minix/sys/lib/libkern/arc4random.c

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/* $NetBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.29 2011/11/29 13:16:27 drochner Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002, 2011 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Thor Lancelot Simon.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*-
* THE BEER-WARE LICENSE
*
* <dan@FreeBSD.ORG> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
* can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you
* think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return.
*
* Dan Moschuk
*
* $FreeBSD: src/sys/libkern/arc4random.c,v 1.9 2001/08/30 12:30:58 bde Exp $
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include "rnd.h"
#else
#define NRND 0
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#endif
#include <sys/systm.h>
#ifdef _KERNEL
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/rngtest.h>
#else
#define mutex_spin_enter(x) ;
#define mutex_spin_exit(x) ;
#define mutex_init(x, y, z) ;
#endif
#include <lib/libkern/libkern.h>
#if NRND > 0
#include <sys/rnd.h>
#include <dev/rnd_private.h>
static rndsink_t rs;
#endif
/*
* The best known attack that distinguishes RC4 output from a random
* bitstream requires 2^25 bytes. (see Paul and Preneel, Analysis of
* Non-fortuitous Predictive States of the RC4 Keystream Generator.
* INDOCRYPT 2003, pp52 67).
*
* However, we discard the first 1024 bytes of output, avoiding the
* biases detected in this paper. The best current attack that
* can distinguish this "RC4[drop]" output seems to be Fleuhrer &
* McGrew's attack which requires 2^30.6 bytes of output:
* Fluhrer and McGrew, Statistical Analysis of the Alleged RC4
* Keystream Generator. FSE 2000, pp19 30
*
* We begin trying to rekey at 2^24 bytes, and forcibly rekey at 2^29 bytes
* even if the resulting key cannot be guaranteed to have full entropy.
*/
#define ARC4_MAXBYTES (16 * 1024 * 1024)
#define ARC4_HARDMAX (512 * 1024 * 1024)
#define ARC4_RESEED_SECONDS 300
#define ARC4_KEYBYTES 16 /* 128 bit key */
#ifdef _STANDALONE
#define time_uptime 1 /* XXX ugly! */
#endif /* _STANDALONE */
static u_int8_t arc4_i, arc4_j;
static int arc4_initialized = 0;
static int arc4_numbytes = 0;
static u_int8_t arc4_sbox[256];
static time_t arc4_nextreseed;
#ifdef _KERNEL
kmutex_t arc4_mtx;
#endif
static inline u_int8_t arc4_randbyte(void);
static inline void arc4randbytes_unlocked(void *, size_t);
void _arc4randbytes(void *, size_t);
uint32_t _arc4random(void);
static inline void
arc4_swap(u_int8_t *a, u_int8_t *b)
{
u_int8_t c;
c = *a;
*a = *b;
*b = c;
}
/*
* Stir our S-box.
*/
static void
arc4_randrekey(void *arg)
{
u_int8_t key[256];
int n, ask_for_more = 0;
#ifdef _KERNEL
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
#if 0 /* XXX rngtest_t is too large and could cause stack overflow */
rngtest_t rt;
#endif
#endif
#endif
#if NRND > 0
static int callback_pending;
int r;
#endif
/*
* The first time through, we must take what we can get,
* so schedule ourselves for callback no matter what.
*/
if (__predict_true(arc4_initialized)) {
mutex_spin_enter(&arc4_mtx);
}
#if NRND > 0 /* XXX without rnd, we will key from the stack, ouch! */
else {
ask_for_more = 1;
r = rnd_extract_data(key, ARC4_KEYBYTES, RND_EXTRACT_ANY);
goto got_entropy;
}
if (arg == NULL) {
if (callback_pending) {
if (arc4_numbytes > ARC4_HARDMAX) {
printf("arc4random: WARNING, hit 2^29 bytes, "
"forcibly rekeying.\n");
r = rnd_extract_data(key, ARC4_KEYBYTES,
RND_EXTRACT_ANY);
rndsink_detach(&rs);
callback_pending = 0;
goto got_entropy;
} else {
mutex_spin_exit(&arc4_mtx);
return;
}
}
r = rnd_extract_data(key, ARC4_KEYBYTES, RND_EXTRACT_GOOD);
if (r < ARC4_KEYBYTES) {
ask_for_more = 1;
}
} else {
ask_for_more = 0;
callback_pending = 0;
if (rs.len != ARC4_KEYBYTES) {
panic("arc4_randrekey: rekey callback bad length");
}
memcpy(key, rs.data, rs.len);
memset(rs.data, 0, rs.len);
}
got_entropy:
if (!ask_for_more) {
callback_pending = 0;
} else if (!callback_pending) {
callback_pending = 1;
strlcpy(rs.name, "arc4random", sizeof(rs.name));
rs.cb = arc4_randrekey;
rs.arg = &rs;
rs.len = ARC4_KEYBYTES;
rndsink_attach(&rs);
}
#endif
/*
* If it's the first time, or we got a good key, actually rekey.
*/
if (!ask_for_more || !arc4_initialized) {
for (n = ARC4_KEYBYTES; n < sizeof(key); n++)
key[n] = key[n % ARC4_KEYBYTES];
for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
arc4_j = (arc4_j + arc4_sbox[n] + key[n]) % 256;
arc4_swap(&arc4_sbox[n], &arc4_sbox[arc4_j]);
}
arc4_i = arc4_j;
memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
/*
* Throw away the first N words of output, as suggested in the
* paper "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4"
* by Fluher, Mantin, and Shamir. (N = 256 in our case.)
*/
for (n = 0; n < 256 * 4; n++)
arc4_randbyte();
/* Reset for next reseed cycle. */
arc4_nextreseed = time_uptime + ARC4_RESEED_SECONDS;
arc4_numbytes = 0;
#ifdef _KERNEL
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
#if 0 /* XXX rngtest_t is too large and could cause stack overflow */
/*
* Perform the FIPS 140-2 statistical RNG test; warn if our
* output has such poor quality as to fail the test.
*/
arc4randbytes_unlocked(rt.rt_b, sizeof(rt.rt_b));
strlcpy(rt.rt_name, "arc4random", sizeof(rt.rt_name));
if (rngtest(&rt)) {
/* rngtest will scream to the console. */
arc4_nextreseed = time_uptime;
arc4_numbytes = ARC4_MAXBYTES;
/* XXX should keep old context around, *NOT* use new */
}
#endif
#endif
#endif
}
if (__predict_true(arc4_initialized)) {
mutex_spin_exit(&arc4_mtx);
}
}
/*
* Initialize our S-box to its beginning defaults.
*/
static void
arc4_init(void)
{
int n;
mutex_init(&arc4_mtx, MUTEX_DEFAULT, IPL_VM);
arc4_i = arc4_j = 0;
for (n = 0; n < 256; n++)
arc4_sbox[n] = (u_int8_t) n;
arc4_randrekey(NULL);
arc4_initialized = 1;
}
/*
* Generate a random byte.
*/
static inline u_int8_t
arc4_randbyte(void)
{
u_int8_t arc4_t;
arc4_i = (arc4_i + 1) % 256;
arc4_j = (arc4_j + arc4_sbox[arc4_i]) % 256;
arc4_swap(&arc4_sbox[arc4_i], &arc4_sbox[arc4_j]);
arc4_t = (arc4_sbox[arc4_i] + arc4_sbox[arc4_j]) % 256;
return arc4_sbox[arc4_t];
}
static inline void
arc4randbytes_unlocked(void *p, size_t len)
{
u_int8_t *buf = (u_int8_t *)p;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; buf[i] = arc4_randbyte(), i++)
continue;
}
void
_arc4randbytes(void *p, size_t len)
{
/* Initialize array if needed. */
if (!arc4_initialized) {
arc4_init();
/* avoid conditionalizing locking */
return arc4randbytes_unlocked(p, len);
}
mutex_spin_enter(&arc4_mtx);
arc4randbytes_unlocked(p, len);
arc4_numbytes += len;
mutex_spin_exit(&arc4_mtx);
if ((arc4_numbytes > ARC4_MAXBYTES) ||
(time_uptime > arc4_nextreseed)) {
arc4_randrekey(NULL);
}
}
u_int32_t
_arc4random(void)
{
u_int32_t ret;
u_int8_t *retc;
retc = (u_int8_t *)&ret;
_arc4randbytes(retc, sizeof(u_int32_t));
return ret;
}