_REFRESHING)
reason= "restart";
else if (rp->r_flags & RS_NOPINGREPLY)
reason= "no-heartbeat";
else if (rp->r_flags & RS_KILLED)
reason= "killed";
else if (rp->r_flags & RS_CRASHED)
reason= "crashed";
else if (rp->r_flags & RS_SIGNALED)
reason= "signaled";
else
{
printf(
"RS: run_script: can't find reason for termination of '%s'\n",
rp->r_label);
return;
}
sprintf(incarnation_str, "%d", rp->r_restarts);
if(rs_verbose) {
printf("RS: calling script '%s'\n", rp->r_script);
printf("RS: sevice name: '%s'\n", rp->r_label);
printf("RS: reason: '%s'\n", reason);
printf("RS: incarnation: '%s'\n", incarnation_str);
}
pid= fork();
switch(pid)
{
case -1:
printf("RS: run_script: fork failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
break;
case 0:
execle(rp->r_script, rp->r_script, rp->r_label, reason,
incarnation_str, NULL, envp);
printf("RS: run_script: execl '%s' failed: %s\n",
rp->r_script, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
default:
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
/* Set the privilege structure for the child process. */
proc_nr_e = getnprocnr(pid);
Basic System Event Framework (SEF) with ping and live update. SYSLIB CHANGES: - SEF must be used by every system process and is thereby part of the system library. - The framework provides a receive() interface (sef_receive) for system processes to automatically catch known system even messages and process them. - SEF provides a default behavior for each type of system event, but allows system processes to register callbacks to override the default behavior. - Custom (local to the process) or predefined (provided by SEF) callback implementations can be registered to SEF. - SEF currently includes support for 2 types of system events: 1. SEF Ping. The event occurs every time RS sends a ping to figure out whether a system process is still alive. The default callback implementation provided by SEF is to notify RS back to let it know the process is alive and kicking. 2. SEF Live update. The event occurs every time RS sends a prepare to update message to let a system process know an update is available and to prepare for it. The live update support is very basic for now. SEF only deals with verifying if the prepare state can be supported by the process, dumping the state for debugging purposes, and providing an event-driven programming model to the process to react to state changes check-in when ready to update. - SEF should be extended in the future to integrate support for more types of system events. Ideally, all the cross-cutting concerns should be integrated into SEF to avoid duplicating code and ease extensibility. Examples include: * PM notify messages primarily used at shutdown. * SYSTEM notify messages primarily used for signals. * CLOCK notify messages used for system alarms. * Debug messages. IS could still be in charge of fkey handling but would forward the debug message to the target process (e.g. PM, if the user requested debug information about PM). SEF would then catch the message and do nothing unless the process has registered an appropriate callback to deal with the event. This simplifies the programming model to print debug information, avoids duplicating code, and reduces the effort to print debug information. SYSTEM PROCESSES CHANGES: - Every system process registers SEF callbacks it needs to override the default system behavior and calls sef_startup() right after being started. - sef_startup() does almost nothing now, but will be extended in the future to support callbacks of its own to let RS control and synchronize with every system process at initialization time. - Every system process calls sef_receive() now rather than receive() directly, to let SEF handle predefined system events. RS CHANGES: - RS supports a basic single-component live update protocol now, as follows: * When an update command is issued (via "service update *"), RS notifies the target system process to prepare for a specific update state. * If the process doesn't respond back in time, the update is aborted. * When the process responds back, RS kills it and marks it for refreshing. * The process is then automatically restarted as for a buggy process and can start running again. * Live update is currently prototyped as a controlled failure.
2009-12-21 15:12:21 +01:00
if ((r = sys_privctl(proc_nr_e, SYS_PRIV_SET_USER, NULL))
!= OK) {
printf("RS: run_script: can't set privileges: %d\n",r);
}
/* Allow the process to run. */
if ((r = sys_privctl(proc_nr_e, SYS_PRIV_ALLOW, NULL)) != OK) {
printf("RS: run_script: process can't run: %d\n",r);
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
}
/* Do not wait for the child */
break;
}
}
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
/*===========================================================================*
* get_next_label *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE char *get_next_label(ptr, label, caller_label)
char *ptr;
char *label;
char *caller_label;
{
/* Get the next label from the list of (IPC) labels.
*/
char *p, *q;
size_t len;
for (p= ptr; p[0] != '\0'; p= q)
{
/* Skip leading space */
while (p[0] != '\0' && isspace((unsigned char)p[0]))
p++;
/* Find start of next word */
q= p;
while (q[0] != '\0' && !isspace((unsigned char)q[0]))
q++;
if (q == p)
continue;
len= q-p;
if (len > MAX_LABEL_LEN)
{
printf(
"rs:get_next_label: bad ipc list entry '.*s' for %s: too long\n",
len, p, caller_label);
continue;
}
memcpy(label, p, len);
label[len]= '\0';
return q; /* found another */
}
return NULL; /* done */
}
/*===========================================================================*
* add_forward_ipc *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void add_forward_ipc(rp, privp)
struct rproc *rp;
struct priv *privp;
{
/* Add IPC send permissions to a process based on that process's IPC
* list.
*/
char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN+1], *p;
struct rproc *tmp_rp;
endpoint_t proc_nr_e;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
int r;
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
int slot_nr, priv_id;
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
struct priv priv;
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
p = rp->r_ipc_list;
while ((p = get_next_label(p, label, rp->r_label)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(label, "SYSTEM") == 0)
proc_nr_e= SYSTEM;
else if (strcmp(label, "USER") == 0)
proc_nr_e= INIT_PROC_NR; /* all user procs */
else if (strcmp(label, "PM") == 0)
proc_nr_e= PM_PROC_NR;
else if (strcmp(label, "VFS") == 0)
proc_nr_e= FS_PROC_NR;
else if (strcmp(label, "RS") == 0)
proc_nr_e= RS_PROC_NR;
else if (strcmp(label, "LOG") == 0)
proc_nr_e= LOG_PROC_NR;
else if (strcmp(label, "TTY") == 0)
proc_nr_e= TTY_PROC_NR;
else if (strcmp(label, "DS") == 0)
proc_nr_e= DS_PROC_NR;
else if (strcmp(label, "VM") == 0)
proc_nr_e= VM_PROC_NR;
else
{
/* Try to find process */
for (slot_nr = 0; slot_nr < NR_SYS_PROCS;
slot_nr++)
{
tmp_rp = &rproc[slot_nr];
if (!(tmp_rp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE))
continue;
if (strcmp(tmp_rp->r_label, label) == 0)
break;
}
if (slot_nr >= NR_SYS_PROCS)
{
2009-10-01 21:21:57 +02:00
if (rs_verbose)
printf(
"add_forward_ipc: unable to find '%s'\n", label);
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
continue;
}
proc_nr_e= tmp_rp->r_proc_nr_e;
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
if ((r = sys_getpriv(&priv, proc_nr_e)) < 0)
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
{
printf(
"add_forward_ipc: unable to get priv_id for '%s': %d\n",
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
label, r);
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
continue;
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
priv_id= priv.s_id;
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
set_sys_bit(privp->s_ipc_to, priv_id);
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
* add_backward_ipc *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void add_backward_ipc(rp, privp)
struct rproc *rp;
struct priv *privp;
{
/* Add IPC send permissions to a process based on other processes' IPC
* lists. This is enough to allow each such two processes to talk to
* each other, as the kernel guarantees send mask symmetry. We need to
* add these permissions now because the current process may not yet
* have existed at the time that the other process was initialized.
*/
char label[MAX_LABEL_LEN+1], *p;
struct rproc *rrp;
int priv_id, found;
for (rrp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rrp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rrp++) {
if (!(rrp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE))
continue;
/* If an IPC target list was provided for the process being
* checked here, make sure that the label of the new process
* is in that process's list.
*/
if (rrp->r_ipc_list[0]) {
found = 0;
p = rrp->r_ipc_list;
while ((p = get_next_label(p, label, rp->r_label)) !=
NULL) {
if (!strcmp(rp->r_label, label)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
continue;
}
Rewrite of boot process KERNEL CHANGES: - The kernel only knows about privileges of kernel tasks and the root system process (now RS). - Kernel tasks and the root system process are the only processes that are made schedulable by the kernel at startup. All the other processes in the boot image don't get their privileges set at startup and are inhibited from running by the RTS_NO_PRIV flag. - Removed the assumption on the ordering of processes in the boot image table. System processes can now appear in any order in the boot image table. - Privilege ids can now be assigned both statically or dynamically. The kernel assigns static privilege ids to kernel tasks and the root system process. Each id is directly derived from the process number. - User processes now all share the static privilege id of the root user process (now INIT). - sys_privctl split: we have more calls now to let RS set privileges for system processes. SYS_PRIV_ALLOW / SYS_PRIV_DISALLOW are only used to flip the RTS_NO_PRIV flag and allow / disallow a process from running. SYS_PRIV_SET_SYS / SYS_PRIV_SET_USER are used to set privileges for a system / user process. - boot image table flags split: PROC_FULLVM is the only flag that has been moved out of the privilege flags and is still maintained in the boot image table. All the other privilege flags are out of the kernel now. RS CHANGES: - RS is the only user-space process who gets to run right after in-kernel startup. - RS uses the boot image table from the kernel and three additional boot image info table (priv table, sys table, dev table) to complete the initialization of the system. - RS checks that the entries in the priv table match the entries in the boot image table to make sure that every process in the boot image gets schedulable. - RS only uses static privilege ids to set privileges for system services in the boot image. - RS includes basic memory management support to allocate the boot image buffer dynamically during initialization. The buffer shall contain the executable image of all the system services we would like to restart after a crash. - First step towards decoupling between resource provisioning and resource requirements in RS: RS must know what resources it needs to restart a process and what resources it has currently available. This is useful to tradeoff reliability and resource consumption. When required resources are missing, the process cannot be restarted. In that case, in the future, a system flag will tell RS what to do. For example, if CORE_PROC is set, RS should trigger a system-wide panic because the system can no longer function correctly without a core system process. PM CHANGES: - The process tree built at initialization time is changed to have INIT as root with pid 0, RS child of INIT and all the system services children of RS. This is required to make RS in control of all the system services. - PM no longer registers labels for system services in the boot image. This is now part of RS's initialization process.
2009-12-11 01:08:19 +01:00
priv_id= rrp->r_priv.s_id;
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
set_sys_bit(privp->s_ipc_to, priv_id);
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
* init_privs *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void init_privs(rp, privp)
struct rproc *rp;
struct priv *privp;
{
int i, src_bits_per_word, dst_bits_per_word, src_word, dst_word,
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
src_bit, call_nr;
unsigned long mask;
/* Clear s_k_call_mask */
memset(privp->s_k_call_mask, '\0', sizeof(privp->s_k_call_mask));
src_bits_per_word= 8*sizeof(rp->r_call_mask[0]);
dst_bits_per_word= 8*sizeof(privp->s_k_call_mask[0]);
for (src_word= 0; src_word < RSS_NR_SYSTEM; src_word++)
{
for (src_bit= 0; src_bit < src_bits_per_word; src_bit++)
{
mask= (1UL << src_bit);
if (!(rp->r_call_mask[src_word] & mask))
continue;
call_nr= src_word*src_bits_per_word+src_bit;
#if 0
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: init_privs: system call %d\n", call_nr);
#endif
dst_word= call_nr / dst_bits_per_word;
mask= (1UL << (call_nr % dst_bits_per_word));
if (dst_word >= CALL_MASK_SIZE)
{
printf(
"RS: init_privs: call number %d doesn't fit\n",
call_nr);
}
privp->s_k_call_mask[dst_word] |= mask;
}
}
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
/* Clear s_ipc_to */
memset(&privp->s_ipc_to, '\0', sizeof(privp->s_ipc_to));
if (strlen(rp->r_ipc_list) != 0)
{
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
add_forward_ipc(rp, privp);
add_backward_ipc(rp, privp);
}
else
{
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
for (i= 0; i<NR_SYS_PROCS; i++)
{
IPC privileges fixes Kernel: o Remove s_ipc_sendrec, instead using s_ipc_to for all send primitives o Centralize s_ipc_to bit manipulation, - disallowing assignment of bits pointing to unused priv structs; - preventing send-to-self by not setting bit for own priv struct; - preserving send mask matrix symmetry in all cases o Add IPC send mask checks to SENDA, which were missing entirely somehow o Slightly improve IPC stats accounting for SENDA o Remove SYSTEM from user processes' send mask o Half-fix the dependency between boot image order and process numbers, - correcting the table order of the boot processes; - documenting the order requirement needed for proper send masks; - warning at boot time if the order is violated RS: o Add support in /etc/drivers.conf for servers that talk to user processes, - disallowing IPC to user processes if no "ipc" field is present - adding a special "USER" label to explicitly allow IPC to user processes o Always apply IPC masks when specified; remove -i flag from service(8) o Use kernel send mask symmetry to delay adding IPC permissions for labels that do not exist yet, adding them to that label's process upon creation o Add VM to ipc permissions list for rtl8139 and fxp in drivers.conf Left to future fixes: o Removal of the table order vs process numbers dependency altogether, possibly using per-process send list structures as used for SYSTEM calls o Proper assignment of send masks to boot processes; some of the assigned (~0) masks are much wider than necessary o Proper assignment of IPC send masks for many more servers in drivers.conf o Removal of the debugging warning about the now legitimate case where RS's add_forward_ipc cannot find the IPC destination's label yet
2009-07-02 18:25:31 +02:00
if (i != USER_PRIV_ID)
set_sys_bit(privp->s_ipc_to, i);
}
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
* init_pci *
*===========================================================================*/
PRIVATE void init_pci(rp, endpoint)
struct rproc *rp;
int endpoint;
{
/* Inform the PCI driver about the new service. */
size_t len;
int i, r;
struct rs_pci rs_pci;
if (strcmp(rp->r_label, "pci") == 0)
{
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: init_pci: not when starting 'pci'\n");
return;
}
len= strlen(rp->r_label);
if (len+1 > sizeof(rs_pci.rsp_label))
{
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: init_pci: label '%s' too long for rsp_label\n",
rp->r_label);
return;
}
strcpy(rs_pci.rsp_label, rp->r_label);
rs_pci.rsp_endpoint= endpoint;
rs_pci.rsp_nr_device= rp->r_nr_pci_id;
if (rs_pci.rsp_nr_device > RSP_NR_DEVICE)
{
printf("RS: init_pci: too many PCI devices (max %d) "
"truncating\n",
RSP_NR_DEVICE);
rs_pci.rsp_nr_device= RSP_NR_DEVICE;
}
for (i= 0; i<rs_pci.rsp_nr_device; i++)
{
rs_pci.rsp_device[i].vid= rp->r_pci_id[i].vid;
rs_pci.rsp_device[i].did= rp->r_pci_id[i].did;
}
rs_pci.rsp_nr_class= rp->r_nr_pci_class;
if (rs_pci.rsp_nr_class > RSP_NR_CLASS)
{
printf("RS: init_pci: too many PCI classes "
"(max %d) truncating\n",
RSP_NR_CLASS);
rs_pci.rsp_nr_class= RSP_NR_CLASS;
}
for (i= 0; i<rs_pci.rsp_nr_class; i++)
{
rs_pci.rsp_class[i].class= rp->r_pci_class[i].class;
rs_pci.rsp_class[i].mask= rp->r_pci_class[i].mask;
}
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: init_pci: calling pci_set_acl\n");
r= pci_set_acl(&rs_pci);
if(rs_verbose)
printf("RS: init_pci: after pci_set_acl\n");
if (r != OK)
{
printf("RS: init_pci: pci_set_acl failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
return;
}
}
/*===========================================================================*
* do_lookup *
*===========================================================================*/
PUBLIC int do_lookup(m_ptr)
message *m_ptr;
{
static char namebuf[100];
int len, r;
struct rproc *rrp;
len = m_ptr->RS_NAME_LEN;
if(len < 2 || len >= sizeof(namebuf)) {
printf("RS: len too weird (%d)\n", len);
return EINVAL;
}
if((r=sys_vircopy(m_ptr->m_source, D, (vir_bytes) m_ptr->RS_NAME,
SELF, D, (vir_bytes) namebuf, len)) != OK) {
printf("RS: name copy failed\n");
return r;
}
namebuf[len] = '\0';
for (rrp=BEG_RPROC_ADDR; rrp<END_RPROC_ADDR; rrp++) {
if (!(rrp->r_flags & RS_IN_USE))
continue;
if (!strcmp(rrp->r_label, namebuf)) {
m_ptr->RS_ENDPOINT = rrp->r_proc_nr_e;
return OK;
}
}
return ESRCH;
}